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Chronicling a Movement:
20 Years of Lesbian/Gay Law Notes
Arthur S. Leonard

In the early months of 1978, when I was just starting out in law
practice, I placed a "personals" advertisement in the Village Voice,
announcing an attempt to start an organization for gay lawyers in
New York. I received enough responses to call a meeting in my
apartment in March, which drew ten people, of whom about half
were lawyers. We continued to meet informally once a month, with
numbers growing through word of mouth and occasional notices I
would place in the New York Law Journal, under the name "New
York Law Group." I sent a monthly meeting notice to everybody
on the mailing list and during 1979 began to add brief news items
about legal developments that came to my attention. By January
1980, I was calling the monthly newsletter "New York Law Group
Notes." This was produced on my portable electric typewriter at
home, consisted of equal parts organizational announcements and
legal news, and fit on two sides of a sheet of paper.
Before long, the amount of legal news was taking up most of
the monthly mailing. When the Law Group was incorporated as
"Bar Association for Human Rights of Greater New York" in 1984,
the organization renamed the publication "Lesbian/Gay Law
Notes" beginning with the June issue, and the purely organizational
announcements (calendar of events, committee news, and the like)
was spun off into a separate newsletter. A typical issue then was
four pages, word-processed at New York Law School (whose
faculty I joined beginning with the Fall 1982 Term), with a supplement included, most months, summarizing the criminal laws affecting gay sex in one of the states. This state law project had been
started late in 1983 by Daniel W. Meyer, a retired attorney who
was interested in contributing some original research to the lesbian
and gay legal movement, and who was directed to me by Abby
Rubenfeld, Lambda Legal Defense Fund's first full-time staff attorney. Mr. Meyer, since deceased, stuck with the project through
thick and thin, completing analyses of the sex crimes laws in all the
states over a period of about seven years. (He was the uncle of Carlin Meyer, who is now a professor at New York Law School.) Be-
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ginning in 1986, I began to compile an annual table of all the cases
cited in Law Notes, which we distributed to any subscriber who requested it at year's end.
When the AIDS epidemic began to generate its own legal stories, I decided to report them together with the lesbian and gay
legal news. Many of the early cases involved gay litigants, and even
those that did not appear likely to generate precedents that would
be important for gay litigants and lawyers. Soon AIDS legal news
was taking up a major part of each issue, and remains a significant
portion of the monthly Law Notes. As the AIDS legal news peaked
in the early 1990's, I faced the question of whether to cut back on
AIDS coverage to focus only on cases that had a gay "angle;" but I
ultimately decided that all AIDS legal developments were of potential importance to the many lawyers who were reading Law Notes,
and we have continued to provide as full coverage of AIDS law as
possible. The first mention of AIDS was in the May 1983 issue,
which reported the first public acknowledgment of the epidemic by
then-Mayor Edward I. Koch (many would argue at least two years
too late). The first substantive legal report on AIDS came in the
July 1983 issue, noting that the City Human Rights Commission was
accepting AIDS discrimination charges under its jurisdiction over
instances of discrimination on the basis of "physical handicap or
disability."
Law Notes readers must have been startled to receive the August 1988 issue, having become accustomed to the dot matrix
printer from my office computer and suddenly being confronted
with beautiful Times Roman typeface and bold headlines. This was
the first issue formatted by my partner, Tim Nenno, who had recently taken a new job in the publishing industry and offered to
provide a more professional look for the newsletter. The next format innovation came with the November 1988 issue, when Tim introduced columns to make the thick paragraphs of text more
readable. The last issue of 1988 featured six pages of two-column
text, plus Dan Meyer's state law summary for Nevada. As we attempted to save on postage costs, Tim began shrinking the typeface and went to three columns of text with the Summer 1989 issue.
In 1991, the Bar Association for Human Rights hired its first
office worker, Florence Oser, who took over the responsibility for
circulation of the monthly newsletter. Prior to that time, I had handled circulation, doing the mailings from my home in the early
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years, then holding a monthly "mailing party" in the old faculty library at New York Law School with a hardy band of volunteers
who loyally appeared the first Monday evening of each month to
help collate the pages, fold, stuff and seal. Florence Oser's name
first appeared on the masthead as Circulation Manager in June
1991. Subsequent circulation managers employed by the Association were Audrey Hartmann, from 1992 to 1995, and Daniel Schaffer, who took over the task in the summer of 1995.
Another important change took place on the masthead of Law
Notes with the October 1991 issue. The "bar association that dare
not speak its name," as the Bar Association for Human Rights was
known among some of its more activist members, had voted to
come fully out of the closet, and the publisher of the newsletter was
identified for the first time that month as the Lesbian and Gay Law
Association of Greater New York (LeGaL). After LeGaL formed
an educational non-profit foundation under section 501(c)(3) of the
federal tax laws as an umbrella organization of its public education
and public service activities, the LeGaL Foundation became the
publisher of Law Notes.
The March 1992 masthead carried, for the first time, the name
of a contributing writer, Colin Crawford, then a writing instructor at
Brooklyn Law School, who was joined early in 1993 by Todd V.
Lamb, then a New York Law School student who was my student
research assistant for 1993-94. Beginning in October 1993, Paula
Ettelbrick, then on the staff of the National Center for Lesbian
Rights (and previously Lambda Legal Defense Fund's Legal Director), and Dirk Williams, then a student at Northeastern Law
School, began writing for Law Notes. Many other contributing
writers have come and gone over the years since then, including
several of my student research assistants at New York Law School,
some of whom continued to contribute after graduation. All of the
contributing writers are listed below. Most of the contributors write
about one case for each monthly issue, and I write the balance,
which remains the majority of the newsletter. For a few years in the
mid-1990's, Colin Crawford participated as a contributing editor,
supervising the contributions of numerous Brooklyn Law School
students. During the early years of contributing writers, they were
identified by their initials after their articles and listed on the masthead. More recently, all contributors' full names have been listed
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after their articles, but I have continued to use my initials for my
contributions.
The next major development in the history of Law Notes was
sparked by reader reaction to my report of the trial court decision
in Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 599 N.Y.S.2d 377 (N.Y.Fam.Ct. Apr. 13,
1993), rev'd, 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept., Nov. 17, 1994), a
dispute between a gay male sperm donor and a lesbian couple over
visitation by the donor with the child who had been conceived using
his donated sperm. The Law Notes report, headlined "Judge Denies Parental Standing to Gay Sperm Donor," 1993 Lesbian/Gay
Law Notes 33 (May), was based on the trial judge's opinion, as published in the New York Law Journal,the Law Journal'sstory about
the case, and an article in The New York Times in which the attorneys in the case were interviewed. The lesbian and gay community
(and especially the lesbian and gay legal community) was sharply
split about the court's handling of the case. The trial judge had
concluded that the sperm donor's visitation petition should be denied, in an opinion that recognized the family unit of the lesbian
couple with their children and concluded that it would not be in the
child's best interest to order visitation in light of the circumstances
of the case. I attempted to provide a balanced report, noting how
the opinion might be considered progressive by some and conservative by others.
My article caused the first real controversy in the Law Notes'
history, resulting in a stream of letters to the editor (which we
printed and distributed with ensuing issues), a resolution by the
board of LeGaL that each issue of the Law Notes should carry a
disclaimer that views stated in the newsletter were not necessarily
those of the organization, and a suggestion that the publication
would benefit from more voices. Those who approved of the
court's decision felt that I had presented the case from the perspective of the defeated sperm donor, as a "defeat," whereas they
viewed the opinion as a "victory" for its recognition of the lesbian
family and its insistence on preserving the terms of the original, unwritten agreement between the sperm donor and the women, under
which he agreed not to assert parental rights. The tone of the letters indicated that some writers, who considered the Law Notes to
be "their" publication and, in some sense, the official record of gay
law, felt betrayed by a depiction of the case that did not treat the
opinion as an unalloyed victory. I.leave it to readers of the article
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to draw their own conclusions on that score. In the selection of
materials from Law Notes that follows, I have included the original
article and some selections from the letters.
Law Notes debuted in cyberspace in January 1996, when the
Queer Resources Directory (www.qrd.org), administered by Ron
Buckmire of the Occidental College Mathematics Department, began to archive Law Notes issues and our website address appeared
for the first time on the masthead in February 1996. We uploaded
several years of back-issues (and case tables) to the archive, and
each monthly issued is now added as it is published.
The sheer volume of lesbian and gay legal news today, compared to 1980, is truly extraordinary. During 1999, the eleven issues
of Law Notes totaled 200 pages, an average of 18 pages per issue,
and the total for 2000 appears likely to surpass that. Today, Law
Notes is read by the members of seven lesbian and gay bar associations and several hundred individual subscribers, some of whom receive it by direct email transmission from the LeGaL Foundation,
as well as thousands each month who access the website. More
than a hundred Law School libraries subscribe to Law Notes, and it
is frequently cited in law review articles as a source of information
on litigation, legislation, and otherwise unpublished decisions.
CONTRIBUTING WRITERS TO LESBIAN/GAY LAW NOTES

Eva G. Anthony, Monica Barrett, Robert Bourguignon, David
Buchanan, Elaine Chapnik, Ian Chesir-Teran, Colin Crawford, Otis
R. Damslet, Leslie S. Deutsch, Paula L. Ettelbrick, Klayton Fennell, Philip Friedman, E. Terry Giuliano, Carolyn Grose, Patrick J.
Henigan, Julia Herd, Kevin Isom, Courtney Joslin, Steven Kolodny,
Todd V. Lamb, Mary Ann LeFort, Ross D. Levi, Arthur L. Levy,
Mark Major, Sharon McGowan, Daniel W. Meyer, William M.
"Barnaby" Millard, Robin Miller, David Pumo, Clarice B. Rabinowitz, Seth M. Rosen, K. Jacob Ruppert, Kenneth Rutman, Michael
Shay Ryan, Daniel R Schaffer, Mark N. Sperber, Angela Thompson, Paul R. Twarog, Helen Ullrich, Kees Waldijk, Charles Wertheimer, Dirk Williams, Robert Wintemute, Leo L. Wong
SELECTIONS FROM LESBIAN/GAY LAW NOTES

The following selections are taken from Lesbian/Gay Law
Notes and its predecessor publication, Law Group Notes. Some ar-
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ticles have been abbreviated. Bracketed material, providing citations, identifications of writers and others, has been added. This
selection does not include every case of significance reported over
the past twenty years. It is intended to give the flavor of the times

and show how Law Notes reported some of the major landmark
decisions and other legally significant events. During the first few
years, many reports were only a few sentences long, and headlines
did not start to appear until the 1981 issues. I wrote all of the articles until the advent of contributing writers in 1992, and their contributions are noted below. To avoid culture-shock for regular Law
Notes readers, the material is arranged in columns with small print!
January 1980: The U.S. Justice Department has advised the immigration service that it must continue to enforce the
legal exclusion of gay people from the
U.S., despite the Public Health Service's refusal to examine people for
"homosexual tendencies."
February 1980: The February issue reproduced an article from the New York
Times, dateline February 1, reporting
that the New York Appellate Division,
4th Department, had ruled the previous
week that the New York Sodomy Law
was unconstitutional, and that the Onondaga County District Attorney had
"tentatively" decided to appeal to the
New York Court of Appeals. The full
text of the decision, taken from the
New York Law Journal, was reproduced in the newsletter. [People v.
Onofre, 72 App. Div. 2d 268, 424
N.Y.S.2d 566 (1980), aff'd, 51 N.Y.2d
476, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 415 N.E.2d 936
(1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987
(1981).]
April 1980: The Bar Association [Association of the Bar of the City of New
York] forum on gay rights was well attended, but the message of the speakers
was mainly negative. In summary, they
commented as follows: Ted Weiss [U.S.
Congressman]: A federal gay rights bill
cannot be passed in the near future. A
new generation of Congresspeople will
be necessary. Richard Gottfried [State

Assemblyman]: Less pessimistic than
Weiss, but feels the state legislature is
not ready to confront the gay rights issue openly. Jane Trichter [City Council
member]: The current racist, sexist,
homophobic power structure of this city
will not allow enactment of a city gay
rights bill. Cary Boggan [Lambda Legal Defense Fund co-founder and
board member]: The trend of recent
court and administrative decisions is
positive. All of the speakers emphasized the need for the gay community
to get better organized for political
action.
June 1980: The U.S. District Court in
Milwaukee has held unconstitutional
the Army's regulation requiring immediate separation of gays from the service. In striking down Regulation 135178, Judge Terrance Evans issued a writ
of mandamus ordering the Army to restore Miriam Ben Shalom to her place
in the 84th Army Reserve unit. The decision was limited, however, to the issue
of discharges based on status. The Regulation had required separation from
the service for any soldier "who evidences homosexual tendencies, desires,
or interests." Evans ruled that "constitutional privacy principles clearly protect one's sexual preferences in and of
themselves from governmental regulations." The decision was based on the
First, Fifth and Ninth Amendments.
[BenShalom v. Secretary of the Army,
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489 F.Supp. 964 (E.D.Wis. 1980), settlement enforced, 826 F.2d 722 (7th Cir.
1987).]
September 1980: Lesbian activist Rosemary Dempsey, of Trenton, New
Jersey, a Rutgers Law student who has
lived with her lover for five years, was
awarded custody of her two children by
Superior Court Judge William
D'Annunzio. The judge described the
home, which also included Dempsey's
lover's children, as "warm and loving,
though unconventional," and referred
to them as a family.
October 1980: On September 9, 1980,
Leonard Matlovich won an order reinstating him in the Air Force from Federal District Court Judge Gesell of the
U.S. District Court in D.C. Judge Gesell's opinion was given orally from the
bench, and thus will not appear in Federal Supplement, however it has been
published in BNA's Fair Employment
Practice Cases, Volume 23, page 1251.
Ruling on cross-motions for summary
judgment upon the remand from the
D.C. Court of Appeals, Judge Gesell
commented that it was "apparent that
the Air Force, either through a total
breakdown in its own communications
or by an intentional trifling with the legal process, has misled two courts and
confused the issues in this long, drawnout case." He noted that "the Air force
not only misrepresented the standards
which had been applied in the past,
but... is totally unable in any way to
clarify or explicate its position either
generally or as applicable to Plaintiff
Matlovich." Judge Gesell concluded
that, because the Air Force was unable
to articulate "standards which can be
evenly, fairly and objectively sustained
and applied throughout the Air Force
command," the discharge of Matlovich
must be held improper. . . The Air
Force has announced that it will appeal
the decision to the Court of Appeals.
November 1980: NYC Criminal Court
Judge Herman Klarsfield recently made
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history by ruling that sexual preference
cannot be the cause for excluding a juror. The issue arose in the trial of "gaybashers" who were arrested for assaults
in Greenwich Village last December.
The defense lawyer asked for exclusion
of a potential juror who said he was
gay. The judge filed a decision on his
ruling against the motion, stating: "Certainly there is no doubt that homosexuals comprise a significant segment of
our population (the National Gay Task
Force estimates that 800,000 persons in
New York City are homosexual) and
that they are as diverse in their opinions as their numbers. To say that this
entire group of citizens who may be
otherwise qualified, would be unable to
sit as impartial jurors in this case,
merely because of their homosexuality,
is tantamount to a denial of equal protection under the United States Constitution." The juror was excluded
anyway, however, when the defense
lawyer decided to use his last peremptory challenge to strike him from the
panel. [People v. Viggiani, 431 N.Y.S.2d
979 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. 1980).]
December 1980: The U.S. Army has
settled a civil lawsuit brought by a former employee of GTE Sylvania, Warren Preston, on the basis that the Army
will grant Preston a security clearance
and will rewrite its regulations so that
gays will not automatically be denied
such clearances. Preston, who lost his
job when a clearance was denied, will
also receive a $10,000 settlement. A
historic journalistic first: The NY
Times, in reporting on the case, ran the
following headline: "Army Allows
Clearances to Gays" (November 16,
1980). The Times did not enclose the
word "Gays" in quotation marks. Is
the Gray Lady coming around? [The
comment was premature. This was a
slip-up by the Times from its style manual requirements, and the newspaper
did not begin to use the word "gay" to
refer to lesbians and gay men, apart
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from its use in quotations, until much
later in the 1980's.]
January 1981: N.Y. SODOMY LAW
STRICKEN BY N.Y.C.A., 5-2! In a
historic 5-2 decision, the New York
Court of Appeals declared Penal Law
sec. 130.38 (which forbids consensual
adult sodomy) unconstitutional on December 18, 1980. The majority decision
by Judge Hugh Jones... is based on alternative grounds of privacy and equal
protection developed under the federal
constitution. Significantly, the decision
does not mention the state constitution
and is based solely on analysis of federal precedents. Jones' decision gained
the concurrence of three other judges,
giving it the support of an absolute majority of the court. Judge Jasen concurred in the result in a separate
opinion based solely on equal protection. Judge Gabrielli dissented in an
opinion joined by Chief Judge Cooke.
[This summary was followed by excerpts from the opinions. People v.
Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 434 N.Y.S.2d
947, 415 N.E.2d 936 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).]
February 1981: LAW GROUP MEMBER SCORES BIG WIN IN GAY
ADOPTION CASE; ONOFRE
CITED! Law Group member Michael
Lavery achieved a new breakthrough in
gay rights litigation, winning a decision
from Family Court Judge Deutsch in
Manhattan that adult gays can adopt
each other to create a legal basis for
their gay relationship. The decision in
Matter of Adult Anonymous was published in the New York Law Journal on
February 3, 1981. The court received a
petition from a 22-year-old man, seeking to adopt his 26-year-old lover. The
22-year-old's mother had recently died,
and the couple felt that had they
adopted reversed roles (the 26-year-old
adopting the 22-year-old), the younger
man might have had trouble collecting
from the estate of his mother, who died
intestate. Judge Deutsch held that, as
both of the individuals involved were
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adults, New York law did not require a
best interest of the child analysis, which
is usually applied in adoption cases involving minors. Rather, Deutsch held
that the only test posed by the law was
whether the proposed adoption would
violate any public policy. Noting that
the couple was proposing to give a legal
context to a homosexual relationship,
the Judge found that the recent Court
of Appeals decision in People v.
Onofre, overturning the state's ban of
consensual adult sodomy, had removed
any argument that there was a public
policy against such a relationship. [In re
Adult Anonymous, 435 N.Y.S.2d 527
(Fam. Ct., Kings Co. 1981).]
May 1981: FOURTH CIRCUIT RECOGNIZES RIGHTS OF GAY CITIZENSHIP: The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled on April 27 in the case of
Horst Nemetz that a gay immigrant
cannot be denied U.S. citizenship on
the basis of his sexuality. The Federal
District Court had found that Nemetz,
who openly revealed his sexuality and
his longstanding relationship with a
lover, did not meet the requirement for
good moral character. The Fourth Circuit stated that his "homosexual activity
cannot serve as the basis for a denial of
a finding of good moral character because it has been purely private, consensual and without harm to the
public." [Nemetz v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 647 F.2d 432
(4th Cir. 1981).]
June 1981: Several sources report that
Parkman Realty Company has sent
eviction notices to 7 gay couples living
in an apartment house in Greenwich
Village, with the rationale being that
the lease was violated because only one
member of each couple had signed the
lease. Also, it was reported that two
straight couples had received similar
notices. According to the Advocate,
one of those evicted is New York
Human Rights Commissioner David
Rothenberg. [This was the first glimmering of an issue that ultimately led to
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passage of the N.Y. Roommate Law, allowing tenants to have unrelated
roommates.]
October 1981: The Buffalo Mattachine
Society has filed a lawsuit challenging
the New York State loitering law, which
has been used by police around the
state to prosecute gay people. Although consensual sodomy is now legal
when engaged in privately, it remains
"illegal" to stand around for the purpose of finding a consenting adult with
which [sic] to do it! The lawsuit, a
class-action on behalf of all gay people
in the state, is also challenging the use
of police entrapment and surveillance
techniques against gays.
November 1981: A federal district court
has held that sexual orientation is not a
basis for firing a teacher. On October
23, a federal jury awarded $40,000 in
back-pay to Marjorie Rowland after
U.S. Magistrate Robert Steinberg of
the federal court in Dayton, Ohio,
ruled that a local school district had violated her rights to freedom of speech
and equal protection of the laws. This
was the end of a long chain of litigation
involving two district court dismissals,
two decisions from the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals, and finally a trial
before Magistrate Steinberg. [Unfortunately, this was not the end of the case.
The school board appealed again, and
the Sixth Circuit reversed the verdict,
with the Supreme Court denying certiorari over a dissent by Justices Brennan
and Marshall. Rowland v. Mad River
Local School District, 730 F.2d 444 (6th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1009
(1985).]
December 1981: Wisconsin state assembly has approved a state-wide gay rights
bill; favorable action on the nation's

first such legislation is expected soon in
the state senate.
January 1982: Finally, an arbitration decision is reported holding that off-duty
homosexual conduct is not just cause
for discharge under a standard union
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contract. In Ralph's Grocery Co., 77
BNA Lab. Arb. 867 (Kaufman, Arb.,
1981), Arbitrator Walter Kaufman vacated the "constructive discharge" of a
gay supermarket employee who had
been forced out of his job after he
hosted a "wild" party at which some
other employees, both gay and straight,
had been present. Noted the Arbitrator: "As already noted, an employee's
conduct when the employee is off duty
and off company property is beyond
the employer's disciplinary reach under
the collective bargaining agreement,
unless the conduct adversely affects the
operation of the business. That must be
no less true for homosexual than heterosexual conduct. Moreover, the employer has the burden of proving any
such adverse effects. Management's
disapproval alone does not satisfy the
contractual standard of 'good cause."'
The Arbitrator found that nobody who
had attended the party had registered
any complaints with the employer, and
that allegations about employees complaining about having to work with gays
were unfounded. The Arbitrator ordered the employee to be reinstated
with back pay and no loss of seniority.
February 1982: A hearing last week on
the national gay civil rights bill (HR
1454) held in Washington brought
waves of positive testimony and a dramatic "coming out" by Syracuse University Law School Dean Craig
Christenson. However, chances of the
bill passing in this Congress are rated as
dim. The bill now has 52 sponsors, including one new addition of a formerly
anti-gay representative who has bowed
to heavy constituent pressure to endorse the bill, organized by local operatives of the Gay Rights National Lobby
in his district. [Note: Dean Christenson
subsequently served as President of the
Law School Admission Council, was a
visiting professor for a time at New
York Law School, and is now a professor at Southwestern University School
of Law. He has the distinction of being
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the first openly-gay dean of an accredited U.S. law school.]
March 1982: Your blood will boil when
you read Childers v. Dallas Police Department, 513 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Tex.
1981), in which the court upheld the refusal of the Dallas Police Department
to hire a gay man as a storeroom clerk.
The man had been employed for several years as a clerk by the city government, had an outstanding record, and
had achieved the highest score on the
competitive civil service exam for the
storeroom clerk position. However, in
his interview, it came out that he was a
deacon of Metropolitan Community
Church, had marched in gay rights
demonstrations, and lived with his male
lover. On that basis, the Department
refused to hire him. The court upheld
this refusal, noting that consensual sodomy was a crime in Texas and that the
Police Department had a right to bar a
habitual criminal offender from a sensitive position as a storeroom clerk. The
court's decision is full of the sorts of
gratuitous slurs against gays which reveal a blatant bias, such as the assumption that a gay person could not be
trusted to handle responsibly evidence
seized by the police in gay-related
cases, and would probably leak information about planned raids on gay establishments.
A truly disgusting
performance by the court!
April 1982: Law Group member Steven
Weinstock was successful in helping an
openly gay client obtain U.S. citizenship recently. The client had stated in
his application that his draft status was
4F and, when questioned at his interview, said it was because he was gay.
He also stated, in response to questioning, that he engages in gay acts. The examiner, astounded by this novel
"admission," accepted the case under
advisement. When Steve brought to his
attention the Fourth Circuit decision in
Nemetz v. INS, holding that commission of gay acts on a private consensual
basis could not serve as grounds for a
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lack of good moral character (the pertinent legal standard), the application for
citizenship was approved. The moral of
the story: every gay immigration lawyer
should carry around a copy of the Nemetz decision!
June 1982: The big news this month is
the stunning victory won by Gay Rights
Advocates (SF) in the Carl Hill immigration case. District Judge Aguilar
(N.D. Ca.) held that the Immigration
Service may not ignore its own rules
and guidelines with respect to psychological testing and diagnosis. Because
the U.S. Public Health Service has refused to certify gays as "psychopathic"
since 1979, the Immigration Service
thus is precluded from excluding gays
from the U.S. on statutory grounds of
"psychopathic personality." However,
as gay columnist Larry Bush notes in
The Advocate, the State Department
continues to discriminate in the issuance of visas overseas; consequently,
the Hill decision is not the final word in
the battle to end U.S. immigration discrimination against gays. It is expected
that the government will appeal the
April 22 decision to the 9th Circuit.
[The government did appeal, and lost.
Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day Committee,
Inc. v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 541 F. Supp. 569 (N.D.
Cal. 1982), aff'd in part, vacated in part,
sub nom. Hill v. U.S. Immigration &
Naturalization Service, 714 F.2d 1470
(9th Circ. 1983).]
June 1982: Law Group member Henry
Weiss recently negotiated a cooperative
agreement with the National Park Service covering some property on Fire Island which contains a nondiscrimination clause with respect to
use of the property based on "race,
creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, or
national origin." Henry comments:
"Since this is believed to be one of the
first coop agreements of its kind between a not-for-profit organization and
the Park Service, we are hopeful that it
will serve as a prototype and that the
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"sexual orientation" language will
sneak into other agreements." [Henry
Weiss was a pioneer in the field of lesbian and gay estates and trusts law. Although he subsequently died from
AIDS, his legacy continues in the Manhattan law firm of Weiss, Buell and
Bell.]
September 1982: Constitutional Rights:
A federal district court has held for the
first time that a state sodomy law violates the United States Constitution.
Ruling on August 17 in Baker v. Wade,
District Judge Jerry Buckmeyer held
that the Texas law against sodomy, one
of the harshest in the nation in terms of
penalties, violated both the right of privacy and the equal protection clause.
In a 53-page opinion characterized by
several sources as "wide ranging" in
scope, the judge noted that there was
no rational basis for such legislation,
and that moral indignation on the part
of conservative legislators was not a
justification for invading constitutional
rights. It is expected that Texas will appeal the decision to the Fifth Circuit.
[The state of Texas did not appeal, but a
local prosecutor did and won a reversal
by the en banc 5th Circuit, which was
more impressed by moral indignation
than was Judge Buchmeyer. The Supreme Court refused to review the case.
Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121
(N.D.Tex. 1982), reversed en banc, 769
F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
478 U.S. 1022 (1986). After this report
was published, we were contacted by
Dr. Arthur Warner of Princeton, New
Jersey, who had served, under the pseudonym of "Austin Wade" as the legal
committee chair of the Mattachine Society in New York during the 1960's and
co-chaired the National Committee for
Sexual Civil Liberties. Dr. Warner advised us of a prior federal court ruling
finding an earlier version of the Texas
sodomy law unconstitutional.
Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp.
729 (N.D. Tex.), vacated on jurisdictional grounds, 401 U.S. 989 (1971).
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This was the first time a letter to Law
Notes sparked a correction in a subsequent issue of the newsletter. Dr.
Warner, a retired college history professor who graduated from Harvard Law
School, became a frequent correspondent.]
February 1983: In U.S. v. Lemons, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit has declined the opportunity to declare the Arkansas sodomy law
unconstitutional. According to a report
in GCN [Gay Community News, a Boston-based newspaper], Lemons, who
was convicted in federal district court of
having oral sex in a public lavatory in
Hot Springs National Park, was held by
the court to lack standing to assert a
constitutionally based privacy argument, on the ground that he engaged in
sodomy in a public place. However, the
GCN report notes that the majority
opinion of the court broadly hints that
the court might strike down the law in a
case involving purely private acts. Senior Judge Henley, dissenting, argued
that the law exists only to discriminate
against gays, and thus does not fulfill a
legitimate government interest. Consequently, it should be struck down as a
violation of equal protection of the laws
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
[U.S. v. Lemons, 697 F.2d 832 (8th Cir.
1983).]
March 1983: NYCA RULES GAY SOLICITATION LAW UNCONSTITUTIONAL: On 2/23/83, the New York
Court of Appeals issued it decision in
People v. Uplinger, holding unconstitutional N.Y. Penal Law sec. 240.35(3),
which prohibits "loitering in a public
place for the purpose of engaging or
soliciting another person to engage, in
deviate sexual intercourse or other sexual behavior of a deviate nature." In its
decision. . . the Court stated that this
statute was a companion statute to the
consensual sodomy law, which had
been declared unconstitutional in People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476 (1981).
The vote was 6-1, with Judge Jasen ar-
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guing in dissent that the decision was an
inappropriate application of the "over
breadth" principle in equal protection
jurisprudence. Congratulations to lead
counsel Bill Gardner and the many
amicus groups who participated in this
great victory. [People v. Uplinger, 58
N.Y.2d 936 (1983), cert. dismissed as
improvidently granted, 476 U.S. 246
(1984).]
July 1983: Landlords won the battle in
Hudson View Properties v. Weiss, but
they definitely lost the war, as the decision was overturned by the state legislature in less than two months through
the vehicle of the biennial renewal of
the rent stabilization law. The new provisions allow tenants to have roommates without the approval of the
landlord, but also provide that the
roommates do not thereby gain any
independent rights to the apartment.
Similar legislation is pending in the
New York City Council, where Intro
No. 576 would amend the city's human
rights ordinance to make it unlawful for
a landlord to evict or attempt to evict a
tenant for taking in a roommate. If the
Intro passes, gay tenants will have two
different forums for enforcing their
rights to live with whom they please.
Most significantly, the city legislation
would specifically provide that a tenant
threatened with eviction could obtain
preliminary relief from a court once the
tenant had filed a complaint with the
City Commission on Human Rights. [In
Hudson View Properties v. Weiss, 59
N.Y.2d 733 (1983), reported in Law
Notes in June 1983, the Court of Appeals held that taking in an unrelated
roommate was a substantial violation of
a lease term limiting occupancy to family members of a tenant, and that the
landlord was not unlawfully discriminating on the basis of marital status by
seeking to evict the tenant. As noted
above, the decision provoked an immediate legislative reversal.]
September 1983: AIDS AND THE
LAW: This is the summer that AIDS
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became a legal as well as a medical issue. As the following news items indicate, the AIDS epidemic has important
implications for the legal rights of gays
which will require gay attorneys to acquire a new sophistication in previously
unexplored fields of law, such as handicap/disability discrimination. LaRocca
v. Dalsheim, NYU, 8/12/83 (S.Ct.,
Dutchess Co., Rosenblatt, J.), is apparently the first court decision to deal
with many issues which are common to
AIDS-discrimination cases. In LaRocca, inmates of a New York state
prison sued the prison, alleging that
they were being endangered by the
presence of prisoners with AIDS and
asking that all such prisoners be removed. The prisoners also requested
that they not be assigned maintenance
work in the prison clinic where prisoners with AIDS had been housed, and
that all incoming prisoners be screened
for AIDS and diverted if evidence of
the disease was found. The court dismissed the suit in a scholarly decision
which made reference to the medical
literature and expert testimony on
AIDS. The court concluded that "current medical evidence. . . supports the
view that AIDS is not communicable
by means other than sexual contact or
through blood." The court also noted
statements of public health officials that
AIDS was not spread by casual contact.
This decision will be important in dealing with recalcitrant employers or
others who seek to isolate or exclude
people with AIDS from employment,
housing, public accommodations or
government services. [LaRocca v. Dalsheim, 467 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup.Ct.,
Dutchess Co. 1983). The trial judge,
Albert M. Rosenblatt, went on to a distinguished career as an appellate judge
in New York State.]
October 1983: AIDS DISCRIMINATION; THE CONTINUING BATTLE
GOES PUBLIC: Cases involving discrimination based on AIDS continue to
occur, and the NYLG's Pro Bono Panel
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and Lambda Legal Defense Fund have
become involved with several interesting cases. In the first major public litigation in NY, the State Attorney
General and Lambda have gone to
court to stay the eviction of a gay doctor, Joseph Sonnabend, who was refused a lease renewal for his office by
the board of the co-op building in
which his office is located. The board
specifically refused to renew the lease
because Sonnabend treats people with
AIDS. Charges filed with the State Division of Human Rights form the basis
for a temporary restraining order which
was obtained in State Supreme Court
on September 30, to prevent the October 1 eviction of the doctor. The rather
novel legal theory underlying the case
is that the doctor's office is a public accommodation, thus covered by the
Human Rights Law's provisions against
discrimination on the basis of physical
disability. In another case filed with
State Division of Human Rights, a major airline has agreed to return a gay
male flight attendant to active duty after having suspended him when he developed swollen glands. The same
airline has been the subject of several
such charges of discrimination, and is
being sued by another flight attendant
on the West Coast. A group of volunteers from the NYLG panel is working
on some cases in which health insurance companies have canceled the
health insurance policies of gay men
who have developed AIDS. The insurers claim that the policy-holders had
failed to disclose various physical conditions at the time they applied for insurance, thus giving the companies the
right to cancel their policies. The gay
men claim that disclosures were made
to the extent that the men had knowledge of their conditions at the time of
the applications. The legal questions
involved are novel, and NYLG members who may be knowledgeable about
insurance law could provide a great service by contacting the administrator of
the panel, Steve Gittleson, to provide
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assistance. [Note: The NYLG pro bono
panel was largely absorbed into the legal department of Gay Men's Health
Crisis when GMHC agreed, after some
resistance, to start that department.
Steve Gittleson became the first director of Legal Services at GMHC in

1984.]
November 1983: BOY SCOUTS
CAN'T DISCRIMINATE AGAINST
GAYS: The Second California District
Court of Appeals has ruled in Curran v.
Mt. Diablo Council of Boy Scouts of
America, 2-Civ.-66755 (10/3/83), that
the Boy Scouts may not exclude an otherwise qualified adult from working as
a Scouts volunteer leader, based on a
"common law right of fair procedure"
and the California Unruh Civil Rights
Act. The court commented: "We have
determined that using the status of homosexuality as a basis of expulsion is
substantively arbitrary and therefore violative of the common law right of fair
procedure." The unanimous threejudge panel reversed a trial court ruling
and stated that the Boy Scouts would
have to show a rational connection between homosexual conduct and "any
significant danger of harm to the association resulting from the continued
membership of the homosexual person" in order to prevail at trial. [Here is
an ironic news item, in light of recent
events. The Curran case kicked around
the California court system for an unconscionable period of time before ultimately resulting in a ruling by the
California Supreme Court that the Boy
Scouts of America is not covered as a
public accommodation under the Unruh Civil Rights Act. Curran v. Mount
Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of
America, 952 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1998).]
December 1983: NY GOVERNOR ISSUES NARROW PRO-GAY EXECUTIVE ORDER: After almost eleven
months of delay and frustration for the
gay community, NY Governor Mario
Cuomo issued Executive Order No. 28
on November 18, fulfilling pledges
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made in his primary and general election campaigns last year. The Order,
which includes a defensive preamble
seeking to placate opponents of gay
rights, orders all state agencies not to
discriminate against gay people with respect to employment or provision of
services. A Task Force is established to
make reports and recommendations
with respect to employment or provision of state services to the gay community. The state Office of Employment
Relations is directed to "promulgate
clear and consistent guidelines prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation." Conspicuously absent from
the Order is any requirement for contractors of the state to comply with the
anti-discrimination policy. Aides to the
Governor have sought to justify the
omission by citing to a mid-1970's NY
Court of Appeals decision voiding a
state executive order which required
contractors to establish affirmative action programs. Gay activists are taking
steps to document the constitutionality
of extending the Order to state
contractors.
January 1984: GAY LAW PROFESSORS TO MEET AT ANNUAL LAW
SCHOOLS CONVENTION IN SAN
FRANCISCO: The first official meeting of the American Association of
Law Schools Section on Gay and Lesbian Legal Issues will be held at the annual AALS meeting in San Francisco
during the first week of January. The
section will present a program on "The
Right of Privacy after Baker v. Wade;"
with Jim Barber, Baker's attorney, as
speaker. A panel of commentators will
include Professor Kenneth Karst and
David Richards and attorney Mary
Dunlap. Prof. Rhonda Rivera of Ohio
State University Law School has
headed the section through its formative year, and Dean Craig Christensen
of Syracuse University Law School will
be leading the Section for 1984.
March 1984: NON-PROFIT INCORPORATION DENIED GAY

[Vol. XVII

GROUPS BY MISSISSIPPI ATTORNEY GENERAL: The Mississippi Gay
Alliance and a Mississippi chapter of
Parents & Friends of Lesbians and
Gays have been denied non-profit corporate status by the state's Attorney
General. In a letter to the two groups
explaining refusal to approve their corporate charters, Assistant AG Richard
Allen cited the Mississippi sodomy law
and stated: "For the state of Mississippi
to approve a non-profit corporate charter of the type you submit would ostensibly give official legal status to an
organization dedicated on its face to
subverting this criminal statute." The
two groups were planning to submit a
third corporate charter for approval
during February, using the name "Mississippi Alliance for Human Rights."
The charters already submitted were
described as using language similar to
that in approved charters of other nonprofit organizations, with nothing but
their names giving any indication that
they were "gay organizations." A
spokesperson for both groups noted
that Metropolitan Community Church
was able to obtain approval for a corporate charter in Mississippi, and was
hopeful that a name change on the submitted charter would be sufficient to
get state approval.
May 1984: In Korf v. Ball State University, 726 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1984), the
court upheld the discharge of a gay university music, professor who was
charged with trading grades for sex
with his male students. The professor
argued that professor who carried on
with students of the opposite sex were
not subjected to discharge, but he was
unable to refute the evidence that he
had apparently enticed students with
promises of academic rewards and
could not cite any actual instance of the
same conduct by a heterosexual teacher
at Ball State. The court held that
neither his constitutional rights nor his
employment contract (which incorporates by reference various professional
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ethical codes) were violated by the
discharge.
June 1984: LAW GROUP BECOMES
BAR ASSOCIATION FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS: After consultation by telephone among committee chairs and active members, the new name Bar
Association for Human Rights of
Greater New York (BAHR-GNY) was
selected at the beginning of May. New
incorporation papers were signed by Incorporator Arthur Leonard on May 3,
the charter was cleared by the NY State
Attorney General's Office on May 4,
the charter was approved by Justice
Jawn A. Sandifer of New York Supreme Court, New York County, on
May 7 (see NYU, 5/9/84, p.12, col.5
[Special Term, Part 2]), and was accepted for filing by the New York Department of State on May 14. We are
now official! On May 29, the Incorporator adopted the By-Laws which had
been approved in our general membership meetings, and appointed an interim Board to conduct business until
elections can be held. At its meeting on
May 29, the Interim Board approved
the change in name of the newsletter.
Details of organizational activity will be
reported in the BAHR Organizational
Report, which will be sent to members.
Henceforth, this newsletter will deal
with lesbian/gay legal news and will
mention BAHR developments when
they are relevant thereto. [This was the
first issue to appear under the name
"Lesbian/Gay Law Notes."]
June 1984: SUPREME COURT REFUSES TO RESOLVE IMMIGRATION SPLIT: On May 29, the U.S.
Supreme Court announced that it
would not grant review in the Longstaff
case, in which the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a gay man could not
become a United States citizen because
he was excludable under the Immigration laws. In denying certiorari, the
Court left in place a split in circuit authority, as the Ninth Circuit has recently held that gays are not excludable
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under the Immigration laws as currently written. While a denial of review
by the Court is not supposed to be interpreted as a decision on the merits, it
is feared that lower courts will interpret
the Court's action as approval of the
Fifth Circuit's position. [In re Longstaff,
538 F. Supp. 589 (N.D. Tex. 1982), aff'd,
716 F.2d 1439 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1219 (1984).]
Summer 1984: NEW YORK MAY
GET FIRST OPENLY GAY JUDGE:
Mayor Ed Koch has announced that,
pending Bar Association approval, he
will designate William Thom, a founder
and first president of Lambda Legal
Defense & Education Fund and a
prominent member of the gay legal
community, to serve on the Civil Court
in New York County for an interim
term expiring December 31, 1984. Bill
was reported favorably by the Independent Democratic Judicial Screening
Panel last month, and is presently
campaigning for the Democratic nomination for a full ten-year term on the
Civil Court from Manhattan's first judicial district (lower Manhattan and
Greenwich Village) with the endorsements of the Village Reform Democratic Club and the Gay & Lesbian
Independent Democratic Club. If
elected, he would become the first
openly-gay elected judge in the United
States. [Note: Thom was never successful in winning election to the Civil
Court in several tries, but he was appointed to a series of interim vacancies
by Mayor Koch.]
September 1984: FIFTH CIRCUIT
HOLDS FOR GAY STUDENTS,
AGAINST LESBIAN TEACHER: In
two recent decision, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has dealt
with the rights of gays on college campuses. In Gay Student Services v. Texas
A & M University, announced August
3, the court, consistent with precedents
in the First, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits,
held that the failure of the public university's administration to extend rec-
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ognition to the gay student organization
violated the students' First Amendment
rights of free speech and association.
However, just three days later, in
Naragon v. Wharton, a different panel
of the circuit, with one dissent, held
that Louisiana State University officials
had not violated First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights of a lesbian music
instructor when they assigned her to
non-teaching duties as a result of her
affair with an undergraduate student.
The student was above the age of consent and was not eligible for enrollment
in any course taught by the instructor.
The court found that the school's decision was not prompted by her homosexuality, but rather by the
unprofessionalism of her conduct. In
an angry dissent, Circuit Judge Irving
Goldberg asserted that the majority
was wearing blinders when it found that
sexual orientation was not an issue in
the case, noting testimony that heterosexual affairs between faculty and student had not provoked similar actions
by the administration, raising serious
equal protection issues. These two decisions are of particular interest to gay
court-watchers, since a panel of the
Fifth Circuit is still deliberating on the
constitutionality of the Texas sodomy
law, a fact which is footnoted in the
Gay Students decision. Neither decision gives any hint as to the outcome of
the pending case, but the unanimous
opinion in Texas A & M, the strong
Goldberg dissent in Naragon, and the
efforts of the Naragon majority to show
that her reassignment was not due to
her lesbianism, may auger well for the
imminent decision in Baker v. Wade.
[My tea leaves were flawed, alas. Gay
Student Services v. Texas A & M University, 737 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1984);
Naragon v. Wharton, 737 F.2d 1403
(5th Cir. 1984).]
October
SION IN
TLE: In
national

1984: LANDMARK DECILESBIAN CUSTODY BATa ruling which has drawn
attention, Alameda County
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(California) Superior Court Judge Demetrius Agretelis has ruled that Linda
Loftin, a lesbian, may seek visitation
rights with respect to the child of Mary
Flournoy, her lover, after the couple's
relationship has ended. The couple decided to have a child after being united
in a 1977 church ceremony. Loftin's
brother donated sperm so that
Flournoy could bear a child, who was
given the family name Loftin, with
Linda Loftin listed as the "father" on
the birth certificate. The couple split in
1980, with Loftin making voluntary
support payments for the child, but
Flournoy denied visitation rights to her.
The judge held that Loftin was a psychological parent of the child and entitled to seek visitation rights. The
director of a local sperm bank in Oakland stated that 40% of the recipients
of sperm were lesbians, mostly members of couples. The sperm bank advises such couples to make contracts
anticipating custody/support/visitation
issues. [This opinion was not published,
but I brought the case to the attention
of Prof. E. Donald Shapiro of New
York Law School, a leading scholar in
the field of medicine and law, and he
co-authored a law review article with
his student research assistant, quoting
extensively from the trial transcripts
and the unpublished decision of the
court. Prof. Shapiro, now retired, told
me this was his most frequently-cited
publication. E.D. Shapiro and S. Schultz, Single-Sex Families: The Impact of
Birth Innovations Upon Traditional
Family Notions, 24 J. Fam. L. 271 (1985-

86).]
February 1985: VIRGINIA SUPREME
COURT DENIES CUSTODY AND
VISITATION TO GAY FATHER: In a
unanimous decision issued January 18,
the Virginia Supreme Court held that a
ten year old girl who had been living
with her gay father and his lover with
"no adverse effect" under a trial court's
joint custody order must be given over
to the sole custody of the mother, with
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"a cassation of any visitations in the father's home, or in the presence of his
homosexual lover, while his present living arrangements continue." Roe v.
Roe, No. 832044 (Va. S. Ct., 1/18/85,
Opinion by Russell, J.). The court's
opinion does not discuss any expert testimony with respect to the best interests
of the child. It does note that the trial
court had conditioned partial custody
for the father on "the requirement that
he and his lover not share the same bed
or bedroom." The supreme court held
that the father's conduct in maintaining
a gay relationship in the presence of his
daughter "flies in the face of ... society's mores." Noting that the father's
relationship is "punishable as a class six
felony (Code Sec. 18.2-361) which is
prosecuted with considerable frequency
and vigor," the court termed the relationship "illicit" and intimated that adverse effects on the child could be
presumed, despite the trial court's finding to the contrary. This decision
shockingly illustrates the enormous
task facing the gay legal community in
educating the judiciary about homosexuality, for here is a decision poisoned
by mythology and prejudice about gays
and children. The decision also underscores the importance of sodomy law
reform, since the decision cites and relies upon the Virginia sodomy law.
[Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va.
1985).]
March 1985. ACLU TO HIRE FULLTIME GAY RIGHTS LAWYER: The
American Civil Liberties Union has
tentatively agreed to hire a full-time
lawyer to work on gay rights cases. The
lawyer will be based in ACLU national
headquarters in New York, and will
concentrate at first on sodomy-challenge litigation. The ACLU decision
grew out of a series of conferences coordinated by Lambda Legal Defense in
which gay rights lawyers from around
the country conferred on strategies for
attacking sodomy laws in the remaining
non-reform states. [Nan Hunter, now a
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professor at Brooklyn Law School, became the first director of the ACLU's
Lesbian and Gay Rights Project.]
April 1985: SUPREME COURT
ROUNDUP: BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY OF OKLAHOMA
CITY V. NGTF: The Court announced
on March 26 that the decision of the
10th Circuit Court of Appeals, holding
unconstitutional an Oklahoma statute
which authorized the discharge of public school teachers who spoke favorably
about homosexuality, would be affirmed by vote of an equally divided
court. Although the identities of the
justices on each side of the issue were
not revealed, observers speculated that
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun
and Stevens had voted to affirm and
Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, White
and Chief Justice Burger voted to reverse, with Justice Powell (who missed
the oral argument due to illness) abstaining. The announcement that three
other cases argued during Justice Powell's absence from the bench would be
set for reargument led some to speculate that Justice Powell agreed with the
result in the split vote affirming the
10th Circuit. Because there was no
written opinion for the court and no
clear majority, this decision has no formal precedential value, but it preserves
an important Circuit Court victory for
the political rights of gays and our supporters. [National Gay Task Force v.
Board of Education of the City of
Oklahoma City, 729 F.2d 1270 (10th
Cir. 1984), aff'd without opinion by
equally divided Court, 470 U.S. 903
(1985).]
June 1985: ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
HOLDS GAY SEX WITHIN CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY SPHERE:
In a 2-1 panel decision announced May
21, 1985, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Atlanta, Georgia, has held that "the Georgia sodomy statute implicates a
fundamental right of [plaintiff] Michael
Hardwick. The activity he hopes to en-
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gage in is quintessentially private and Summer 1985: NEW YORK COURT
lies at the heart of an intimate associa- OF; APPEALS INVALIDATES PROGAY EXECUTIVE ORDER: Antion beyond the proper reach of state
regulation... We therefore remand this nouncing its 6-1 ruling on June 28, the
case for trial, at which time the State sixteenth anniversary of the Stonewall
must prove in order to prevail that it Riots, New York's highest court held
has a compelling interest in regulating
that Mayor Ed Koch's Executive Order
this behavior and that this statute is the 50, banning employment discrimination
most narrowly drawn means of safeagainst gays by NY City contractors,
guarding that interest.". . . Circuit
was unconstitutional. The court reJudge Frank Johnson, one of the heroic
versed a 2-1 decision by the Appellate
figures of the civil rights movement for
Division, First Department, which had
his decisions as a district judge in Ala- held that the order was supported by
bama and a member of the old Fifth the mayor's obligation under the Equal
Circuit, held with the concurrence of Protection provisions of the U.S. and
Senior Circuit Judge Tuttle that Doe v. state constitutions to avoid discriminaCommonwealth's Attorney does not
tory state action. Key to both rulings
necessarily control the pending action, was the characterization of the actividue both to Doe's uncertain scope as a ties by the contractors. The Appellate
summary affirmance without opinion Division majority argued that contracwhich might have been disposed of on
tors who were providing social services
procedural grounds, and to develop- to the general public with city money
ments subsequent to Doe, including Su- were engaging in state action. The
preme Court decisions embracing a Court of Appeals disagreed, holding
more expansive view of personal pri- that employment discrimination by city
vacy rights and indications that a major- contractors would only amount to state
ity of the Supreme Court still considers action if the city were in some sense
the issue of gay sex to be an open con- "responsible" for the discriminatory
stitutional question. . . This is a deci- conduct. . . [Under 21 v. Koch, 65
sion of great significance, since it N.Y.2d 344 (1985). This problem was
essentially endorses the privacy analysis cured a year later when the City Counof the Texas district court in Baker v. cil finally passed a local law forbidding
Wade, which awaits reargument this employment discrimination, thus promonth in the Fifth Circuit, and directly
viding a legislative basis for a new execcontradicts the privacy analysis of the utive order refusing city contracts to
D.C. Circuit in Dronenburg v. Zech, discriminatory contractors. But the
741 F.2d 1388, in which Judge Bork mayor sought to avoid confrontation
held that no constitutional privacy right with religious charities that contracted
attaches to gay sex. With a decision in with the city to provide social services,
Baker v. Wade likely before the end of and so exempted them from complithe year, and the direct circuit conflict
ance with the new executive order.]
with Dronenburg, it is reasonable to
predict that this issue will be before the
United States Supreme Court within a October 1985: FEDERAL JUDGE
RULES MILITARY POLICY MUST
few years. [All too true; the Supreme
OVERRIDE LOCAL GAY RIGHTS
Court reversed this opinion in Bowers ..ORDINANCE:
In an order filed Sepv. Hardwick the following year. Hardtember 11 in Temple University v. City
wick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th
Cir. 1985), rev'd, sub nom. Bowers v. of Philadelphia, No. 85-1422 (E.D.Pa.),
Judge James T. Giles held that PhiladelHardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).]
phia's Fair Practices Act, which forbids,
among other things, discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation by em-
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ployment agencies, may not be sued to
ban Department of Defense Recruiters
from the Temple University Law
School Placement office. Relying on
rulings in several federal circuits upholding the constitutionality of the military's policy against recruitment of gay
people, Judge Giles reasoned that the
Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution made it invalid for a city to regulate or burden that military policy. The
judge declined to rule on Temple's contention that the city law also infringed
the university's First Amendment free
speech rights. There is no written opinion in the case, because the judge ruled
orally from the bench in response to
cross-motions for summary judgment.
Lambda Legal Defense Fund had filed
an amicus brief on behalf of the Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations, which had been defending its
February 15, 1985 order that Temple
ban military recruiters. The lesbian and
gay law students who had brought the
original case at the City Commission,
represented by attorney David Webber,
are appealing the court's refusal to allow them to intervene in this case. It is
likely that the whole matter will be
brought before the Third Circuit. [So it
was, the circuit affirming Judge Giles in
United States v. City of Philadelphia,
798 F.2d 81 (3rd Cir. 1986).]
November 1985: An important case for
those who are preparing wills for persons with AIDS is Estate of Richard T.
Thaler, NYLJ, 10/3/85, p. 7 , col.1 (Surr.
Ct., N.Y. Co., Lambert, S.), in which
the court upheld a will executed in the
hospital by a man who later died from
AIDS. The will left the bulk of the
man's estate to his lover, and was challenged by his parents. Important points
were affidavits by attending medical
personnel as to the state of mind of the
testator, and evidence that the testator
had not received any sedatives for more
than a day before the execution ceremony. It is important to note, however,
that this was not a "deathbed will," as
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the testator's condition improved after
execution and he went home from the
hospital shortly after making the will.
The court rejected claims of undue influence by the lover, commenting that
"the intimate nature of the relationship
does not per se constitute undue
influence."
January 1986: SHUTTLEWORTH
VICTORY A RARE BRIGHT SPOT
IN AIDS LEGAL NEWS: IN a decision widely hailed by advocates for the
rights of persons with AIDS (PWA's),
Florida Commission on Human Relations Executive Director Donal A.
Griffin ruled on December 11 in Shuttleworth v. Broward County Office of
Budget and Management Policy, FCHR
No. 85-0624 (BNA Daily Labor Report
No. 242, 12/17/85) that the Florida
Human Rights Law, Fla. Stats. Sec.
760.01-760.10, forbids employment discrimination because of AIDS. Although agency officials in several other
jurisdictions have taken a similar position with respect to the applicability of
their state handicap discrimination provisions, the Florida decision was particularly anticipated because Florida is
one of a handful of states in which the
term "handicap" is not defined in the
statute. See Leonard, "Employment
-Discrimination Against Persons With
AIDS," 10 Univ. of Dayton L. Rev.
681, 692 n.48 (1985). In addition, the
Shuttleworth case was the first to attract national media attention, and so
could well set the tone for consideration of this issue in other jurisdictions. *
* * Griffin relied on CDC policy statements that AIDS was not casually
transmitted in reaching his ruling, and
relied on the Eleventh Circuit's important decision in Arline v. School Board
of Nassau County, 772 F.2d 759 (1985),
to conclude that an infectious illness
such as AIDS could be considered a
handicap within the meaning of the
state law. Now that Griffin has ruled,
the parties are expected to negotiate an
appropriate settlement of the case, al-
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though the County has the option to
appeal the ruling to the full Commision.
[The County did appeal, and the matter
ended up in court, where Shuttleworth
prevailed. Shuttleworth v. Broward
County Office of Budget & Management Policy, 649 F. Supp. 35
(S.D.Fla.1.986).]
February 1986: GEORGIA APPEALS
COURT UPHOLDS TELEPHONE
BOOK BAN: The Georgia Court of
Appeals upheld Bellsouth Advertising
& Publishing Corporation's decision to
deny Christopher's Kind Bookstore the
right to advertise in South Georgia Yellow Pages as a vendor of lesbian and
gay literature. Loring v. Bellsouth, No.
70673, December 5, 1985. The decision,
which will be appealed to the Georgia
Supreme Court, produced a split of
views on the court. Four judges concurred in the opinion, one concurred in
the judgment only, two concurred specially, and one dissented. In essence,
the court held that Bellsouth, a separate corporate entity from the telephone company, was not a regulated
utility of the type that might be required to respect First Amendment
rights; there being no state action in the
decision that the words "lesbian and
gay" could not appear in the directory,
no constitutional right had been violated. Judge Pope, dissenting, argued
that Bellsouth was a wholly owned subsidiary of the telephone company, the
directory was part of the company's
public service function, and the company had no rational basis for excluding
the advertising. [Loring v. Bellsouth,
339 S.E.2d 372 (Ga. Ct.App. 1985).
The Georgia Supreme Court denied
certiorari on January 29, 1986.]
March 1986: SUPREME COURT ARGUMENT IN HARDWICK SET FOR
MARCH 31: ... Court watchers speculate that the result may hinge largely on
the views of Justice Lewis Powell,
whose failure to participate in last
year's gay rights case before the Court
(challenging an Oklahoma law mandat-
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ing discharge of school teachers who
supported gay rights) resulted in a split
vote with no opinion for the Court. Although, as noted above, the Court may
follow its practice of avoiding the controversial constitutional issue by deciding the case on standing, or may instead
use the case as a vehicle for clarifying
the precedential value of summary affirmances in cases such as Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, it seems more
likely that, having passed by the opportunity to rule on the privacy issues in
Onofre (51 N.Y.2d 476, cert. denied,
451 U.S. 987 [1981]) and Uplinger (58
N.Y.2d 936, cert. dismissed, 467 U.S.
246 [19841), the Court's decision to take
this case for argument signals its intention to confront the merits at long last.
If the Court restricts itself to the questions presented by the certiorari petition and briefs and rules that privacy
doctrine does extend to lesbian/gay sex,
the result would be a remand for trial
on the issue of state justification for the
law. Although the compelling justification test would be hard to meet, it is
predictable that the resulting trial
would become an important test of the
significance of AIDS for the sodomy
law reform movement.
March 1986: NY COURT HOLDS
AIDS A "HANDICAP" UNDER
FEDERAL LAW: Ini a thoughtful and
scholarly opinion, Queens County Supreme Court Justice Harold Hyman
ruled on February 11 in District 27 v.
Board of Education, No. 14940/85, that
exclusion of children with AIDS from
New York public schools could violate
the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of
1973, sec. 504, which prohibits discrimination against the handicapped by any
program receiving federal financial assistance. Holding that the City's decision to evaluate children and make
attendance decisions on a case-by-case
basis was not arbitrary and capricious,
Hyman concluded on the basis of expert testimony and documentation that
the virus believed to cause AIDS was
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not casually transmitted in a school setting, that transmission through "biting
behavior" was remote at best, and that
the fears of parents were unjustified, although understandable. He criticized
the City for failing to take appropriate
steps to develop policy in an open manner that would have educated the public to the underlying facts. (In a similar
holding, Orange County, California Superior Court Judge Harmon Scoville
ruled early in February that an 11 year
old boy with AIDS had a right to attend classes; the Indiana controversy
over school attendance by Ryan White
is continuing as a state court judge is
apparently trying to overrule federal
holdings in the controversy!) Judge
Hyman's Rehabilitation Act holding is
of crucial significance, because it is
likely to be the first published decision
so holding, with important implications
for the rights of PWA's in a wide variety of circumstances, including employment, publicly-assisted services, and
federally subsidized housing. The federal administration has been vacillating
about the applicability of the Act to
AIDS, with Regional Offices accepting
complaints but no formal position being
taken. We are informed that Hal Freeman, the Regional Manager of the Office of Civil Rights of the U.S. Dept. of
Health and Human Services in San
Francisco, has resigned in protest over
the refusal of department higher-ups to
commit themselves to a position that
the Act covers AIDS as a handicap.
Recognition of AIDS as a handicap
would be consistent with two significant
US Courts of Appeals decisions, Arline
v. School Board of Nassau County, a
recent 11th Circuit case holding that tuberculosis was a handicap, and New
York State Association for Retarded
Children, Inc. v. Carey, a 1979 2nd Circuit decision holding that hepatitis B infection was a handicap. [Local District
Board 27 v. Board of Education, 130
Misc.2d 398, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325
(N.Y.Sup.Ct., Queens Co. 1986).]
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April 1986: GAY RIGHTS LAWS
ADOPTED IN NEW YORK CITY,
ATLANTA, AND DAVIS (CA): By a
surprisingly wide margin of 21-14, the
New York City Council on March 20
enacted amendments to the City's
Human Rights ordinance which will include sexual orientation among prohibited bases of discrimination in
employment, housing and public accommodations. The amendments, expected to be signed into law on April 2
by Mayor Ed Koch, will be enforced by
the New York City Commission on
Human Rights. Earlier versions of the
legislation had been pending in the City
Council for fifteen years, but this was
only the second time that the bill had
been voted out of committee for a full
debate and vote by the Council. Opponents of the measure, led by Councilman Noach Dear and Cardinal John
O'Connor, pledged to block its implementation through litigation or a referendum. According to city legal officers,
a referendum could only be held to
amend the city charter, not to repeal a
specific law. The New York vote
capped a busy legislative period for gay
rights, as the Atlanta City Council had
voted 14-4 on March 3 to amend that
city's charter to protect gay and lesbian
city employees from discrimination,
and the Davis, California, city council
had voted 4-1 on February 19 to adopt
a comprehensive civil rights law on
housing, employment and public accommodations which includes sexual
orientation. A local group in Davis is
trying to get a petition drive going for a
referendum to remove sexual orientation from the law.
June 1986: CALIFORNIA A.G.
OPINES GAYS PROTECTED
UNDER STATE LABOR CODE: Expanding on the California Supreme
Court's 1979 decision in Gay Law Students Assn. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co.,
595 P.2d 592, Attorney General John
Van de Kamp issued his Opinion on
April 30 that lesbian and gay people are
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a "political class" protected from employment discrimination under secs.
1101 and 11.02 of the Labor Code, originally enacted in 1915. The Opinion responded to an inquiry from
Assemblyman Art Agnos, prime sponsor of a state gay rights bill which
passed the legislature but was vetoed
by the governor. California gays are already protected from discrimination in
housing and public accommodations
under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Civil
Code sec. 51. Thus, the AG's opinion
would appear to complete a package
resembling the traditional "human
rights" law. However, Agnos states
that a "Gay Rights Bill" is still needed
in order to create the administrative
machinery to enforce protected rights.
Under the Labor Code, an aggrieved
individual must retain his own attorney
and initiate private litigation. Under a
typical human rights law, filing of a
complaint with an agency will set in
motion an administrative process which
usually results in the settlement of a
case without actual litigation.
June 1986: NEW MOVEMENT LAWYERS ANNOUNCED: The American
Civil Liberties Union has announced
the appointment of Nan Hunter as staff
counsel for its new Lesbian/Gay Rights
Project. Nan is the first full-time
ACLU national staff member whose
work is devoted exclusively to lesbian
and gay legal issues. She was previously employed as staff counsel for the
ACLU's Reproductive Freedom Project. Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund has announced the
appointment of Paula L. Ettelbrick as
its new staff attorney. Paula will work
in Lambda's legal program directed by
Legal Director Abby Rubenfeld. [She]
was formerly associated with a major
firm in Detroit, and has served on the
board of directors of the Michigan Organization for Human Rights and its litigation committee.
Summer 1986: SUPREME COURT
MAJORITY RULES AGAINST PRI-
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VACY RIGHTS FOR GAYS IN
GEORGIA CASE, DENIES REVIEW IN TEXAS CASE: A five-judge
majority of the Supreme Court ruled on
June 30 in Bowers v. Hardwick, No. 85140, a challenge to the Georgia sodomy
law, that the Constitution does not confer "a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy." On July
7, the Court dismissed petitions for certiorari pending in Baker v. Wade, a
challenge to the Texas sodomy law, thus
leaving in place a Fifth Circuit decision
holding the law constitutional. Writing
for the Court in Hardwick, Justice Byron White described as "facetious" the
claim that a right of adults to engage in
consensual gay sex in the privacy of a
home could be described either as
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," formulations
the Court uses to describe fundamental
rights protected from governmental invasion by the 5th and 14th Amendments. Joining White's opinion were
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor. In a separate opinion, the Chief Justice
catalogued the history of prohibitions
on sodomy dating from the Bible as a
reason for holding that sodomy not be
"protected" as a "fundamental right."
Justice Powell's concurrence stated uneasiness with imposing a substantial
prison term for consensual sodomy, but
noted that the declaratory judgment action before the Court did not properly
present the 8th Amendment issue of
"cruel and unusual punishment." * * *
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens,
Justice Harry Blackmun contended the
majority had mischaracterized the case.
Although it was brought by a gay man
arrested for engaging in oral sex in his
home, Blackmun asserted the case was
not about "homosexual sodomy" as
such, but rather about sexual privacy in
the home. Where Justice White (a frequent dissenter in sexual privacy cases)
found no "resemblance" between the
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right of gays to have sex and other privacy interests held protected by the
Court, Justice Blackmun found such a
resemblance based on his view that the
privacy cases rest on a theoretical
framework protecting the individual's
right to make fundamental decisions
about how to live his life and the individual's right to privacy in his home,
stating: "the case before us implicates
both the decisional and spatial aspects
of the right to privacy." In a separate
opinion joined by Brennan and Marshall, Stevens argued that the case
raised serious issues of Equal Protection and vagueness which the Court
should have addressed. Noting the concession by Georgia's attorney that the
sodomy law would probably be invalid
as applied to heterosexuals, Stevens asserted that "the homosexual and the
heterosexual have the same interest in
deciding how he will live his own life,
and, more narrowly, how he will conduct himself in his personal and voluntary associations."
Assuming the
statute's invalidity as applied to heterosexuals and lack of guidance for prosecutors, Stevens commented that undue
discretion was given law enforcement
officials for selective enforcement, raising serious vagueness issues. [Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).]
September 1986: U.S. FINALLY ISSUES AIDS DISCRIMINATION
RULING. After a two year delay during which the complainant died, the Office of Civil Rights, Department of
Health and Human Services, issued a
letter ruling in Doe v. Charlotte (NC)
Memorial Hospital, #04-84-3096, holding that the hospital's refusal to consider reinstatement of a registered
nurse with AIDS, whose doctors advised that he should be returned to
work, violated sec. 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The charge was filed by
Lambda cooperating attorney John
Boddie with the Atlanta Regional Office of OCR in 1984; the nurse died in
February, 1986. Announcement of the
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ruling came at a hearing before the
House Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations and Human Resources in Washington on August 6, at
which Tom Stoddard of Lambda testified about the inordinate delays in
processing of AIDS discrimination
charges by OCR. Betty Dotson, Director of OCR, testified that her agency
was bound by the Justice Department's
memorandum opinion that discrimination based on fear of contagion was not
prohibited by sec. 504. However, the
letter ruling states that even though the
hospital cited fear of contagion as the
reason for excluding the nurse, "the
hospital could not have been motivated
by the transmissible nature of complainant's condition because the function of the hospital's infectious disease
control process is to evaluate all employees suffering from potentially
transmissible ailments. Instead, the denial was motivated by the fact of the
complainant's particular condition, i.e.,
AIDS." * * * At the same hearing, Rep.
Barney Frank intensively cross-examined Assistant Attorney General
Charles Cooper on the Justice Department's opinion. Cooper refused to
waiver from his position, although he
conceded that some of the assertions in
the memo about medical opinions on
transmissibility may have been faulty.
Arthur Leonard testified that the opinion was wrong as a matter of law, inconsistent with existing precedents, and
bad policy. The memo will be tested in
School Board v. Arline and in Shuttleworth v. Broward County, 41 Fair
Emp. Prac. Cases (BNA) 406 (S.D.Fla.,
July 8), in which the court overruled a
motion to dismiss a sec. 504 claim by a
PWA and set the matter for trial in December. There are also reports of a
west coast federal court suit by a former Justice Department employee with
1ADS, which may provide another
court test for the memorandum. The
CDC count as of August 11 was 23,7000
cases. [The Shuttleworth case was settled before trial, but the Justice Depart-
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ment's memorandum was decisively
repudiated by the Supreme Court in
School Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).]
November 1986: FEDERAL JUDGE
UPHOLDS CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF DC AIDS-INSURANCE LAW:
U.S. District Judge Thomas F. Hogan
has ruled that the District of Columbia
Council had a rational basis for enacting a law severely restricting the ability
of insurance companies from discriminating against applicants suspected of
being at risk for AIDS. American
Council of Life Insurance v. District of
Columbia, 55 U.S.L.Wk. (BNA) 2184
(D.D.C., 9/19/86). Rejecting an attack
on the law by insurance industry associations, Judge Hogan noted that economic regulation enjoys the
presumption of constitutionality when
it is rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose, and found that
the Council's expressed purpose of ensuring access to care and treatment and
assisting in the District's AIDS public
health program satisfied the requirement of a legitimate purpose. Judge
Hogan did express reservations about
the five-year moratorium imposed on
AIDS testing, given the rapidly changing knowledge of AIDS, and suggested
that the Council need not wait five
years to reconsider the wisdom of its
policy. [American Council of Life Insurance v. District of Columbia, 645
F.Supp. 84 (D.D.C. 1986).]
January 1987: MINNESOTA COURT
DECLARES SODOMY LAW UNCONSTITUTIONAL: Ruling December 1 on a motion to dismiss a criminal
complaint in State v. Gray, No.
3103327, Hennepin County District
Judge Pamela G. Alexander ruled that
the Minnesota sodomy law, sec.
609.293(5), violates the Minnesota Constitution's right of privacy. Richard
Gray, 45, had been charged with "oral
sodomy" in July, after reporting a theft
to police. The thief was a 16 year old,
who represented himself to be 18 when
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Gray picked him up in downtown Minneapolis. The court found that their
sexual relations had been voluntary, despite evidence that Gray paid the youth
for sex at least once. The law prohibits
oral and anal sex, regardless of gender
or marital status of participants. * * *
Noting the Supreme Court's Bowers v.
Hardwick decision, Judge Alexander
wrote: "[In Bowers, the Court specifically left open the right of state courts
to invalidate such laws on state constitutional grounds... Furthermore, the
Bowers case was decided on a narrow
issue - whether the Federal Constitution grants a fundamental right upon
homosexuals to engage in sodomy. Unlike Bowers, the issue before this Court
is whether the statute is unconstitutional on its face as could be applied to
the public in general, in addition to the
application of the statute to the defendant as to his right to be free from governmental intrusion concerning his
private sexual decisions." [Unfortunately, the state successfully appealed
this case on the ground that Gray's conduct came within the prostitution laws
and could not provide the basis for a
privacy challenge to the sodomy law.
State v. Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107 (Minn.
1987). Judge Alexander's trial court
opinion was not officially published.]
March 1987: CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ISSUES STRONG AIDS
HANDICAP RULING; URGES PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
IN DISCRIMINATION CASES: Reversing an Administrative Law Judge
ruling from last summer which held
AIDS was not a handicap under California law, the state's Fair Employment
and Housing Commission ruled February 5 that discrimination against persons with AIDS based on fear of
contagion violates the state's Fair Employment & Housing Act. Dep't of Fair
Employment & Housing v. Raytheon
Co., No. FEP83-84 L1-031p L-33676 8704 (full text in BNA's Daily Labor Report No. 29, 2/13/87, E-1.) The Com-
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mission unanimously rejected the
argument that the state's law was preempted by the federal Rehabilitation
Act (applicable to Raytheon as a federal contractor), which was interpreted
by the Justice Department last year not
to forbid AIDS discrimination. The
Commission also rejected the notion
that 1ADS was not a handicap because
of its failure to fit neatly into the statutory language, relying upon American
Nat'l Ins. Co. v. FEHC, 32 Cal.3d 603
(1982), where the state's Supreme
Court held that a broad interpretation
was appropriate, embracing any physically disabling condition that "makes
achievement unusually difficult" and
also "conditions ... that may handicap
in the future but have no present disabling effect."
April 1987: SUPREME COURT EXTENDS DISCRIMINATION LAW
PROTECTION TO PERSONS DISABLED BY CONTAGIOUS DISEASES: The U.S. Supreme court was
busy handing victories (albeit oblique
or partial in some cases) to gay people
during March. The most decisive, by a
vote of 7-2, came in School Board of
Nassau County, Florida v. Arline, 107
Sup. Ct. -, 55 U.S.L.Wk. (BNA) 4245,
43 F.E.P.Cas. (BNA) 81, 42 E.P.D.
(CCH) para. 36,791 (March 3, 1987), in
which the Court rejected the theory underlying the Justice Department's
AIDS Memorandum of last summer.
Federal officials had contended that
sec. 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, which forbids discrimination in
programs receiving federal money
"solely by reason of . . . handicap,"
would not forbid discrimination against
persons with AIDS if motivated by fear
of contagion. The Justice Department
admitted that AIDS was a "handicap"
("handicap" being defined as a "physical impairment" "affecting a major life
activity"), but contended that only discrimination motivated by the "impairment" as such was handicap
discrimination, and that contagiousness
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was not itself an "impairment." The
Department also opined that persons
believed to be infected but not actually
impaired would not be protected from
discrimination either. * * * . . . Rejecting the Justice Department's view of
the statute, the Court stated: "Allowing
discrimination based on the contagious
effects of a physical impairment would
be inconsistent with the basic purpose
of sec. 504, which is to ensure that
handicapped individuals are not denied
jobs or other benefits because of the
prejudiced attitudes or the ignorance of
others. By amending the definition of
"handicapped individual" to include
not only those who are actually physically impaired, but also those who are
regarded as impaired and who, as a result, are substantially limited in a major
life activity, Congress acknowledged
that society's accumulated myths and
fears about disability and disease are as
handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment." The Court refrained from
stating whether HIV-seropositive persons are protected by sec. 504, noting
that the issue was not directly
presented by the case because Ms. Arline's tuberculosis gave rise to an actual
impairment. However, the Court's reasoning gave hope to legal advocates for
persons affected by AIDS that seropositive persons would be protected as
persons who "are regarded as having an
impairment." The footnote on AIDS
(the only mention of AIDS in the opinion) may have been necessary to secure
certain votes on the Court... [School
Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).]
June 1987: TO TEST OR NOT TO
TEST, THAT IS THE AIDS QUESTION!: So-called "AIDS testing," i.e.,
blood tests for antibodies to HIV, a retro virus believed to be a causative
agent for AIDS, became the central issue of debate as the CDC case count
approached 36,000 during May. President Reagan announced he will appoint
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a national commission to recommend
policies on AIDS; furious debate ensued over White House statements that
no provision would be made for gay

representation on the commission, and
it was noted that the president was ap-

pointing a commission to preempt Congressional efforts to establish such a
body over which the president would
not have full appointing power. AIDS
became a more personal matter for
Congress as Rep. Stewart B. McKinney,
a Connecticut Republican, died from
AIDS and the Washington Post reported that McKinney, a married father, had engaged in homosexual
affairs.
Summer 1987: D.C. CIRCUIT: NO
EQUAL PROTECTION FOR GAYS:
A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled
June 26 in Padula v. Webster, No. 865053, that employment discrimination
against gays by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation does not offend the Constitution. Basing its decision Bowers v.
Hardwick, 106 S.Ct. 2841 (1986) and
Dronenburg v. Zech; 741 F.2d 1388
(D.C.Cir. 1984), the court ruled that the
Bureau's refusal to hire a well-qualified
job applicant who is an out-of-thecloset lesbian was justified on the basis
of fears of blackmail and the assertion
that the FBI's credibility would be undermined by employment of agents
whose sexual activities were subject to
criminal prosecution in many states. * *
* The opinion by Judge Laurence Silberman (Judge Robert Bork was also
on the panel) is a classic in judicial
homophobia. The court defines the
purported "class" for equal protection
analysis as "persons who engage in homosexual conduct" and comments: "It
would be quite anomalous, on its face,
to declare status defined by conduct
that states may constitutionally
criminalize as deserving of strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause.
More importantly, in all those cases in
which the Supreme Court has accorded
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suspect or quasi-suspect status to a
class, the Court's holding was predicated on an unarticulated, but necessarily implicit, notion that it is plainly
unjustifiable (in accordance with standards not altogether clear to us) to discriminate invidiously against the
particular class ...If the Court was unwilling to object to state laws that
criminalize the behavior that defines
the class, it is hardly open to a lower
court to conclude that state sponsored
discrimination against the class is invidious. After all, there can hardly be
more palpable discrimination against a
class than making the conduct that defines the class criminal." In other
words, discrimination against gays is
not invidious because it is justifiable!
Although the court then goes on to say
that a rational basis is required for the
discriminatory policy, it finds it easy to
imagine at least two: the credibility and
blackmail rationales. [Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C.Cir. 1987).]
September 1987: S.F. FEDERAL
JUDGE: YES TO EQUAL PROTECTION FOR GAYS: U.S. District Judge
Thelton E. Henderson's decision in
High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial
Security Clearance Office, No. C846078 (U.S.D.Ct., N.D.Cal., 8/19/87),
holding that homosexuality is a "quasisuspect classification" subject to
"heightened scrutiny" under the Constitutional requirement of Equal Protection, directly contradicts the holding
and reasoning of the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals in Padula v. Webster, 822
F.2d 97 (1987) (reported at 1987 LGLN
38 [Summer]). Ruling on cross-motions
to dismiss in a challenge to the Defense
Department's procedures for dealing
with security clearance applications by
lesbians and gay men, Judge Henderson
(a Carter appointee) held that the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO) may not subject
applicants to extended and usually negative procedures merely on the basis
that they are gay or suspected of being
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gay. He further ruled that DISCO's
practice of singling out members of gay
organizations for special investigation
violates the First Amendment. Richard
Gayer, Esq., of San Francisco, brought
the class action suit on behalf of members of High Tech Gays, an organization of gays employed in technological
occupations. The certified class includes all applicants or holders of security clearances over the past five
years. . . [High Tech Gays v. Defense
Industrial Security Clearance Office,
668 F.Supp. 1361 (N.D.Cal. 1987), reversed, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir.), denial
of rehearing en bane, 909 F.2d 375 (9th
Cir. 1990).]
September 1987: PRESIDENTIAL
AIDS COMMISSION EXCLUDES
EXPERTS: The major AIDS news of
the summer, as the CDC case count
surpassed 40,000, was President Reagan's appointment of a national AIDS
commission which included no experts
on the epidemic, and was sharply tilted
in its membership toward right-wing
demagogues. Although the commission
has already made history by including
the first openly-gay presidential appointee in American history, Dr. Frank
Lilly of Albert Einstein Medical College (a biochemist whose background
does not include any direct AIDS research - Dr. Lilly is also the only biomedical researcher on the panel), the
bulk of the appointments (including
Cardinal John O'Connor of New York,
a leading homophobic bigot) has
spurred Congressional action to create
a real national commission of experts.
Rep. Henry Waxman and Senator Edward Kennedy have jointly introduced
a major legislative proposal, H.R. 3071,
to fund more widespread voluntary
HIV antibody-testing programs and to
enact federal protection against discrimination for seropositive persons.
But the Public Health Service issued
new guidelines on testing (36 MMWR
No. 31, 8/14/87) which seriously undermine the positive results that came out
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of last February's CDC conference on
the subject; the guidelines, reportedly
redrafted by White House ideologue
Gary Bauer and his staff, essentially
adopt the position articulated by President Reagan favoring widespread "routine" testing for hospital admittees,
women of childbearing age, marriage license applicants and the like. The political crisis surrounding AIDS is
becoming vicious. [Note: It is fair to
comment that Reagan's AIDS Commission surprised everybody by issuing
a list of recommendations that included
legal protection for. privacy and against
discrimination, largely drafted by the
Commission's staff of real experts retained by the figurehead commissioners.]
December 1987: GEORGETOWN
UNIVERSITY GAY STUDENTS
WIN EQUAL TREATMENT: After
two years of consideration, a divided en
banc District of Columbia Court of Appeals has determined that gay student
organizations at Georgetown University are entitled to equal treatment with
other student organizations, but that
the University may not be compelled to
extend "official recognition" to them.
Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown
University Law Center v. Georgetown
University, No. 84-50 & 84-51 (11/20/
87). The case dates from early 1979,
when Gay People at Georgetown University (GPGU) received Student Government approval but was denied
"university recognition" as an official
organization by the administration on
the ground that Georgetown, a "Catholic university," could not grant recognition compatibly with its religious
mission. Later in 1979 the Gay Rights
Coalition at the Law School encountered a similar refusal. Both student
groups brought suit under the District
of Columbia's Human Rights Act,
which forbids, inter alia, discrimination
in educational opportunities on the basis of sexual orientation. [The full report of the case in Law Notes was the
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longest article to appear up to that
time, due to the convoluted decision of
the court, which generated seven
lengthy opinions, with various coalitions of judges combining on each point
of the holding.] ... Trial counsel for the
gay student groups was BAHR member
Ron Bogard, now an Assistant Corporation Counsel in New York City. Appellate counsel was Richard A. Gross.
Amicus briefs were filed by a host of
organizations on both sides of the case.
(The ACLU had an embarrassing split:
the head of the local organization filed
a brief on behalf of Georgetown, while
the national ACLU filed a brief in support of the student groups.) [Gay
Rights Coalition v. Georgetown University, 536 A.2d 1 (D.C.App. 1987).]
February 1988: COURT REBUFFS
CHALLENGE TO REAGAN AIDS
COMMISSION: In a December 16
opinion, U.S. District Judge Oliver
Gasch denied a motion to grant preliminary injunctive relief against further
operation of President Reagan's AIDS
Commission, holding that "Plaintiffs
are not likely to succeed on the merits
of their complaint and no irreparable
harm is likely to result in the absence of
a preliminary injunction." National Association of People With AIDS v. Reagan, No. 87-2777-OG (D.Ct., D.C.).
The action, brought by a coalition of
AIDS service groups and persons with
AIDS, contended that the composition
of the Commission violated the president's executive order creating it as
well as the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. I, secs. 3 &
5(b)(2), which requires that advisory
commissions "be fairly balanced in
terms of the points of view represented
and the functions to be performed;" the
president's order provided for a commission consisting of persons with relevant expertise. * * * The suit was filed
in October after several unsuccessful
attempts by the plaintiff groups to persuade the White House to appoint additional Commissioners representative of
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people with AIDS and those who represented their interests. The complaint
alleged that the Commission was
stacked with people lacking relevant
expertise who had stated views about
aspects of the epidemic outside the
"mainstream" of current medical
thought. Judge Gash noted the resignation of two members and their replacement by two persons who have been
more directly active in AIDS matters
(the two new commissioners are members of organizations which are plaintiffs in the case), and also observed that
"another is directly involved in the
treatment of AIDS patients - Cardinal
O'Connor." One is hard-pressed to interpret this last statement; is
O'Connor's credential that he is nominal head of a Catholic hospital system
in New York with many AIDS patients,
or that he shows up at one of those hospitals from time to time to carry some
bedpans and talk to patients? * * * Further, Judge Gasch observed that the
complaint had actually singled out for
attack as "extremist" only four of the
commissioners out of the 13 members,
and described as "surrealistic" the standard suggested by plaintiffs for determining whether commissioners are in
the "mainstream," which he described
essentially as letting the immediately
affected groups (PWA's and health care
providers) define the "mainstream."
The judge also noted that the Commission had been holding public hearings
at which representatives of the plaintiff
groups had been allowed to testify;
thus, he concluded, the failure to afford
them direct representation on the Commission was not locking them out of the
process. The judge dismissed as "speculative" the contention that allowing
the Commission to continue its work
would result in irreparable injury. The
ruling came shortly after the Commision issued its preliminary report, which
spokespersons for the plaintiff organizations had greeted with measured
praise in statements to the media.
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March 1988: NINTH CIRCUIT
VOIDS ANTIGAY ARMY REGULATIONS: In a major breakthrough
for gay rights under the Equal Protection requirements of the Constitution,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit ruled February 10 in Watkins v.
U.S. Army, No. 85-4006, that "sexual
orientation" is a suspect classification
and the military's purported justifications for excluding gays fail to withstand strict scrutiny required by Equal
Protection precedents. The 3-judge
panel (all Carter appointees) split 2-1,
but dissenting Judge Stephen Reinhardt
indicated that were it not for Hardwick
and Belier v. Middendorf, he would
have joined his colleagues in the majority... [Watkins v. U.S. Army, 837 F.2d
1428 (1988), aff'd on other grounds en
banc, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989). Although a victory for the plaintiff, the en
banc decision erased the first federal
appellate decision to hold that anti-gay
discrimination by the government is
subject to strict scrutiny by the courts.]
May 1988: ISRAEL REPEALS SODOMY LAW: The most surprising legislative development this month comes
from the Holy Land! On March 23, the
Israeli Knesset (Parliament) enacted a
package of bills reforming Israel's sex
crimes statutes which effectively
decriminalized consensual sodomy,
lowered the age of consent, and made
homosexual and heterosexual rape
equal offenses. The repealed sodomy
law, which provided for a ten year
prison sentence, dated from the British
Mandate (which expired in 1948), but
had never been enforced. The rightwing Religious parties absented themselves from the Knesset during the
vote.
August 1988: UNANIMOUS 8TH CIRCUIT PANEL RULES FOR ARKANSAS LESBIAN/GAY STUDENTS: A
3-judge panel of the 8th Circuit Court
of Appeals ruled June 22 in Gay and
Lesbian Students Assoc'n v. Gohn, No.
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87-1569, that the University of Arkansas at Fayetteville violated the First
Amendment by refusing to overturn
the Student Senate's 1985 decision to
deny funding to the Gay and Lesbian
Students Association (GLSA). GLSA,
formed in 1983, requested funding that
year and in subsequent years. The 1983
request was voted down, although
GLSA met requirements for funding,
no other student group was denied
funding, and there was excess money in
the treasury. In 1984, GLSA's funding
request got through as part of a package with other student groups; immediately after the vote, the Senate resolved
to forbid future funding of groups organized around "sexual preference"
and state legislators met with University officials to protest funding the gay
and lesbian student group. When the
Senate voted down GLSA's 1985 request and University officials refused to
overrule the vote, GLSA sued. * * *
The District Court held for the University, emphasizing there was no entitlement to government funding. The
Court of Appeals reversed in an opinion by Circuit Judge Richard Arnold (a
Carter appointee), holding that even if
government funding was not a right,
once it was authorized it must be impartially administered without regard
to the political content of programs
presented by individual groups, unless
the content was not subject to First
Amendment protection. The Court asserted that "the record is replete with
evidence that the Senate's action was
based on viewpoint discrimination...
The GLSA met all objective criteria for
funding. . . It is apparent that GLSA
was denied. . . funds because of the
views it espoused.". . . The University
has not indicated whether it will appeal.
GLSA was represented on appeal by
the ACLU Gay and Lesbian Rights
Project, whose director, Nan Hunter,
argued the case. [Gay and Lesbian Students Association v. Gohn, 850 F.2d
361 (8th Cir. 1988).]
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September 1988: NATIONAL LEGAL
CONFERENCE ON LESBIAN &
GAY ISSUES IN NOVEMBER: A national conference on Lesbian and Gay
Legal Issues, "Lavender Law," will occur Saturday and Sunday, November 12
& 13, 1988, at Golden Gate Law School
in San Francisco. The AIDS Legal Referral Panel of San Francisco will present a conference on AIDS legal issues
on Friday, November 11, at the War
Memorial Building. The Lavender Law
conference, organized by a committee
established at the March on Washington in October 1987, will feature speakers from across the country and is cosponsored by several legal organizations and gay lawyer associations. [This
first Lavender Law Conference led to
the formation of the National Lesbian
& Gay Law Association, which has
sponsored successive conferences.]
November 1988: L.A. CITY COUNCIL APPROVES LIMITED DOMESTIC PARTNER BENEFITS: The first
positive result of last spring's Los Angeles Family Diversity Task Force Report was an October 4 vote by the Los
Angeles City Council to approve the
concept of inclusion of domestic partners in the definition of "immediate
family" for family sick leave and bereavement leave allowances. The 10-2
vote approved "in principle" Task
Force Recommendation No. 104, which
suggested amending the Administrative
Code to allow city employees to use
paid leave to care for ailing domestic
partners or to attend the funeral of a
domestic partner. Domestic partners
would have to register their status by
filing an affidavit with the Personnel
Department, alleging that they have resided together in the same household
for 12 months, share the common necessities of life, have a mutual obligation of support and are each other's
sole domestic partner, are both over 18
years of age and are competent to contract, are not married or related by
blood to each other, and will notify the
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appropriate agency within 30 days of
any change with regard to their status.
March 1989: 8TH CIRCUIT:
MANDATORY TESTING BY PUBLIC EMPLOYER BARRED BY 4TH
AMENDMENT: A unanimous panel
of the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled on February 6 that Eastern Nebraska Community Office of Retardation violated the 4th Amendment rights
of its employees to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures when it
adopted a policy of mandatory HIV antibody testing. Affirming a trial court
decision in Glover v. ENCOR, 686 F.
Supp. 243 (D. Neb. 1988), the Court
held that evidence introduced at trial
supported the determination that HIV
infected employees would present virtually no risk of workplace transmission
to the mentally retarded clients of ENCOR. The Court cautioned, however,
that such a determination had to be
based on the individual factual situation, and that it was not adopting a
"broad-based rule with regard to testing public employees for any infectious
disease, including AIDS." ENCOR
employees were represented by Omaha
attorney Patrick Kennison and the
ACLU of Nebraska. * * * Despite the
cautious note sounded by the Court,
the strongly worded district court opinion should provide a firm constitutional
basis for challenging other governmental testing programs. In that regard,
Lambda Legal Defense Fund recently
filed a motion for summary judgment in
its challenge to the U.S. Department of
Labor's testing program for Job Corps
participants, Dorsey v. U.S. Dept. of
Labor, urging the federal district court
in Washington, D.C., to rule that the
program was adopted in violation of
the Administrative Procedure Act. If
the motion succeeds, the policy might
have to be rescinded pending proper
publication and comment. The Job
Corps contends that the case is moot
because it has modified its policy away
from automatic exclusion of all HIV
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positive applicants. [Glover v. Eastern
Nebraska Community Office of Retardation, 867 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 321 (1989).]
May 1989: BAHR PRESIDENT WINS
MAJOR AIDS TRIAL ON BEHALF
OF PROMINENT GAY PHYSICIANS: BAHR President Morton
Newburgh won a jury verdict March 31
in Seitzman and Minola v. Hudson
River Associates (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co.,
Baer, J.), in which doctors Peter
Seitzman and Joseph Minola charged
the sponsor of a cooperative apartment
building with breach of a contract to
sell them an apartment for use as a
medical office. Testimony at trial centered on the risk, if any, to other occupants of the building from having a
medical office where persons with
AIDS were treated; Dr. Stephen Joseph, NY City's Health Commissioner,
responding to the question of risk,
stated "None whatsoever... Absolutely
none. Zero." However, the doctors
have to be content with a monetary
award, since the cooperative sponsor
no longer has voting control of the
building and the apartment was sold to
others before trial. The jury awarded
approximately $90,000 in compensatory
damages; the overall claim, including
punitive damages, was settled after the
verdict for $180,500.
Summer 1989: NEW YORK HIGH
COURT RECOGNIZES GAY FAMILIES: The New York Court of Appeals
ruled 4-2 in Braschi v. Stahl Associates
on July 6 that unmarried domestic partners of deceased tenants in rent controlled apartments were entitled to
protection from eviction as "family
members" under a state rent control
regulation which forbids eviction of
members of a deceased tenant's family
who resided with the tenant. * * * The
case involved a gay male couple, Leslie
Blanchard and Miguel Braschi. When
Blanchard died from AIDS, the landlord sought to evict Braschi from the
apartment where they had resided to-
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gether for ten years. Braschi sued to
enjoin his eviction. Trial judge Harold
Baer, Jr., ruled that their relationship
"fulfills any definitional criteria of the
term 'family,"' but the Appellate Division, First Department, reversed, holding that the regulation, Section
2204.6(d), which does not define "family," should be construed narrowly to
include only relatives by blood, marriage or adoption. * * * The Court of
Appeals disagreed. A plurality opinion
by Judge Vito Titone adopts a broad,
policy-based view of the regulation...
[extended quotation from the opinion
omitted here] Judge Titone's opinion
does not specifically mention gay people or sexual orientation, and due to
the gender-neutrality of Blanchard's
first name (Leslie) one could read the
first twelve pages of the opinion without even realizing it involved a samesex couple. At that point, in evaluating
the facts in Braschi's complaint, Titone
first refers to the couple as "the two
men," and concludes that a court could
reasonably hold that the two men
"were more than mere roommates."
The plurality clearly treated the case
generically as involving all unmarried
adult domestic partners (although the
term "domestic partner" is never used
in the opinion). . . Bill Rubenstein of
the ACLU Lesbian and Gay Rights
Project argued the appeal for Braschi.
Seven amicus briefs were filed in Braschi's behalf, including briefs from the
City of New York (urging broad construction of the term "family") and the
Association of the Bar of the City of
New York (urging a broader decision
on constitutional equal protection
grounds). The Court refrained from
any mention of constitutional grounds,
thus restricting the decision to the rent
control context and leaving numerous
pending cases on similar facts to be resolved under the Rent Stabilization
Law, while precluding a United States
Supreme Court appeal. [Braschi v.
Stahl Associates Co., 74 N.Y.2d 201,

446

N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.

543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (N.Y.
1989).]
September 1989: NEW YORK
MAYOR KOCH ISSUES EXECUTIVE ORDER ON DOMESTIC
PARTNERSHIPS: New York City
Mayor Edward I. Koch issued Executive Order 123 on August 7, authorizing
the city's Department of Personnel to
accept registration statements from
"domestic partners" and extending the
city's policy on bereavement leave so
that city employees may take paid leave
to attend funerals for their domestic
partners, partners' parents or children,
or other relatives of the partner living
with them. The policy binds all mayoral
agencies, and is also expected to be followed by the Health and Hospitals Corporation and the Board of Education.
The Order defines "domestic partnerships" as consisting of "two people,
both of whom are 18 years of age or
older and neither of whom is married,
who have a close and committed personal relationship involving shared responsibilities, who have lived together
for a period of one year or more on a
continuous basis at the time of registration, and who have registered as domestic partners. .. "
September 1989: BUSH MAKES
AIDS COMMISSION APPOINTMENTS: President George Bush finally
made his appointments to the National
AIDS Commission in July, naming Belinda Mason, president of the National
Association of People with AIDS, and
Professor David Rogers of Cornell
Medical College, who chairs New York
State and City AIDS Task Forces.
PWA advocacy groups hailed the
choices. Unlike President Reagan's
"HIV Commission," appointed to include few persons with AIDS expertise,
the new Commission, jointly appointed
by the President, the Senate and the
House of Representatives, includes
leading AIDS "experts" and advocates.
At its first meeting, the Commission
elected Dean June Osborn of the Uni-
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versity of Michigan School of Public
Health as its chair.
December 1989: MASSACHUSETTS
ENACTS GAY RIGHTS LAW: Massachusetts became the second state to enact a gay rights law on November 15,
when Governor Michael S. Dukakis
signed H 5427, which amends the Massachusetts Law Against Discrimination
to add to the prohibited bases for discrimination "sexual orientation, which
shall not include persons whose sexual
orientation involves minor children as
the sex object." (Those who might find
this category odd are reminded that the
North American Man/Boy Love Association was founded in Massachusetts
and is a major issue for local politicians.) Sexual orientation is defined as
"having an orientation for or being
identified as having an orientation for
heterosexuality, bisexuality, or homosexuality." * * * In addition to banning
discrimination in employment, housing,
bonding, and public accommodations,
the bill gives the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination authority to investigate and prosecute
violations. The chair of the MCAD,
Alex Rodriguez, told a reporter from
BNA that the agency projected a 15%
increase in its caseload as a result of the
new categories covered by the law,
which goes into effect in February. Opponents vowed to secure sufficient signatures to force a statewide referendum
on the law next November. * * * Enactment capped seventeen years of organizing and lobbying efforts by
Massachusetts gays. Arlene Isaacson,
head of the state's principal lesbian and
gay rights lobbying organization,
emerged as the leading spokesperson.
A last minute strategic decision to support passage with some weakening
amendments added by the state Senate
clouds the victory, however. One of the
amendments may preclude litigating
the issue of domestic partner benefits
under the statute, while others excuse
all religious institutions from compli-
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ance and disclaim any intent to authorize or require placement of adoptive or
foster children with gays. The law also
includes a ritualistic statement that the
law does not involve an endorsement or
approval of homosexuality or bisexuality. The inclusion of such 'demeaning
statements in a civil rights law reaffirms
the status of gays as perhaps the least
popular minority group, even among
those who acknowledge that we are entitled to civil rights.
January 1990: MASS. A.G. BLOCKS
GAY RIGHTS REFERENDUM: Massachusetts Attorney General James
Shannon has ruled that because the recently enacted Gay Rights Law "relates
to religion, religious practices, or religious institutions," it may not be the subject of a referendum vote because such
laws are expressly excluded by the
state's constitution from voter initiatives. In an opinion issued on December 7, Shannon reasoned that the
religious exclusion provisions (which
were insisted upon by legislative opponents of the Gay Rights Law) conferred
a benefit upon religious institutions by
broadly exempting them from compliance with the Massachusetts Law
Against Discrimination, and thus could
not be put up for a repeal vote by the
general public. Amendment Article 48
of the Massachusetts Constitution requires the Attorney General to certify
that petitions submitted to initiate the
referendum process are in proper form
and do not include material expressly
excluded from consideration by that
Article. Gay & Lesbian Advocates and
Defenders, a public interest law firm in
Boston, filed a brief with Shannon arguing that the various provisions of the
Gay Rights Law dealing with exclusions
and exemptions for religious institutions brought the law within the ambit
of the constitutional exclusion. [Note:
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court subsequently confirmed Attorney General Shannon's opinion in Collins v. Secretary of Commonwealth, 407

Mass. 837, 556 N.E.2d
1990).]
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February 1990: LAW SCHOOLS
VOTE DISCRIMINATION BAN: The
House of Representatives of the Association of American Law Schools
(AALS) voted January 6 in San Francisco to amend the AALS By-Law Section 6-4 to require member schools to
"provide equality of opportunity in legal education for all persons, including
faculty and employees, with respect to
hiring, continuation, promotion and
tenure, applicants for admission, enrolled students, and graduates, without
discrimination or segregation on the
ground of ...handicap or disability, or
sexual orientation." The new By-Laws
also provide, "A member school shall
communicate to each employer to
whom it furnishes assistance and facilities for interviewing and other placement functions the school's firm
expectation that the employer will observe the principle of equal opportunity." This provision follows a sentence
which requires schools to "pursue a
policy of providing its students and
graduates with equal opportunity to obtain employment, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of...
handicap or disability, or sexual orientation." Taken together, this may mean
that the law school community has enlisted in the campaign to end the Justice
Department's homophobic exclusionary policies, as well as adopting policies
protecting people with AIDS from discrimination under the "disability" rubric. The House also added "age" to
the list of protected categories, and
adopted an affirmative action requirement with regard to race, color and sex.
April 1990: IOWA SUPREME
COURT RULES FOR GAY FATHER
ON VISITATION: The Iowa Supreme
Court unanimously ruled in Walsh v.
Walsh, 1990 WL 16834 (2/21/90) that a
trial court erred by restricting Michael
Walsh's visitation with his young children to times when "no unrelated
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adult" was present. Susan Walsh had
conceded that Michael was a "good,
loving and responsible father to his
children." The trial court had awarded
joint custody, the children to reside
with Susan but with liberal visitation
rights for Michael, whose "coming out"
precipitated the divorce. The Supreme
Court commented, "This unusual provision was obviously imposed on account
of Michael's homosexual lifestyle,"
noted the findings about Michael's fitness and his assertion that his children
would not be "exposed" to his "private
sex life," and concluded that "Michael's
visitation rights should not be restricted
by limiting them to times when no unrelated adult is present." The court
also ruled that Michael's visitation
should be expanded to include a full
week during the summer. The trial
court had only awarded weekend visitations. Lambda Legal Defense and National Center for Lesbian Rights filed a
joint amicus brief, centering on scientific research on gay parenting and
child rearing. [Walsh v. Walsh, 451
N.W.2d 492 (Ia. 1990).]
May 1990: OHIO SUPREME COURT
APPROVES ADOPTION BY GAY
MAN; REVERSES MOST HOMOPHOBIC OPINION OF RECENT
YEARS: Repudiating what may be the
most homophobic appellate decision of
recent years, the Ohio Supreme Court
approved the adoption of an eight-yearold boy by a gay psychologist on March
28 in Matter of Adoption of Charles B.,
No. 88-2163. The 6-1 vote decisively rejected a 1988 decision by the 5th District Court of Appeals, which had ruled
that "the goals of announced homosexuality are hostile to the goals of the
adoption statute" and that, as a matter
of law, it is not in the best interest of
the then-seven-year-old child to be
"placed for adoption into the home of a
pair of adult male homosexual lovers."
This may be the first time a highest
state court has explicitly approved an
adoption of a minor by an openly gay

[Vol. XVII

adult. * * * Attorney C. William
Rickrich represented the minor,
Charles, as guardian ad litem, and attorney Robin Lyn Green represented
the gay psychologist, referred to in the
opinion as "Mr. B." Amicus briefs
were also filed on Mr. B's behalf by
Lambda Legal Defense & Education
Fund, the ACLU, the Institute for
Child Advocacy, and the Gay & Lesbian Parenting Group of Central Ohio
...[In re Adoption of Charles B., 50
Ohio St.3d 88, 552 N.E.2d 884 (Ohio
1990).]
June 1990: GAYS INVITED TO SIGNING OF BIAS BILL AT WHITE
HOUSE: For the first time, representatives of gay and lesbian groups were invited to the White House to witness the
signing of the first federal law to deal
explicitly with sexual orientation as a
protected class [sic]. President George
Bush signed the new federal Hate
Crimes Statistics Act on April 23 with
representatives of the National Gay
and Lesbian Task Force and the Human
Rights Campaign Fund in attendance.
The law mandates the Justice Department to compile national figures on
hate crimes, including crimes motivated
by actual or perceived sexual orientation of the victim. Bush announced
that a national toll-free phone number
would be established for reporting such
crimes. Pointedly not invited to the
signing ceremony was Task Force Executive Director Urvashi Vaid, who
earned White House antipathy by publicly interrupting a Bush speech on
AIDS.
October 1990: CALIFORNIA APPEALS COURT RULES AGAINST
LESBIAN CO-PARENT: In one of
two similar cases working their way
through the California courts, the
Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District ruled August 22 that Angela Curiale, co-parent of a child borne
by Robin Reagan, did not have standing to bring an action for determination
of visitation rights. . . On appeal, the
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unanimous court in an opinion by Presiding Judge Puglia agreed that no provision of California statutory law gave
any support to Curiale's claim. In addition, the court rejected Curiale's argument that it should strike out into new
territory in "the best interests of the
child by conferring legal parental status
on those who in reality act as the child's
parent, without totally depriving the biological or adoptive parent of their
rights." Asserting that plaintiff "misconceives the role of the judiciary as an
innovator of social policy," the court
holds that it is up to the legislature to
determine whether the de facto parent
doctrine should be used to confer
standing on "unrelated" parents to contest custody and visitation . . . Nancy
Kirk and M. Jane Pearce represented
Curiale and William Neil Shepard represented Reagan. [Curiale v. Reagan,
222 Cal.App.3d 1597, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520
(Cal.App. 3rd Dist. 1.990).]
December 1990: CONGRESS REPEALS ANTI-GAY IMMIGRATION
POLICIES: As Congress rushed to adjourn before the elections, the Senate
and House overwhelmingly passed the
Family Unity and Employment Opportunity Act of 1990. The Bush Administration supported the bill in its final
form, and approval was expected from
the President. Among other things, the
Act ends an anti-gay exclusionary policy of fifty years standing. It may also
eventually end the policy of excluding
HIV-seropositive immigrants. The Senate vote Oct. 26 was 89-8; the House
vote Oct. 27 was 264-118. * * * Repealing the anti-gay exclusion (included in
the medical exclusion section of the law
under the headings of "psychopathic
personality" and "sexual deviation")
was the principal legislative project of
Rep. Barney Frank (D-Mass.). Frank
introduced repeal bills for several years
and secured favorable testimony from
representatives of the Reagan and Bush
administrations. This year he succeeded in getting the measure attached
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as a House amendment to the Family
Unity Act, and it survived the final conference on dissimilar bills passed by the
two chambers. Frank initially opposed
trying to get a repeal of the 1987 Helms
Amendment, which mandated exclusion of HIV-positive immigrants, asserting it might kill the bill due to a
Helms filibuster. However, as things
came together in the final weeks, AIDS
activists saw an opportunity to take advantage of the overall reform of medical exclusions, and were able to obtain
language vesting discretion in the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
determine which "communicable diseases of public health significance" are
to be excluded. There is no guarantee
that HHS Secretary Louis Sullivan
(miffed at AIDS activists for disrupting
his speech at the International AIDS
Conference in June) will omit HIV infection from the list, but activists were
counting on the widespread consensus
that such an exclusion is of no benefit
to the public health. * * * While the
anti-gay exclusion does not directly affect many American gays, its removal is
a major event in the unfolding history
of gay liberation. The exclusion dates
from days when orthodox medical opinion insisted homosexuality was a
mental illness, and the political right
contended homosexuals in public office
(particularly the State Department)
were traitors who could not be trusted.
The McCarthy-era McCarran-Walter
Act of 1952 called for exclusion of
those afflicted with "psychopathic personality," which the Supreme Court
construed in Boutilier v. Immigration
and Naturalization Service, 387 U.S.
118 (1967), to apply to homosexuals.
Reacting to the argument that "psychopathic personality" might not apply to
all homosexuals, Congress amended the
law to add "sexual deviation" as an excludable condition. The statute established a medical diagnosis prerequisite
for exclusion under these categories;
Public Health Service doctors were to
"diagnose" those afflicted. In 1979,
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Surgeon General Julius Richmond
ruled that homosexuality was no longer
considered an illness by mental health
professionals, so his doctors would no
longer diagnose it. Circuit courts of appeals split on whether such a diagnosis
was a prerequisite to exclusion or denial of naturalization of an admitted
homosexual, but the Supreme Court refused to take a case to resolve the split.
Discriminatory U.S. immigration policies became the focus of world protest
in 1990 during the International AIDS
Conference, and Harvard University
had indicated it might forego hosting a
similar conference in 1992 if the HIVexclusionary policy was not changed by
then. [Note: Dr. Sullivan disappointed
the AIDS activists and, bowing to pressure from Congressional Republicans,
included HIV infection on the official
listing of excludable conditions under
the revised immigration law, where it
remains to this day.]
January 1991: NY APPELLATE DIVISION NARROWS PRIVACY
RIGHTS: In a memorandum decision
upholding a continuing injunction
against operation of the New Saint
Mark's Baths in New York City, a
unanimous panel of the New York Appellate Division, First Department,
adopted a narrow interpretation of the
sexual privacy rights protected in People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987, the historic 1980
decision barring prosecution of sodomy
between consenting adults in private,
non-commercial settings. The usual interpretation of Onofre has been that
reference to "non-commercial" settings
was intended to exempt from protection sex for hire (prostitution). However, the Appellate Division construed
the exemption much more broadly, implying that a private room rented in a
bathhouse is not a non-commercial setting. By this logic, the N.Y. sodomy
statute (which has not been modified or
repealed) might apply to consensual
sodomy between adults in a hotel or
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motel room... The injunction allowed
the bathhouse to reopen at the end of
September 1990, provided there were
no "private rooms which are not continuously open to visual inspection" on
the premises. The bathhouse did not
reopen. [City of New York v. New St.
Marks Baths, 168 A.D.2d 311, 562
N.Y.S.2d 642 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990),
appeal dismissed, 77 N.Y.2d 939, 569
N.Y.S.2d 612, 572 N.E.2d 53 (N.Y.
1991). The gay bathhouses in New
York City were casualties of the decision by the city government to be seen
to be "doing something" in response to
the AIDS epidemic. The gay community itself was heavily split over the
question whether it made more sense to
let bathhouses stay open under strict
regulation of conduct, or to close them
down.]
February 1991: BROOKLYN SURROGATE SAYS NO TO SPOUSAL
ELECTION BID: Kings County, New
York, Acting Surrogate Vincent Pizzuto
has dismissed an attempt by a surviving
gay life partner to claim a spousal share
against the estate of his deceased partner. Ruling in Estate of William
Thomas Cooper, Surrogate Pizzuto rejected the argument that refusal to allow a gay partner to elect against an
estate violated Equal Protection requirements or the Court of Appeals'
1989 Braschi decision. * * * Of perhaps
more significance, Surrogate Pizzuto
went behind the estates law claim to
rule that exclusion of gays from the
ability to marry in New York is constitutional. Citing old case law from other
jurisdictions (the most recent appellate
rulings on gay marriage date from the
1970s), Pizzuto held that the state's interest in promoting heterosexual marriage as a stable environment for
procreation and the raising of children
justified the state's refusal to make
marriage available to lesbians and gay
men. The contestant, Ernest Chin, had
argued that his exclusion from electing
a spousal share was a compounded
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Equal Protection violation because of
the underlying exclusion from marriage. * * * In rejecting the claim that
the Braschi decision, which recognized
gay partners as family members for purposes of a regulation governing evictions from rent controlled apartments,
would control this case, Pizzuto commented: "There is a great distinction
between being part of a family entitled
to the protection of rent control laws
because of public policy and legislative
intent and in being a surviving spouse
of a decedent." He also said that it
would be inappropriate "judicial legislation" for him to extend the right to a
spousal share beyond the relationships
recognized by the legislature. * * *
Bradley B. Davis represented Mr. Chin.
[Cooper, In the Matter of the Estate of
William Thomas, 149 Misc.2d 282, 564
N.Y.S.2d 684 (Sur.Ct., Kings Co., 1990),
affirmed, 187 A.D.2d 128, 592 N.Y.S.2d
797 (N.Y.A.D., 2nd Dept. 1993), appeal
dismissed, 82 N.Y.2d 801, 624 N.E.2d
696 (1993). By the early 1990's, samesex marriage had emerged as a major
topic of gay rights litigation after a hiatus of a decade, as will be seen below.]
March 1991: CENSUS BUREAU REPORTS NON-TRADITIONAL FAMILIES GREW DURING 1980s: The
U.S. Census Bureau announced Jan. 29
that a recent household survey showed
that the trend toward non-traditional
families continued during the 1980s, although at a slower rate than during the
1970s. As summarized in the Jan. 30
New York Times, in 1970 40% of the
nation's households were made up of a
married couple with one or more minor
children. That figure dropped to 31%
by 1980 and 26% by 1990. Average
household size also continued to drop,
from 3.14 persons in 1970 to 2.76 in
1980 and 2.63 in 1990. The number of
households consisting of "single" parents with children grew by 41% during
the 1980s. More detailed figures are expected later this year based on the 1990
national census. * * * The growth in
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non-traditional families provides the
demographic basis for the movement
toward domestic partnership ordinances, which provide formal recognition for non-traditional families. Major
cities which have enacted such ordinances in recent years include San
Francisco, Seattle, Madison (WI), and
Minneapolis. These ordinances allow
unmarried couples (including same-sex
couples) to register with city authorities
as domestic partners. Some of these
and similar ordinances in smaller municipalities also extend various benefits
otherwise granted only to legally recognized spouses.
April 1991: FLORIDA COURT DECLARES BAN ON ADOPTIONS BY
GAYS UNCONSTITUTIONAL: Circuit Court Judge M. Ignatius Lester of
the Florida Circuit Court of the 16th Judicial Circuit (Key West, Monroe
County), ruled March 15 in Seebol v.
Farie, No. 90-923-CA-18, that sec.
63.042(3), Florida Statutes, barring gays
from being adoptive parents, violates
the Florida Constitution's privacy
amendment as well as federal and state
due process and equal protection provisions. Lester ruled on a challenge
brought by Edward Seebol, a prospective adoptive parent who had participated in the state's guardianship and
guardian ad litem programs but was
turned down by the state Department
of Health and Rehabilitative Services
when he applied to become an adoptive
parent. The statute, enacted in 1977 in
the wake of the Anita Bryant "Save
Our Children" campaign to repeal a local gay rights ordinance in Dade
County, states: "No person eligible to
adopt under this statute may adopt if
that person is a homosexual." * * * The
Privacy Amendment, Art. I, sec. 23 of
the state's constitution, was adopted in
1980, and was recently invoked by the
state Supreme Court in support of a
woman's right to an abortion, but has
not previously been construed in the
context of gay rights. Florida activists
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have been contemplating a challenge to
the state's misdemeanor sodomy law
under this amendment. Lester's opinion indicates such a challenge would
have a strong chance of success. Lester
noted that two years prior to passage of
the amendment, the Florida Supreme
Court ruled that the homosexuality of
an applicant for admission to practice
law was not a disqualifying factor, stating that "[g]overnmental regulation in
the area of private morality is generally
considered anachronistic in the absence
of a clear and convincing showing that
there is a substantial connection between the private acts regulated and
public interest and welfare," leading
Lester to conclude: "The strong message from In re Florida Board of Bar
Examiners [358 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1978)] is
that sexual orientation was entitled, in
1978, to at least some measure of constitutional protection. The fact that two
years later the people chose to expand
constitutional protection for privacy
strongly supports the position that they
felt existing constitutional protections
were inadequate and that the Florida
right to privacy should encompass a
broader realm of privacy rights than
that in the Federal Constitution... That
broader realm certainly must include
protection for an individual's sexual
orientation, which is a 'decision [] vitally affecting his private life according
to his own conscience'..., and protection against penalization of sexual orientation." The state is violating the
privacy amendment by inquiring into
the sexual orientation of applicants as a
disqualifying factor, because it has no
compelling justification for the inquiry.
Based on existing literature on lesbian
and gay parenting, Lester concludes
that any state interest in protecting the
best interests of children "is not advanced by this statutory exclusion. . ." *
* * An interesting sidelight: In discussing the right of privacy, Lester notes the
recent comment by retired Justice
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. that "he recognized
his mistake in not voting for an exten-
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sion of the constitutional right to privacy in Bowers v. Hardwick." Even
though Justice Powell's comments to
the press are obiter dicta, they may
have some weight as judges have to
grapple with the precedential effect of
Hardwick. * * * Seebol is jointly represented by West Palm Beach attorney
Lynn G. Waxman and Florida ACLU
Legal Director James K. Green.
[Seebol v. Farie, 17 Fain. L. Rep.
(BNA) 1331 (Fla.Cir.Ct., Monroe
County, Mar. 15, 1991).]
June 1991: NGRA DISBANDS: National Gay Rights Advocates, a San
Francisco-based public interest law
firm, closed its door in May. Founded
in the mid-1970s as Gay Rights Advocates, the firm was known for the famous Pacific Telephone case, in which
the California Supreme Court ruled
that a regulated utility like the telephone company was bound by state
constitutional and regulatory policies
not to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. During the AIDS crisis, NGRA was particularly active on
insurance issues, participating on a special study panel of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners,
surveying state insurance departments
on their policies, and instituting complaints against several insurance companies for discriminatory practices on
the basis of HIV status or perceived
sexual orientation. NGRA suffered a
major blow in 1989 when its long-time
Legal Director, Leonard Graff, resigned and Executive Director Jean
O'Leary discharged the remaining staff
attorneys. Several other staff members
then resigned. O'Leary subsequently
resigned after former staffers alleged a
variety of improprieties. Although
NGRA hired new attorneys in 1990, the
organization never recovered from the
shocks of 1989, and the faltering economy hurt an organization that relied almost exclusively on direct mail
solicitation for funding. * * * NGRA's
demise leaves two national lesbian and
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gay public interest firms: Lambda Legal
Defense & Education Fund (main office in New York, branch office in Los
Angeles) and the National Center for
Lesbian Rights (San Francisco). The
ACLU's Lesbian and Gay Rights Project employs staff attorneys in New
York, Washington, Chicago, San Francisco and Los Angeles. Regional organizations with smaller litigation dockets
exist in Massachusetts, Texas, and
Michigan.
Summer 1991: BOWING TO POLITICAL PRESSURE, CDC SAYS HIVINFECTED PHYSICIANS & DENTISTS SHOULD TELL PATIENTS;
CONGRESS FOLLOWS SUIT: The
Centers for Disease Control announced
in the July 12 issue of its Morbidity and
Mortality Weekly Report (vol. 40, no.
RR-8) its new "Recommendations for
Preventing Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Hepatitis B
Virus to Patients during ExposureProne Invasive Procedures." Despite
no documented case of transmission
from a physician to a patient during invasive procedures, and only one documented case where an infected dentist's
lax infection control procedures may
have led to infection of five patients,
CDC recommended that all health care
workers who perform invasive procedures "should know their HIV-antibody status" as well as their status
with regard to contagious hepatitis B
(HBV), should refrain from "exposureprone procedures unless they have
sought counsel from an expert review
panel," and should notify "prospective
patients of the [health care worker's]
seropositivity before they undergo exposure-prone invasive procedures."
Although stated as "Recommendations," CDC's statement seemed likely
to become a requirement rather
quickly. Within days of its release, the
noted medical and AIDS expert Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina had
persuaded the Senate to amend an appropriations bill to make it a federal
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crime for an HIV- or infectious HBVinfected health care worker to perform
an invasive procedure without notifying
the patient. Other legislative leaders
crafted a less onerous amendment,
which also passed the Senate easily, requiring states to adopt the CDC Guidelines as part of their licensing
requirements for health care professionals. It was not known how these
amendments would fare in the House
of Representatives, but the panic to do
something about protecting straight
people from AIDS has fueled irrational
legislative thinking on this issue. The
likely consequence will be further to
deter health care workers from performing invasive procedures on patients they know or suspect to be HIVinfected (or to demand HIV testing of
all patients), and to attempt to conceal
their HIV-status from colleagues and
employers, knowing that if they were
forced to reveal their status to patients
their practices would be destroyed.
Meanwhile, legislation is pending in
several states requiring infected health
care workers to disclose their status to
patients. That these unscientific and
damaging developments stem from a
freak coincidence in one dentist's office
is a disgrace for the credibility of national public health policy.
October 1991: D.C. JUDGE GRANTS
TWO-PARENT ADOPTION FOR
LESBIAN COUPLE: Judge Geoffrey
M. Alprin, who heads the Family Law
Division of the D.C. Superior Court,
ruled August 30 that each member of a
lesbian couple could adopt the child of
the other without cutting off parental
rights. Although two-parent adoptions
have become routine in some California counties, and have been granted in
some other states, including Alaska,
Minnesota, and Oregon, this decision,
Ex Parte in the Matter of the Petitions
of L.S. and V.L., Adoptions No. A-26990 & A-27090 [17 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA)
1523], appears to be the first published
decision expressly to consider granting
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the adoption petition of one woman
without cutting off the other woman's
parental rights, according to American
University Law School Professor Nancy
Polikoff, a leading authority on this issue and the lead counsel for the petitioners. The case may also be the first
in which a court has approved a "joint"
adoption where each of the women is
already established as the mother of
one of the children prior to the
adoption.
November 1991: TULANE PUBLISHES FIRST LESBIAN & GAY
LAW REVIEW: Students at Tulane
University Law School have succeeded
in publishing what is probably the first
law-school-sponsored law review devoted primarily to lesbian and gay legal
issues in the United States. The first issue of Law & Sexuality: A Review of
Lesbian and Gay Legal Issues arrived
in subscribers' mail late in October. All
of the articles and comments are listed
in the Publications Noted section of this
Newsletter.
December 1991: CALIFORNIA APPEALS COURT SAYS GAYS ARE
PROTECTED FROM PRIVATE
SECTOR EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION; WILSON CLAIMS VINDICATION: Ruling October 28 in
Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corporation,
a three-judge panel of the California
Court of Appeal for the First District
unanimously ruled that the state's Labor Code prohibits discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation by private sector employees. Relying on the
1979 Pacific Telephone decision of the
California Supreme Court (which cited
the Labor Code's political freedom provisions to hold that a highly-regulated
public utility was barred from systematic discrimination against openly gay
employees) and subsequent developments in the lower courts, Justice
Timothy Reardon flatly stated: "These
statutes also prohibit a private employer from discriminating against an
employee on the basis of his or her sex-
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ual orientation." However, attorneys
representing the three plaintiffs in the
case, which had broader implications
for pre-employment testing of applicants because of its holding with regard
to state privacy law, cautioned that the
case was likely to go up on appeal to
the California Supreme Court, which is
a much more conservative bench than it
was when the key 1979 precedent was
rendered (by a 4-3 vote). * * * Governor Pete Wilson's deputy press secretary, Franz R. Wisner, was quoted in
the New York Times as stating that the
ruling vindicated Wilson's position that
the recently vetoed gay rights employment bill was unnecessary. Wisner asserted that the Governor had treated
this as a "policy issue" and that the
court ruling confirmed the correctness
of his position. However, critics of Wilson's veto had pointed out that existing
legal protections, whatever their extent,
placed a significant burden on gay discriminates to litigate without the assistance of the Fair Employment and
Housing Commission, and without the
strong possibility of a government-assisted settlement in the administrative
process, forestalling the need to litigate
in most cases. [Soroka v. Dayton-Hudson Corporation, 235 Cal.App.3d 654, 1
Cal.Rptr.2d 77 (Cal.App., 1st Dist.
1991), review granted, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d
180, 822 P.2d 1327 (Cal. 1992), review
dismissed as moot, 862 P.2d 148, 24 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 587 (Cal. 1993). The case became moot because the legislature codified the ruling by adding amendments
to the Labor Code specifically forbidding sexual orientation discrimination
in employment, which Governor Wilson signed.]
January 1992: MINNESOTA COURT
NAMES THOMPSON GUARDIAN
OF KOWALSKI: A unanimous panel
of the Minnesota Court of Appeals
ruled Dec. 17 that Sharon Kowalski, seriously injured in a 1983 automobile accident, should be placed under the
guardianship and custody of Karen
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Thompson, her domestic partner before
the accident. 1991 WL 263225. Reversing St. Louis County District Court
Judge Robert Campbell on virtually all
points of his April 23, 1991, ruling, the
court held that Campbell abused his
discretion by denying Thompson's
guardianship petition and instead appointing Karen Tomberlin, a friend and
neighbor of Kowalski's parents. Judge
Jack Davies' decision for the court
pointedly observes that Sharon's choice
to live with Karen Thompson "is further supported by the fact that Thompson and Sharon are a family of affinity,
which ought to be accorded respect." *
* * After the accident, when Thompson
informed Sharon's parents that Karen
and Sharon were lesbian partners, they
moved to exclude Karen from any contact with Sharon. They repeatedly denied that their daughter was a lesbian,
and Donald Kowalski was able to secure sole appointment as legal guardian
of his adult daughter, moving her to a
nursing home remote from the home
that she shared with Thompson.
Thompson established a legal defense
fund to support her efforts to have the
guardianship decision modified or overturned. The effort took her through the
state court system and an unsuccessful
attempt to get the U.S. Supreme Court
to intervene in the case. Thompson's
big breakthrough came when she discovered that Donald Kowalski failed to
have new medical evaluations made as
required by Minnesota law. In 1988,
Campbell granted Thompson's petition
to compel a medical evaluation of
Sharon and, when the doctors indicated
that Sharon wanted to see Thompson
(from whom she had been kept totally
isolated for five years), Campbell ordered that visitation be allowed and
that Sharon be moved to a facility
closer to Thompson's home where better medical services would be available.
Later in 1988, bowing to the inevitable,
Donald Kowalski notified the court that
he wished to be relieved as guardian
due to "his own medical problems,"
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and Thompson petitioned for guardianship. * * * Campbell ruled on April 23,
1991, that a "neutral" person, Tomberlin, should be the guardian. Tomberlin
never formally applied for appointment, although she suggested it in a private letter to Judge Campbell.
Thompson received no notice prior to
Campbell's decision that Tomberlin was
proposed to be the guardian. * * * Davies' opinion is highly critical of Campbell's decision-making, which appeared
to disregard the medical testimony
presented at the hearing. Davies
pointed out that doctors testified without contradiction that Sharon was capable of expressing a preference, but
Campbell found she was not. All the
expert testimony showed Thompson
was fully qualified to serve as guardian,
but there was no evidence on Tomberlin's qualifications. Indeed, Davies emphasized, the doctors' treatment goal
for Sharon was to achieve a living situation outside an institution; Thompson
was prepared to provide this, having
constructed a fully-accessible and
equipped home in St. Cloud; Tomberlin
was unable to do more than supervise
Sharon's treatment in an institution.
Furthermore, Davies rejected Campbell's characterization of Tomberlin as a
"neutral" party, observing that she had
opposed Thompson's appointment, was
a friend of the Kowalskis, and had facilitated appearances of two other witnesses opposing Thompson's appointment. Hardly neutral! * * * At press
time, it was not clear whether Tomberlin would appeal the court's ruling.
Thompson was represented by M. Sue
Wilson and Christine N. Howard of
Wilson & Binder, a Minneapolis firm.
Amicus briefs were submitted on behalf
of Thompson by Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund (Suzanne
Born, cooperating attorney), the Minnesota Civil Liberties Union (Brian B.
O'Neill, John R. Bedosky, and Michael
A Ponto, cooperating attorneys), and
the National Organization for Women
(Sonja R. Peterson, cooperating attor-
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ney). [In re Guardianship of Sharon
Kowalski, Ward, 478 N.W.2d 790
(Minn. App. 1991), rev. denied, Feb. 10,
1992.]
January 1992: CDC ABANDONS
"EXPOSURE-PRONE"
PROCEDURE LIST: Despite official statements that it still intends to proceed
with publishing a list of "exposureprone" procedures which HIV-infected
surgeons and dentists should not be allowed to perform, officials of the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) have
indicated that such a list will not be issued for the foreseeable future. Bowing to pressure from its members, the
American Medical Association finally
indicated in December that it would
join with other health care professional
organizations in refusing to cooperate
in producing a list of procedures that
HIV-infected health care workers
would be barred from performing. This
is not surprising, since to date no surgical or dental procedures have been
identified as actually having been a vector of HIV transmission.
February 1992: CO-FOUNDER OF
GAY LEGAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
DIES: E. Carrington Boggan, a cofounder of Lambda Legal Defense &
Education Fund and a leading advocate
for lesbian and gay rights within the organized bar, has died in Los Angeles on
Jan. 20, age 48. Cary Boggan was the
first openly-gay section chair in the
American Bar Association, and litigated many important gay rights cases
during the 1970's as a board member of
Lambda. He was also one of the first to
teach a law school gay rights course, as
an adjunct instructor at New York Law
School beginning in 1978. With William J. Thom, he co-founded the firm of
Boggan & Thom, one of the earliest
"gay law firms" in the country.
April 1992: GEORGIA SUPREME
COURT ENFORCES LESBIAN
COUPLE'S CONTRACT: Reversing a
trial court ruling, the Georgia Supreme
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Court held March 19 that a joint property ownership agreement by a lesbian
couple is not unenforceable as a matter
of public policy. Crooke v. Gilden.
The lower court premised its decision
on the sodomy law, which was upheld
against federal constitutional challenge
in Bowers v. Hardwick. * * * Patricia
Gilden and Florence Crooke began
their relationship in 1982, and executed
a written joint property ownership
agreement to govern their house and
other personal property. The agreement was drafted by a lawyer whom
they retained for that purpose. Crooke,
original owner of the home, was to convey half-interest to Gilden, while
Gilden was to contribute money toward
household renovations. The contract
also designated property owned by the
women before the agreement or acquired during their relationship as
jointly-owned, to be equally divided in
the event their relationship ended.
Crooke refused to honor the agreement
when the relationship ended in 1989.
Gilden sought specific enforcement
with respect to the real estate. The trial
court ruled that the contract was unenforceable on public policy grounds,
commenting that enforcement would
"facilitate a relationship which in Georgia is considered illegal and immoral."
Section 13-8-1 of the Georgia statutes
provides: "A contract to do an immoral
or illegal thing is void." * * * The Supreme Court disagreed with this application of the statute. "Nothing in the
contract casts upon either of the parties
the responsibility to perform any illegal
activity," wrote Chief Justice Clarke.
"Further, the parol evidence admitted
demonstrates that the alleged illegal activity was at most incidental to the contract rather than required by it."
Finding the contract was supported by
legal consideration and that the
promises contained in the contract "are
also legal," the court asserted: "Enforcement of those promises does not
contravene OCGA sec. 13-8-1." * * *
Lambda Legal Defense Fund, National
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Center for Lesbian Rights and the
ACLU filed amicus briefs in the case,
urging enforceability of the agreement.
The trial court's decision had startled
Georgia attorneys who assist lesbian
and gay couples in formalizing their relationships through contractual agreements, since if affirmed it would have
made it virtually impossible for gays in
the state to make binding agreements
to govern the economic terms of their
relationships. [Crooke v. Gilden, 262
Ga. 122, 414 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. 1992).]
May 1992: FEDERAL AU ORDERS
FUNDING CUT-OFF AT DISCRIMINATORY HOSPITAL: For the first
time in the AIDS epidemic, a federal
administrative law judge (AU) ordered
suspension of federal funding for a private hospital that maintains a policy of
discriminating against HIV-infected
health care workers. Ruling April 20 in
In the Matter of Westchester County
Medical Center, Docket No. 91-504-2,
Decision No. 191, AU Steven T. Kessel
determined that the hospital's refusal to
employ the JoAn Doe complainant as a
pharmacist without work restrictions violates sec. 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973. The only remedy for a violation that can be imposed by federal authorities is suspension of federal
financial assistance. The hospital derives 40% of its annual budget from
Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements, which could be ended by Judge
Kessel's order. (By contrast, a private
action brought under sec. 504 in federal
court would expose the hospital to the
possibility of full remedial relief, including, according to at least one recent
federal court ruling, compensatory and
punitive damages.) The hospital indicated it would appeal to the Department of Health and Human Services'
Departmental Appeals Board. A parallel proceeding by the complainant,
under the New York State Human
Rights Law continues on appeal in state
courts. The complainant is represented
by Lambda Legal Defense & Education
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Fund, where Evan Wolfson is the lead
attorney on the case.
June 1992: IRONY, THE NAME IS
FEMA!: On May 11, Federal Times, a
newspaper for federal civil servants,
published a lengthy front-page story by
Daniel J. Roy titled "Being Gay in
Government: Facing Choice of Openness At the Office," which profiled
openly lesbian and gay employees of
the federal government. First described
in the article was Lorri Jean, a member
of the Board of Directors of Lambda
Legal Defense and Education Fund,
who is Deputy Regional Director (San
Francisco) of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA). In the
article, Jean recounts how her boss was
fully supportive after she participated
in a television news interview as a lesbian activist, and she had been promoted to this job (with a top secret
security clearance) after coming out.
Sounds great! * * * On May 14, leading
national newspapers reported that a
FEMA employee in Washington, Jerald
E. Johnson, had been pressured by
agency officials to give them a list of
agency employees Johnson suspected
might be gay, as a condition for obtaining a necessary security clearance to
undertake an overseas assignment.
Johnson's own remarks during an earlier security clearance proceeding appear to have sparked the agency
demand: responding to a question
about sexual activity, Johnson stated he
was gay and did not consider that an issue, since there were plenty of other
gay people at FEMA with clearances.
Agency security officials asked him to
name names, and he initially refused
and withdrew his application. Then
when the opportunity for the overseas
job came up and it was made clear he
would not get a clearance without naming names, he submitted a list on the
understanding it would be confidential.
When Johnson returned from his assignment and discovered the list had
been turned over to security officials,
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he decided to go public. The New York
Times ran a front-page article May 14,
titled "Government Agency Ferreted
Out Names of Its Gay Workers," and
editorialized on May 115 that the government action was inappropriate and
demonstrated the need for federal laws
banning anti-gay discrimination. U.S.
Rep. Barney Frank announced he
would hold a subcommittee hearing to
grill agency director Wallace E.
Stickney, who initially defended the
agency's actions by claiming that closeted gay employees pose a security risk.
On May 19, the Times reported that the
agency had shredded the list and Frank
had postponed his hearing. Director
Stickney also announced he would convene a "board of review" to examine
the agency's Security Department, after
indications that it "may be operating
under outmoded procedures." Although federal Office of Personnel
Management guidelines state that sexual orientation is not grounds per se for
agency personnel actions, security
agencies and clearance procedures focusing on gays have been upheld by the
courts and are required by internal
rules of some agencies, including the
Defense Department, FBI, and CIA.
Guess who was called to Washington by
Stickney for advice on how to deal with
this exploding issue? Lorri Jean!
October 1992: KENTUCKY SUPREME COURT STRIKES SODOMY LAW, 4-3: In the first sodomy
law reform victory in a state's highest
court since the Hardwick decision, the
Kentucky Supreme Court ruled 4-3 in
Commonwealth v. Wasson (9/24/92),
that a sodomy law prohibiting only
same-sex activity violates the state's
constitution. A similar challenge is
pending before the Texas Supreme
court. The ruling is premised solely on
state constitutional grounds, so it is not
subject to further appeal. * * * Jeffrey
Wasson was arrested in a Lexington,
Kentucky, parking lot in 1986 by an undercover police officer and charged
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with solicitation to commit a crime in
violation of KRS 506.300. The officer
charged that Wasson invited him home
to engage in gay sex violative of KRS
510.100, which punishes "deviate sexual
intercourse with another person of the
same sex" and specifies that consent is
not a defense. Deviate sexual intercourse is defined as sexual contact between the genitals of one person and
the mouth or anus of the other. Violation of the sodomy law is a class A misdemeanor; solicitation to violate it is a
class B misdemeanor. Wasson asserted
that the sodomy law is unconstitutional
and thus no charge of solicitation to
commit a crime could be lodged against
him. * * * Trial and intermediate appellate courts agreed with Wasson, finding
the law violative of privacy (at the trial
level) and additionally of equal protection (at the intermediate appellate
level). The state Supreme Court affirmed on both theories, in an opinion
by Justice Charles M. Leibson, joined
by Chief Justice Robert F. Stephens
and Justices Dan Jack Combs and
Thomas B. Spain. Justice Combs also
wrote a concurring opinion, which was
joined by the Chief Justice. Justices Joseph E. Lambert and Donald C.
Wintersheimer wrote dissents. Justice
Charles H. Reynolds joined the Lambert dissent. * * * Counsel for Jeffrey
Wasson through six years of litigation
include Ernesto Scorsone, Pam
Goldman and Dean W. Bucalos of Lexington. Amici too numerous to list
here filed briefs on both sides of the
case; briefs from an array of professional medical and mental health
groups, as well as religious groups supportive of gay rights, were specifically
noted by Leibson in his opinion. [Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Wasson, 842
S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992).]
December 1992: CLINTON VICTORY
MAY SIGNAL END TO MILITARY
BAN: On Nov. 3, U.S. voters elected
the first president ever to campaign on
a platform including a pledge to lift the
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U.S. Defense Department's ban on
openly gay and lesbian service members. Even more astonishing to many
media pundits and the Defense Department, Bill Clinton, governor of a state
with a criminal sodomy law and no
state or local bans on anti-gay discrimination, appeared to mean what he said
on this issue, responding to a question
at his first post-election press conference by reiterating his intention of ending the ban. A prolonged nationwide
media uproar ensued, as various military "experts," from Chair of the joint
Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell to Senate
Armed Services Committee Chair Sam
Nunn, to anonymous soldiers interviewed by reporters, predicted massive
problems should the ban be lifted.
(Where were these people during the
campaign, one wonders?) Several
newspapers rushed to take on the opponents, editorializing that the nay-sayers sounded too much like those who
opposed racial integration of the armed
forces more than forty years ago by
President Truman's Executive Order.
(The Washington Blade did a brilliant
job of juxtaposing old and new quotes
to illustrate this point in its Nov. 20 issue). Although not waivering on his
overall intention, Clinton did follow his
accustomed approach when he announced that he would consult widely,
perhaps setting up a study committee
on implementation, and that he would
insist on stringent regulations governing conduct (without specifying in
his announcement what conduct would
be banned by the regulations). Resulting skepticism in the gay press brought
reminders that Truman had done something similar in 1948: issued an order
suspending the existing segregation
while appointing a commission to oversee implementation. * * * The press was
then full of recommendations on how
Clinton should or should not do it: The
New Republic accompanied a scathing
expose of mistreatment of lesbians and
gays in the military with an editorial
calling for an immediate end of the au-
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tomatic expulsion of gays, and a
delayed (to January 1994) end to the
ban on enlistments, to give the military
time to process the change and adopt
appropriate regulations. Meanwhile,
media military "experts," such as bigmouth retired colonel David Hackworth of Newsweek, raised specters of
gay soldiers making passes in the showers. In a typical display of bad timing,
the Navy decided to implement a new
oath policy for its Reserve Officer
Training Corps (ROTC) units on college campuses, under which enlistees
swear that they are not gay and promise
to return all their ROTC scholarship
money if it later comes out that they
are. And a bevy of Congress members,
led by Rep. Gerry Studds of Massachusetts, sent a letter to the Pentagon demanding suspension of process of gays
for discharge pending the expected policy change.
December 1992: TEXAS COURT UPHOLDS LIFE SENTENCE IN SPITTING CASE: The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals has refused to review
the Texas Court of Appeals' July 9 decision in Weeks v. State, 834 S.W.2d 559,
upholding a virtual life sentence for
Curtis Weeks, an HIV-infected man
convicted of attempted murder for spitting at a prison guard. At trial, the
state presented two so-called "experts"
- a social psychologist and a dental hygienist/orthopedic surgeon, neither with
academic training in infectious diseases
- who swore that HIV can be transmitted by spitting; the Court of Appeals
found no error on the part of the trial
court in relying on these "experts." At
the time of his conviction, Weeks was
six weeks short of release from a robbery sentence. Weeks claimed he was
provoked to spit at a guard when he
was denied use of bathroom facilities.
Weeks is represented on appeal by the
ACLU Aids and Civil Liberties Project
(attorneys Bill Rubenstein and Ruth
Harlow) and cooperating attorneys
Steven Alan Reiss and Curt P. Beck
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from Weil, Gotshall & Manges. [Weeks
v. State, 834 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Ct. App.
1992), discretionary rev. denied, Oct.
14, 1992, habeas corpus denied, sub
nom Weeks v. Collins, 867 F. Supp. 544
(S.D.Tex. 1994), aff'd sub nom. Weeks
v. Scott, 55 F.3d 1059 (5th Cir. 1995).]
February 1992:
CLINTON IN STRATEGIC COMPROMISE ON MILITARY BAN: Reiterating that he intended to redeem his
pledge to end the ban on military service by lesbians and gay men, President
Bill Clinton deferred issuing an Executive Order when it became clear during
the second week of his administration
that Congressional opponents would
try to overrule any such Order by attaching an amendment in the Senate to
pending administration legislation. * * *
Immediately after the inauguration,
Clinton staffers floated a trial balloon:
an Executive Order would be delayed
while language was negotiated with military personnel, but informally the
armed services would be instructed to
cease inquiring about the sexual orientation of new recruits and cease
processing for discharge those service
members discovered to be gay. By the
end of his first full week in office, Clinton had met with the joint chiefs of
staff, who furiously opposed lifting the
ban, and congressional leaders, who
warned Clinton to hold off for fear of
endangering his legislative program.
By the end of January, it had come
down to direct negotiations between
Clinton, Senate Armed Services Committee Chair Sam Nunn of Georgia,
and General Colin Powell, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while Congress
was flooded with phone calls generated
largely by the religious right and conservative radio talk show hosts. On
Jan. 29 Clinton announced the result:
an Executive Order drafted by Defense
Secretary Les Aspin will be issued July
15; in the meantime, Sen. Nunn will
hold hearings on the issue, the Defense
Department will omit questions about
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sexual orientation from enlistment

forms, judges will be requested to stay
proceedings in pending lawsuits involving the ban, and instead of being discharged, gays will be placed on unpaid
reserve status, from which they would
have to petition for reinstatement when
the ban is lifted. However, Republican
Senators Dan Coats and Bob Dole repeated threats to attempt to amend the
first bill to come before the Senate with
a codification of the current ban, setting
up a confrontation in the Senate during
the first week of February, when floor
action is expected on the Family and
Medical Leave Bill.
February 1992: NEW YORK HOSPITAL SETTLES LONG-RUNNING
AIDS DISPUTE: Westchester County
(NY) Medical Center abandoned further appeals in its quest to deny unrestricted employment to an HIVinfected pharmacist, after being ordered to offer such employment by
both the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) and the
New York State Division of Human
Rights (SDHR). The case arose when
an offer of employment to the John
Doe plaintiff was rescinded after a
nurse employed by the Medical Center
breached the confidentiality of the
plaintiff's medical records to inform the
physician in charge of hiring for the
hospital's Pharmacy Department that
the plaintiff was HIV-infected. The
plaintiff filed charges in 1986 with the
SDHR under the state's disability discrimination law, and with HHS, alleging a violation of sec. 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The hospital previously attempted to settle by offering Doe a restricted job, excluding
preparation of intravenous medications. The hospital's position was that
allowing an HIV-infected pharmacist to
prepare intravenous solutions posed a
significant risk of contamination and
transmission of HIV to patients. Both
the state and federal agencies found no
credible support for this. Doe's case
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was the first to result in a final order by
HHS to suspend federal payments to a
hospital as a result of a finding of
AIDS-related discrimination, which
was undoubtedly the main incentive for
the Westchester County legislature to
vote in January to fund the settlement,
which amounts to approximately
$330,000 in back pay, legal fees, and
compensation for emotional damage
(available under the N.Y. Human
Rights Law). Doe was represented
throughout the proceedings by a succession of cooperating and staff attorneys from Lambda Legal Defense &
Education Fund, and at one point by
students and staff of the former Columbia University Law School AIDS Law
Clinic.
May 1993: JUDGE DENIES PARENTAL STANDING TO GAY SPERM
DONOR: N.Y. City Family Court
Judge Edward M. Kaufmann ruled
April 13 that a gay man who donated
sperm to a lesbian couple was equitably
estopped from asserting parental rights
with respect to their 11-year old child.
Thomas S. v. Robin Y., NYU, 4/16/93,
p. 27. Kaufmann found that for a period of about three years after the birth
of Ry to Robin Young, donor Thomas
Steel, a gay attorney in San Francisco,
made no attempt to establish contact
with Ry, having agreed with the birth
mother and her life partner, Sandra
Russo, prior to donating the sperm that
he would not attempt to assert parental
rights. Contact was initiated by the
mothers, who wanted to respond to
their daughters' inquiries about their
fathers (Russo previously bore a child
using sperm from a different donor).
After successful initial contact, a relationship was established with visits back
and forth between San Francisco and
New York and calls and correspondence. Based on documentary evidence and testimony at trial (especially
notes and cards written by Ry to Steel),
the relationship appears to have become increasingly affectionate. As Ry
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grew older and her relationship with
Steel became more extensive, her
mothers apparently became concerned
about encroachment on their New
York-based family unit and sought to
limit contact. Steel brought this action
seeking a declaration of paternity and a
visitation order to establish a formal
right to preserve and develop his relationship with Ry. * * * The biological
father of a child is normally entitled to
assert parental rights unless shown to
be unfit. The few precedents involving
sperm donors indicate that courts will
accord them similar rights if the sperm
donation was neither anonymous nor
made with a physician as an intermediary, as provided in the Uniform Parentage Act. See Jhordan C. v. Mary K.,
179 Cal.App. 3d 386, 224 Cal. Rptr. 530
(1st Dist. 1986). Kaufmann ordered
psychological studies of Ry, from which
he concluded that it would not be in her
best interest to formalize Steel's parental status. While noting that Ry's recent emotional resistance to Steel was
shaped by her mothers' attitudes, Kaufmann concluded it was nonetheless
real, and that the circumstances under
which Steel agreed to donate sperm
and lack of contact for three years after
Ry's birth provided the basis for raising
an estoppel against his petition. Kaufmann also speculated that Steel's HIV
status may have caused him to seek a
closer relationship with Ry.
The decision might be seen as a progressive one in recognizing a family
unit consisting of two lesbians and their
children, conceived through alternative
insemination. On another level, the decision might be seen as analogous to recent appellate decisions denying the
standing of lesbian co-parents to seek
visitation rights with children they
helped to raise but to whom they were
not legally related. Newspaper accounts describing letters and cards to
Steel seem to indicate that Steel's relationship with Ry, prior to the falling out
with Ry's mothers, was closer and more
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"parental" than Kaufmann's decision
suggests. The decision may actually appear conservative in clinging to a view
of families limited to a two-parent
model and not accepting the possibility
in the gay context of different kinds of
parental relationships. Yet the opinion
contains strong language recognizing
the legitimacy of the non-traditional

family unit Young and Russo had
created.
Young and Russo are represented by
Peter Bienstock. Steel is represented
by Emily Olshansky, who indicated in
an interview with The New York Times
that an appeal is contemplated.
[Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 599 N.Y.S.2d
377 (N.Y.Fam.Ct. Apr. 13, 1993), rev'd,
618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept.,
Nov. 17, 1994).]
Letters to Law Notes: Following are excerpts from letters published with the
June 1993 issue of Law Notes: In
Thomas S. v. Robin Y., a family law
court, for the first time in history, gave
its fullest, most affirming respect to a
family consisting of a lesbian couple
and their two daughters. The court
found that the child's sense of her family was her two mothers and her older
sister, and that a donor who had agreed
to donate sperm and agreed that he
would not be in any way considered a
father could not claim paternity merely
because of his biological relationship
with the child. This is an astounding
decision, not only because it supports
lesbian families, but because it gives
credit to the original agreements made
among the parties in the creation of
their family, a notion that we, as advocates for lesbian and gay families, have
been trying to convince courts to follow
since the first child was ever conceived
by donor insemination. * * * Why then
was this most affirming victory for lesbian and gay families reported by the
Law Notes, a lesbian and gay publication, as a defeat? And why would the
Law Notes, a reporter of legal decisions, rely more substantially on "facts"

[Vol. XVII

as reported in the newspaper rather
than the facts as found by the Family
Court after 28 days of trial testimony?
Such reporting makes the lesbian
mothers appear irrational and controlling (as if having a donor file a paternity action after twelve years would not
make any of us retreat into protecting
our families) and the donor appear to
be the epitome of fatherhood (even
though by his own account, he only saw
the child approximately 120 days out of
her entire life of eleven and one-half
years). The Law Notes' reporting of
this case was uncharacteristically incognizant of the consistency of theories
between this and other lesbian and gay
family cases and it appeared to be distressingly sexist in its presentation of
the facts ... Paula Ettelbrick.
I was distressed to read Arthur Leonard's comments on the Thomas S. v.
Robin Y. case. Almost everyone I
know regards this as an important legal
victory for the rights of lesbian
mothers. Leonard includes an alternative interpretation in his notes which
seems reasonable until one compares
his summary with the actual court decision. By summarizing the judge's decision in a highly biased manner,
Leonard manages to mute the meaning
of the case... I believe LeGaL would
better serve our community by having a
lesbian co-editor of the Newsnotes.
However, if this is not possible, surely it
would be possible to have a lesbian
member review Leonard's comments
on cases of concern to women before
they are published. Jim Levin.
I am shocked at the gay press for not
coming to the defense of a gay, HIVpositive man who functioned as the
child's father from the time the child
was three years old. I am sure that the
judge in the case took very careful notice of this man, including his sexual
orientation and his HIV status... This
brings me to the conclusion that although everyone involved in the case is
gay, including the man's lawyer, this
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isn't a gay/straight issue but rather a
Have/Have Not issue. White middle
class gay men have been trying to persuade the gay community to assimilate
into the straight, white, middle classdominated world so we can get a slice
of what little money and privilege there
is left in this country, all the while peddling the politic of "we're no different
from straight people - we just sleep
with the same sex," as our ticket into
assimilation. As a lesbian, I want to see
gays get all the rights they can. However, if it means getting the right to "act
straight," as in defending the nuclear
family against real or imagined attacks
by gay brothers or sisters, count me out.
Lia Brigante.
Responsible discussion of this case requires a restraint from a rush to judgment and a resistance of fall into
political rhetoric. Art Leonard's
thoughtful and thorough summary of
the case makes an important contribution to a full understanding of the issues
presented. Having presided over many
domestic relations cases as a judge, I
appreciate the complexities and difficulties in deciding such a case. But I
also learned that to tailor an equitable
and fair remedy, a court must consider
all relevant facts, not simply those that
support a predetermined notion of
what the result should look like. In this
case, the court seemed to be unable to
envision any resolution of this case that
looked like anything other than a traditional nuclear family.
Rebecca
Westerfield.
I represent Thomas Steel, the gay man
whose application for paternity and visitation was dismissed by the Family
Court in Thomas S. v. Robin Y. I am
writing in response to the reporting of
the decision in the Lesbian/Gay Law
Notes and to the controversy that has
arisen as a result. Although Judge
Kaufman's decision is being hailed in
some quarters as a step forward in securing lesbian and gay rights, Mr. Leonard recognized that it is, in fact, a

463

conservative decision that ignores the
struggle of lesbian and gay parents to
establish alternative family structures.
As Mr. Leonard indicates, the decision
clings to a view of families that is limited to a two-parent model mimicking
heterosexual marriage. Those critical
of Mr. Leonard's note mistakenly assume that Tom Steel's assertion of parental rights is based solely on his status
as Ry's biological father. This is hardly
the case. Tom Steel is not a sperm donor who suddenly and inexplicably appeared out of the woodwork to assert
his rights to paternity. Rather, Mr.
Steel bases his struggle to maintain continued visitation with his daughter on
the warm and loving relationship that
they established and maintained over
the course of the last six years.... Emily Olshansky.
Art Leonard performs a tremendously
valuable public and scholarly service by
researching and writing the Law Notes
each month. Nevertheless, I do think
that LeGaL must take steps to ensure
that, whether it be in the Law Notes or
in letters to various publications, it is
made clear that he is not the spokesperson for LeGaL. Unfortunately, some
readers of the Law Notes have interpreted the Thomas S. commentary to
mean that LeGaL places a higher priority on the rights and interests of gay
men than on those of lesbians. Such a
perception is patently false, of course.
Nevertheless, I am concerned because
even "false impressions" can have a
powerful impact on the reputation and,
ultimately, the effectiveness of LeGaL.
This particular controversy comes at a
time when LeGaL is placing special emphasis on increasing lesbian membership and participation. I would hate to
think that our efforts might be undermined. Erica Bell.
[As a follow-up to the controversy over
Law Notes' reporting of this case, the
LeGaL board voted to require that
each issue of the newsletter carry a
statement indicating that views ex-
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pressed were not necessarily those of

Judges Burns and Heen, ordering that

the Association. Additional letters were
published with the following two issues

proceedings at trial be conducted "con-

of Law Notes, further rehashing the
case and its reporting in the publication. The controversy was also aired at
a public forum at the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, at which
counsel for both parties spoke.]
June 1993: HAWAII SUPREME
COURT REVIVES MARRIAGE
SUIT: STATE EQUAL RIGHTS
AMENDMENT MAY BE VIOLATED BY SAME-SEX EXCLUSION: The Hawaii Supreme Court
ruled May 5 that denying same-sex
couples the right to marry may violate
the equal protection provision of Hawaii's constitution, but does not violate
the state constitutional right to privacy.
Baehr v. Lewin, 1993 WL 142682. The
court remanded for trial on the question whether the state has a compelling
justification for the exclusion. Justice
Steven H. Levinson wrote a plurality
opinion for himself and Acting Chief
Justice Arnold Moon; Intermediate
Court of Appeals Chief Judge James
Burns (sitting in place of Chief Justice
Lum, who retired March 31 and recused himself from the case) wrote a
concurring opinion.
Intermediate
Court of Appeals Judge Walter Heen
(sitting in place of Justice Klein, who
recused himself, having been the trial
judge in the case) dissented, in an opinion agreed to by Retired Justice
Hayashi, whose appointment expired
before opinions were filed. * * * The
immediate result was a 2-1-2 decision;
due to the peculiar reasoning of Burns's
concurrence, it was initially unclear
what the trial court would be doing on
remand. The state filed a motion for
reconsideration or clarification on May
17. On May 27, newly reconstituted
with the appointment of Justice
Nakayama in place of Justice Hayashi,
and confirmation of Moon as Chief Justice, the court issued a paragraph of
clarification, agreed upon by all except

sistent with the plurality opinion,"
which belatedly became the opinion of
the court. Burns issued a separate
statement, asserting that the case required compilation of a trial record, but
not agreeing with the reasoning of the
Levinson opinion. * * * This is the first
U.S. court opinion to hold that excluding same-sex couples from marriage is
sex discrimination. Both the Levinson
opinion and the Heen dissent agreed
that sexual orientation was irrelevant to
disposition of the case. Burns's concurrence made sexual orientation a central
issue.
Levinson first held that exclusion of
same-sex couples from marriage does
not violate the right of privacy. The
Hawaii constitution (art. I, § 6) includes
an express right of privacy that may not
be abridged absent a compelling state
interest. However, wrote Levinson, the
convention that adopted this provision
made clear that its purpose was to provide a textual privacy right coequal with
the federal constitutional privacy right
as then defined in case law. Levinson
concluded that the federal right extends
only to heterosexual marriage, because
the Supreme Court always links it with
procreation. Levinson stated: "[W]e do
not believe that a right to same-sex
marriage is so rooted in the traditions
and collective conscience of our people
that failure to recognize it would violate the fundamental principles of liberty and justice that lie at the base of all
our civil and political institutions.
Neither do we believe that a right to
same-sex marriage is implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty. . ." * * * On
the other hand, Levinson found that
Hawaii's equal protection guarantee,
which specifically mentions "sex,"
might be violated, asserting that refusal
to let same-sex couples marry "deprives
them of access to a multiplicity of rights
and benefits that are contingent upon
that status." Addressing a question Ha-
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waii courts had refrained from deciding
in several cases since the equal rights
amendment was adopted, Levinson
held that the state constitution requires
that sex-discriminatory policies be subjected to a test of strict scrutiny, placing
a high burden on the government to
justify any use of a sexual classification.
(Burns apparently agreed on this
point.) * * * Rebutting arguments by
the dissent, Levinson refuted the reasoning adopted by courts of other states
that previously rejected same-sex marriage challenges. Relying heavily on
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967),
the plurality rejected the argument that
excluding same-sex couples from marriage was not sex discrimination because both men and women were
equally forbidden from marrying persons of the same sex. In Loving, the
Supreme Court rejected the argument
that a miscegenation law did not discriminate racially because it equally
forbade whites from marrying blacks
and blacks from marrying whites; the
evil was the use of a racial classification
in a government policy without compelling justification. Quoting from the
Loving opinion, Levinson commented
that one could substitute the word
"sex" for "race" and reach the same result, and called the dissent an "exercise
in tortured and conclusory sophistry."
Levinson held that the marriage law
must be presumed to be unconstitutional unless the state meets the burden
of showing that its "sex-based classification is justified by compelling state interests and the statute is narrowly
drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgments of the applicant couples' constitutional rights." * * * Levinson
remarked that the plaintiffs' sexual orientation was irrelevant to their constitutional challenge, since heterosexuals
were equally forbidden from contracting same-sex marriages. Thus, it
was unnecessary to determine whether
sexual orientation is a suspect classification. * * * Judge Burns concurred on
different grounds. Burns stated that if
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"sexual orientation" is "biologically
fated," then it is an immutable aspect of
sexual identity just as "gender" is.
"Therefore, the questions whether heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality, and asexuality are 'biologically
fated' are relevant questions of fact
which must be determined before the
issue presented in this case can be answered. If the answers are yes, then
each person's 'sex' includes both the
'biologically fated' male-female difference and the 'biologically fated' sexual
orientation difference, and the Hawaii
constitution probably bars the State
from discriminating against the sexual
orientation difference by permitting opposite-sex Hawaii Civil Law Marriages
and not permitting same-sex Hawaii
Civil Law Marriages. If the answers are
no, then each person's 'sex' does not include the sexual orientation difference,
and the Hawaii constitution may permit
the State to encourage heterosexuality
and discourage homosexuality, bisexuality, and asexuality by permitting opposite-sex Hawaii Civil Law Marriages
and not permitting same-sex Hawaii
Civil Law Marriages." Burns's analysis
originally threatened to create significant confusion on remand; the subsequent clarification, with Nakayama
apparently joining Moon and Levinson's plurality opinion, may render
Burns's peculiar approach irrelevant.
Judge Heen's dissent endorsed Singer
v. Hara, 522 P. 2d 1187 (Wash.App.),
rev. denied, 84 Wash. 2d 1008 (1974),
the most recent appellate decision on
point, where the court held there was
no sex discrimination because men and
women are equally forbidden from contracting same-sex marriages. "The effect of the statute is to prohibit same
sex marriages on the part of professed
or non-professed heterosexuals, homosexuals, bisexuals, or asexuals, and does
not effect an invidious discrimination."
Heen added: "Appellants' sexual preferences or lifestyles are completely irrelevant.
Although the plurality
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appears to recognize the irrelevance,
the real thrust of the plurality opinion
disregards the true import of the statute. The statute treats everyone alike
and applies equally to both sexes."
Heen argued that the question whether
to extend marriage to same-sex couples
was for the legislature, and noted that
some cities adopted domestic partnership ordinances for this purpose. * * *
The plaintiffs are represented by Daniel
R. Foley, with amicus support from
Lambda Legal Defense and the ACLU
Foundation of Hawaii. The state is represented by Deputy Attorney General
Sonia Faust, with amicus support from
the Rutherford Institute. [Baehr v.
Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw., May 5,
1993).]
Summer 1993: SUPREME COURT
UPHOLDS CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF HATE CRIMES LAWS; NARROWS EQUAL PROTECTION AND
TITLE VII PROTECTION: The U.S.
Supreme Court unanimously ruled June
11 that laws providing penalty enhancement for the commission of bias-motivated crimes may be constitutional.
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S.Ct. 2194.
In an opinion by Chief Justice William
H. Rehnquist, the Court rejected the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's holding
that a bias crime law violated the 1st
Amendment by imposing a penalty for
offensive thought or by chilling the
speech of potential offenders. The Wisconsin court decision, issued after last
term's decision in R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 112 S.Ct. 2538 (1992), was the first
of several from state courts suggesting
that hate crimes laws must fall under
the same rationale, i.e., that enhancing
punishment for acts that are already
criminal because of the element of categorical bias in selecting the victim implicates freedom of thought. * * *
Rehnquist distinguished R.A.V. by noting that "whereas the ordinance struck
down in R.A.V. was explicitly directed
at expression (i.e., 'speech' or
'messages,'), the statute in this case is
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aimed at conducted unprotected by the
First Amendment." He emphasized
that sentencing judges have traditionally been allowed to take motivation of
defendants into account in imposing
sentences, and distinguished between
defendant speech going to "abstract beliefs" and speech indicating a particular
animus against a defendant based on a
particular characteristic, such as race.
Rehnquist also noted the analogy between the role of motivation in hate
crimes laws and in discrimination laws,
which the Court in R.A.V. had cited
"as an example of permissible contentneutral regulation of speech." * * *
Rehnquist said it was "attenuated and
unlikely" that hate crimes laws would
violate the over breadth doctrine by
chilling protected speech, asserting that
such a scenario was "too speculative a
hypothesis to support Mitchell's over
breadth claim." A.S.L. [Wisconsin v.
Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1992). Initials
of writers began to appear at the end of
articles in the summer of 1993, as Law
Notes acquired its first contributing
writers.]
September 1993: COLORADO SUPREME COURT FINDS AMENDMENT 2 "PROBABLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL": On July 19, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed that the
constitutionality of Amendment 2 to
the state constitution - the anti-gay
and lesbian rights provision - is subject to "strict scrutiny" review. Evans
v. Romer, 1993 WL 264693. The decision, written by Chief Justice Luis D.
Rovira, was hailed as a victory in the
fight to overturn the Amendment has
resulted in the loss of million of dollars
of tourist revenues to the state as a result of a gay-led boycott. * * * Amendment 2 was passed by Colorado voters
on Nov. 3, 1992. Plaintiffs - including
tennis star Martina Navratilova and the
cities of Denver, Boulder and Aspen,
all of which had sexual orientation discrimination ordinances on the books filed suit in Denver District Court on
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Nov. 12, seeking to enjoin enforcement
of Amendment 2 on grounds of unconstitutionality. They sought an expedited hearing on the merits, concerned
that the amendment was to go into effect on Jan. 15. When this request was
denied, plaintiffs sought and secured a
preliminary injunction against its enforcement, which was granted by District Court Judge Jeffrey Bayless on the
grounds that plaintiffs had demonstrated "that enjoining the enforcement
of Amendment 2 was necessary to protect their right to equal protection of
the laws under the United States Constitution." Bayless observed that because Amendment 2 "may burden the
fundamental rights of an identifiable
group," strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review. * * * Defendants appealed pursuant to C.A.R.
l(a)(3), alleging that the trial court improperly applied Colorado's six-part
test for injunctive relief in order to protect existing fundamental constitutional
rights (as articulated in Rathke v. MacFarlane, 648 P.2d 648, 653-654 (Colo.
1982).) On appeal, "the gravamen of
defendants' allegation of error is their
contention that the trial court 'did not
base its decision on any direct precedent,' but rather 'extrapolated from
several federal court decisions' the right
identified an allegedly infringed by
Amendment 2. Moreover, defendants
argue, there is no applicable legal precedent or established right under the
Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution which Amendment
2 can be shown to infringe upon." Although the Supreme Court noted that
an appellate court reviewing issuance of
a preliminary injunction usually shows
great deference to the lower court, because the question for review was
strictly a question of law, its review
would be an independent one. As a result, the court was not limited to assessing only the right identified and relied
on by the trial court. * * * The Supreme
Court began its substantive analysis by
observing that while "gay men, lesbi-
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ans, and bisexuals have not been found
to constitute a suspect class, . . . and
that plaintiffs do not claim that they
constitute such a class do not [sic]
render the Equal Protection Clause inapplicable to them." The court stated
that its task was two-fold: to determine
which standard of review applies and
whether under that standard "and to a
reasonable degree of probability,"
Amendment 2 can be shown to violate
equal protection. * * * The court concluded that for over 30 years, U.S. Supreme Court equal protection
jurisprudence has clearly "guaranteed
the fundamental right to participate
equally in the political process and that
any attempt to infringe on an independently identifiable group's ability to exercise that right is subject to strict
judicial scrutiny." The court relied, for
example, on Kramer v. Union Free Sch.
Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969), which
disallowed any legislative restriction of
the franchise, Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964) and related cases concerning attempts to dilute voting rights
through reapportionment, and the
"candidate eligibility" cases, notably
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968),
which struck down statutes that made it
difficult for marginal or new political
parties to field candidates. The Colorado court recognized that none of
these cases was directly controlling.
However, it argued that taken together
they constituted a consistent recognition of "the paramount importance of
political participation in our system of
government.... This principle is what
unifies the cases, in spite of different
factual and legal circumstances ... the
common thread which unites them with
one another, and with the cases before
us, is the principle that laws may not
create unequal burdens on identifiable
groups with respect to the right to participate in the political process absent a
compelling state interest." * * * But the
cases held by the court to be most applicable to the dispute over Amendment 2 are a series of decisions
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involving "legislation which prevented
the normal political institutions and
processes from enacting particular legislation desired by an identifiable group
of voters," especially Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), which struck a
charter amendment requiring that fair
housing ordinances to be approved by
the electorate. Chief Justice Rovira insisted that although Hunter was concerned with preventing racial
discrimination, the opinion "speaks to
concerns which are broader than the repugnancy of racial discrimination
alone" - and in particular concerns
about the importance of the opportunity to participate equally in the political process. In support of its view that
Hunter and subsequent cases were not
limited solely to questions of racial discrimination, the court observed that the
U.S. Supreme Court similarly stressed
the importance of political participation
in Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1.971)
(seeking a declaratory judgment that a
law requiring 60% voter approval of
proposed bond indebtedness or state
tax rates was unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause.) The Colorado court favorably quoted the conclusion of Gordon that "no sector of the
population may be said to be 'fenced
out' from the franchise because of the
way they will vote." * * * In sum, the
court concluded that these cases support the view that "the United States
Constitution protects the fundamental
right to participate equally in the political process, and that any legislation or
state constitutional amendment which
infringes on this right by 'fencing out'
an independently identifiable class of
persons must be subject to strict judicial
scrutiny." The court rejected "defendants' contention that Amendment 2
cannot be understood to infringe on
any recognized right protected under
the Equal Protection Clause" for several reasons. First, it argued that U.S.
Supreme Court precedent is not limited
to racial minorities. Second, it looked
to the fact that precedent disallows dis-
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criminating against segments of the voting population. Third, the court held
that if the U.S. Supreme Court had
wished only to protect "suspect" classes, it would not have consistently
stressed the importance of political participation. "We therefore conclude that
defendants' argument that the right to
participate equally in the political process applies only to traditionally suspect
classes is without merit. Similarly, we
reject their argument that the above
cited authorities are properly understood only as 'suspect class' cases, and
not 'fundamental rights' cases." * * *
Having concluded that strict scrutiny
applies, the Colorado Supreme Court
looked at the question of whether
Amendment 2 seems likely to infringe
the fundamental right to participate
equally in the political process. Because Amendment 2 had both the proximate effect of repealing any existing
laws banning sexual orientation discrimination and because its end result
would be to prohibit any governmental
entity from adopting gay-protective
statutes, "the right to participate
equally in the political process is clearly
affected by Amendment 2, because it
bars gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals
from having an effective voice in governmental affairs insofar as those persons deem it beneficial to seek
legislation that would protect them
from discrimination .... Amendment 2
expressly fences out an independently
identifiable group .... Strict scrutiny is
thus required because the normal political processes no longer operate to protect these persons." In conclusion, the
court said that although an amendment
passed by a majority of voters through
the initiative process is an electoral
mandate meriting great deference, this
voting event could not threaten the
right to life, liberty and property to
which all citizens are entitled. * * * The
sole dissenter was Justice Erickson. In
an opinion that matched the majority
opinion's 38 pages, Erickson argued
that because the "district court's de-
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lineation of the fundamental right supporting the preliminary injunction has
never been identified or recognized by
the United States Supreme Court or by
any other court . . . the district court's
recognition of a new fundamental right
is based on an underlying legal premise
that is erroneous." In Erickson's reading of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, the list of "fundamental rights"
is extremely limited. In support of this
view, he cited Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986), in which the Court rejected extension of privacy rights to
consensual homosexual acts. Erickson
further disagreed with the majority that
the district court had engaged in a fundamental rights analysis, holding instead that the cases it had cited
involved traditionally suspect classifications. Moreover, Erickson concluded
"that the majority's underlying legal
premise that the Supreme Court has
recognized a fundamental right to participate equally in the political process
is erroneous." By contrast, Erickson interpreted the cases cited by the majority as being concerned either with the
fundamental rights of voting or ballot
access or suspect classifications. "To
date,. . . the Supreme Court has never
explicitly stated that a fundamental
right to participate equally in the political process exists that is subject to the
strict scrutiny standard of review. Nor
has the Supreme Court found such a
fundamental right within the penumbras of the Constitution. At some point
in the future, the Supreme Court may
agree with the majority's underlying legal premise and identify such an expansive fundamental right to participate
equally in the political process" but has
not yet, in Erickson's view, done so.
Erickson concluded that he would have
reversed the preliminary injunction and
remand for trial on the permanent injunction. * * * The State promptly announced its intention to appeal to the
U.S. Supreme Court. Although Governor Roy Romer campaigned against
Amendment 2 in the 1992 elections, he
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said that his "duty as governor is to
fully represent those who voted for that
law in the process of the courts," recognizing a need for certainty on this contentious issue. BNA Daily Lab. Rep.
No. 137 (July 20, 1993), at A-13. State
Attorney General Gale Norton "said
the state has raised a number of issue
indicating why Amendment 2 is justified, among them that it preserves present civil rights and concerns the state's
ability to address moral issues." Norton reported that the state had 90 days
to appeal but would do so in half that
time. Will Perkins, Chair of
Coloradans for Family Values, the
group that sponsored Amendment 2 at
the initiative level, seemed encouraged
by the fact that this might receive U.S.
Supreme Court review, indicating that
it was important to have a national debate on the issue. BNA Daily Lab.
Rep. No. 138 (July 21, 1993) at A-5.
Shortly after the court's ruling, Judge
Bayless rejected a request by the state
to delay trial of the matter, reaffirming
an October trial date despite the state's
intent to petition for review. C.C. [Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo.),
cert. denied 114 S.Ct. 419 (1993). The
subsequent trial, appeals, and U.S. Supreme Court opinion are reported below. The article is by Colin Crawford.]
October 1993: MASSACHUSETTS
HIGH COURT APPROVES JOINT
ADOPTIONS BY SAME-SEX
COUPLES: Voting 4-3, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled
Sept. 10 that the state adoption law may
be interpreted to allow "unmarried cohabitants" to adopt where it is in the
child's best interest and where the biological parent is party to the joint adoption, affirming a trial court decision
approving such an adoption. Adoption
of Tammy, 1993 WL 346566. The
groundbreaking ruling is the second by
a state's highest court to allow lesbian
and gay non-biological parents the
chance to legalize their relationship
with the child they are raising with the
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biological parent, following a unanimous Vermont Supreme Court ruling
(628 A.2d 1271) earlier in 1993. In a
companion case reported the same day,
Adoption of Susan, the court remanded
a similar case to the Probate and Family
Court for appropriate resolution. * * *
A lesbian couple, Helen and Susan,
conceived and gave birth to a child
through donor insemination with the
agreement that they would raise the
child as equal parents, which they have
done for the past 5-1/2 years of
Tammy's life. The record was full of experts, friends, the guardian ad litem,
and even a parish priest and nun, supporting the adoption. The case also involved a known donor who voluntarily
surrendered parental rights and supported the adoption. Reciting case law
mandating a liberal construction of the
adoption law to advance the best interest of the child, Justice Greaney held
that the court had jurisdiction to grant
"a joint petition for adoption brought
by two unmarried cohabitants in the
petitioners' circumstances." Stating
that nothing in the statute precluded
unmarried couples from adopting,
Greaney concluded that the statutory
statement that a "person" may petition
to adopt should be construed to allow
for more than one person to adopt
jointly. Thus, in Massachusetts these
adoptions will proceed as joint adoptions, in contrast to other jurisdictions
where only the non-biological parent
petitions for adoption. The question
then arises whether the biological
mother's rights must be terminated, as
is done in traditional adoptions outside
the step-parent context. The court held
that "[t]he Legislature obviously did
not intend that a natural parent's legal
relationship to its child be terminated
when the natural parent is a party to
the adoption petition." * * * Dissenting,
Justice Lynch disagreed with the court's
statutory interpretation allowing unmarried couples to adopt jointly. He
seems, though, to adopt an interpretation that would allow for the non-bio-
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logical parent to adopt as a single
parent with the biological mother's consent, but does not comment on whether
the biological mother's rights must be
terminated. Justice Nolan joined Justice Lynch's dissent in all respects but
for Lynch's "first few sentences," which
state that he does not disapprove of the
adoption because the petitioners are
lesbians. * * * Katherine Triantafillou
represented the petitioning mothers in
the Tammy case; Mary L. Bonauto of
Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders represented the petitioning mothers
in the Susan case, with GLAD participating as an amicus in Tammy. The
Women's Bar Association of Massachusetts and other groups also filed an amicus brief in support of the petitioners in
Tammy. P.L.E. [Adoption of Tammy,
619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993). Article
written by Paula L. Ettelbrick.]
November 1993: DOMESTIC PARTNER HAD STANDING TO SUE
OVER LOVER'S FUNERAL:
Michael Stewart had standing to enjoin
his deceased lover's family from conducting an Orthodox Jewish funeral
ceremony. Stewart v. Schwartz Brothers-Jeffer Memorial Chapel, Inc.,
NYU, 9/13/93 p. 21 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.,
Queens County). Drew Stanton died
on July 19, 1993, due to complications
from AIDS. Joyce and Scott Sobel,
Stanton's mother and brother, took
possession of the remains and shipped
the body to Schwartz Brothers-Jeffer
Memorial Chapel, Inc., for an elaborate
funeral and burial. Stewart, Stanton's
lover and companion of five years, filed
an emergency action to enjoin the funeral, claiming that Stanton had stated
that he did not want an Orthodox Jewish funeral. Stanton's will was silent as
to the disposition of his body. * * * The
only issue before the court was whether
Stewart had standing to sue. Generally,
only the deceased's surviving spouse or
next of kin would have standing. Judge
William D. Friedman noted in his decision that had Stewart claimed to be
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Stanton's surviving spouse or next of
kin, the court probably would not have
granted him standing, because New
York courts have been reluctant to
treat gay relationships as familial ones
beyond the context of rent and eviction
laws. Oddly, however, it was the
"spousal-like relationship" that existed
between Stewart and Stanton along
with Stanton's strained relationship
with his family that led Judge Friedman
to find that Stewart had standing to enjoin the funeral. Friedman cited Matter
of Conroy, 138 A.D.2d 212
(N.Y.App.Div. 3rd dept, 1988), which
held that decedent's short-time girlfriend had standing as a representative
of his wishes to oppose the family's attempt to disinter his remains. Before a
decision could be made on who should
get possession of Stanton's remains, the
parties reached a settlement. Stanton's
body was cremated and the parties split
the ashes. T.V.L. [Stewart v. Schwartze
Brothers-Jeffer Memorial Chapel, Inc.,
606 N.Y.S.2d 965 (N.Y.Sup.Ct., Queens
County 1993). The article is by Todd V.
Lamb.]
December 1993: NY CITY EXTENDS
DOMESTIC PARTNER BENEFITS
IN SETTLEMENT OF GAY TEACHERS SUIT: After New York State Insurance Superintendent Salvatore
Curiale stated that the Insurance Department would approve sale of group
health insurance policies covering domestic partners of employees upon a
showing of financial interdependence,
NY City Mayor David Dinkins announced he would direct city attorneys
to negotiate a settlement of Lesbian &
Gay Teachers Association v. Board of
Education, as to which trial was pending in State Supreme Court after a determination by the Appellate Division
that failure to provide such benefits
presented a plausible cause of action
under state and local law. See 585
N.Y.S.2d 1016 (1st Dept. 1992). Settlement was complicated, since the mayor
hoped to resolve at the same time a
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charge filed against the city by a coalition of lesbian and gay city employees
seeking domestic partnership benefits
city-wide, and the mayor had consistently taken the position that such a
sweeping change required agreement
with municipal unions. * * * Hoping to
resolve the issue prior to the Nov. 2
elections, the city, the unions, and
counsel for the Lesbian & Gay Teachers Association finally reached agreement on Oct. 29. At a press conference
on Oct. 30, the parties announced that
domestic partnership coverage would
be extended to all city employees. Prerequisites for coverage would include
registration of the partnership and filing of an application accompanied by
evidence of financial interdependence.
The city undertakes as of Jan. 1, 1994,
to "make health insurance benefits and
options available to the domestic partners (and their dependent children) of
its active and retired employees that are
in every way identical to the health insurance benefits and options offered to
married spouses (and their dependent
children) of its active and retired employees." Acceptable evidence of financial interdependence requires two
items of proof, drawn from a list of a
dozen items on a form titled "Declaration of Financial Interdependence."
They include joint ownership of bank
accounts, credit cards, homes, cars, residential leases, and a variety of family
planning documents, such as powers of
attorney, wills, health care proxies, etc.
* * * Because this was undertaken as a
formal settlement of the Lesbian & Gay
Teachers litigation (in a written stipulation of settlement approved by NY
State Supreme Court Justice Karla
Moskowitz), the settlement is binding
despite the change in mayor on Jan. 1.
Republican-Liberal Rudolph Giuliani,
who won the election a few days later,
indicated on Oct. 30 that he was not opposed to domestic partnership benefits
but questioned how they would be paid
for. Lambda Legal Defense Fund and
pro bono attorneys from Morrison &

472

N.Y.L. ScH. J. HuM. RTS.

Foerster and Sullivan & Cromwell represented the Gay Teachers Association,
and will monitor compliance with the
settlement agreement. A.S.L.
February 1994: COWARDLY TEXAS
HIGH COURT BLOWS OFF SODOMY CHALLENGE: Voting 5-4, the
Texas Supreme Court ruled Jan. 12 in
State v. Morales, 1.994 WL 6714, that it
lacked jurisdiction to rule on a pending
constitutional challenge to the state's
sodomy law, Penal Code sec. 21.06,
which penalizes only same-sex sodomy.
Justice Bob Gammage wrote a sharply
worded dissent for himself and Chief
Justice Thomas Phillips, Justices Lloyd
Doggett and Rose Spector, accusing the
court of "shirking its equitable duty to
provide a remedy for a wrong. . . [by
allowing] the State to insulate its laws
from judicial scrutiny." Three of the
five justices in the majority are up for
re-election this year. * * * State v.
Morales is a test case, brought in the
district court in Austin as a class action
attack on the state's misdemeanor sodomy law. Texas has a bifurcated judicial system, with separate civil and
criminal courts, culminating in a Supreme Court for civil matters and a
Court of Criminal Appeals for criminal
matters. Although the state contested
jurisdiction of this action on the civil
equity side in district court, arguing that
only the criminal courts in the context
of an actual prosecution had jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality
of the state's sodomy law, both the district and intermediate appeals courts
rejected this argument, finding that recent decisions of the Supreme Court
had afforded equity relief in cases
where personal or property rights were
endangered by an unconstitutional penal statute and review on the criminal
side was unlikely. See 826 S.W.2d 201.
Since the state conceded from the outset that it was not interested in prosecuting consensual same-sex sodomy
between adults in private, it was unlikely that the issue of the sodomy law's

[Vol. XVII

constitutionality would ever come
before the criminal courts in an actual
prosecution for consensual sodomy.
Thus, the courts below found that they
had jurisdiction because the plaintiffs
otherwise would have no remedy, and
ruled that the sodomy law violated the
state constitution. * * * The Supreme
Court, in an opinion by Justice John
Cornyn, joined by Justices Raul Gonzalez, Jack Hightower, Nathan Hecht, and
Craig Enoch, claimed that the lower
courts had misconstrued its recent
precedents. The court insisted that in
no recent case had an equity court asserted jurisdiction to make a "naked"
declaration on the constitutionality of a
statute, Rather, in each case, the plaintiffs had shown either that enforcement
against them of a potentially unconstitutional statute was imminent, or the
plaintiffs were not seeking a declaration
of unconstitutionality of a statute, but
rather an injunction against a particular
body whose pending enforcement of a
statute against the plaintiff would cause
irreparable injury to the plaintiff's personal or property rights. "An injunction will not issue unless it is shown that
the respondent will engage in the activity enjoined," wrote Cornyn. "As we
have already noted, there is no allegation that absent an injunction prohibiting enforcement of 21.06, that the
statute will be enforced." The court
reversed the decision of the court of appeals holding the statute unconstitutional, and remanded to the district
court with instructions to "dismiss for
want of jurisdiction." * * * In his dissent, Justice Gammage sharply disputed
the court's narrow construction of its
leading recent precedent on equity jurisdiction, Passel v. Fort Worth
Independent School District, 440
S.W.2d 61 (Tex. 1969), in which the
court had enjoined school officials from
forbidding students from attending
school unless the students disclaimed
all membership or participation in certain student clubs that the school officials found objectionable. In that case,
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according to Gammage, the court had
abandoned its long-standing precedent
that civil equity would only enjoin the
operation of a criminal statute where irreparable injury to property rights was
in question, and ruled that equity could
also enjoin operation of a criminal statute where personal rights were at stake
"because the plaintiffs had no way to
test the penal statute because no prosecutions were threatened or even contemplated." Gammage argued that this
test case fit neatly into the Passel precedent's scope. Indeed, in this case, the
plaintiffs had demonstrated harms
flowing from the mere existence of the
statute, in contexts where their stigmatization as "criminals" was held against
them in the context of employment and
family law cases. * * * "Under the
court's analysis," charged Gammage,
"the State may adopt all manner of
criminal laws affecting the civil or personal rights of any number of citizens,
and by declining to prosecute under
them, ensure that no court ever reviews
them. Declining to even consider the
merits of the pleas for equitable relief
before us today could have an impact
far beyond the class of citizens to any
individual or group of citizens who seek
equitable relief under the Texas Constitution, because of an unenforced Texas
criminal statute, for the alleged deprivation of any personal liberty or civil
right which does not also involve what
the court may perceive as an adequate
vested property interest." * * * Where
does this leave the Texas sodomy law?
The Texas Supreme Court's ruling does
not go to the merits, so it is not a holding that the law is valid, although it
reverses the court of appeals' ruling in
this case that the law is invalid. The Supreme Court previously denied review
in City of Dallas v. England, 846
S.W.2d 957 (Tex.App.-Austin 1993),
in which the court of appeals held that
the Dallas police department could not
deny employment to a lesbian applicant
on the basis of the sodomy law, because
the sodomy law was unconstitutional as
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applied to private, consensual behavior.
The Texas Supreme Court denied the
city's petition for review in England because the city failed first to file a motion for rehearing in the court of
appeals, apparently a jurisdictional prerequisite. (See Morales, fn5.) Thus, the
denial of review in England was not a
ruling on the merits by the Texas Supreme Court. Apparently, then, what
we are left with is a final decision in the
England case in which the court of appeals held the sodomy law unconstitutional, and a holding by the Texas
Supreme Court in Morales that a Texas
equity court does not have jurisdiction
to consider the constitutionality of the
sodomy law with respect to consensual,
private behavior in a declaratory judgment proceeding. But, the facts in England appear, at first blush, to satisfy
the requirements specified in Morales
for finding equity court jurisdiction to
declare a criminal statute unconstitutional; England did not seek a "naked"
declaration of unconstitutionality, but
rather an adjudication of the validity of
a particular policy that disadvantaged
her and that was premised on the sodomy law. The bottom line: Perhaps the
cowardly Supreme Court justices up for
election saw a way to leave the situation as follows: The sodomy law is unconstitutional (per England) without
the Supreme Court having to rule on
the merits. Or is this paragraph wishful
thinking? We'd be eager to hear readers' views on this. * * * The Morales
case was devised and litigated by the
Texas Human Rights Foundation and
its cooperating attorneys. A.S.L. [State
v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941 (Tex.1994).]
May 1994: COLORADO COURT OF
APPEALS: DOMESTIC PARTNER
NOT PART OF "IMMEDIATE FAMILY": In December 1991, Mary Ross, a
social worker employed by the Denver
Department of Health and Hospitals,
applied for family sick leave benefits
when she took three days off to care for
her domestic partner. The Department
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denied Ross' application since her domestic partner was not a member of
Ross' immediate family as defined in
the Career Service Authority Rules.
The decision was reversed on appeal by
the Career Service Authority, which
found that the definition of "immediate
family" in the Rules resulted in Ross'
being discriminated against on the basis
of sexual orientation, in violation of an
anti-discrimination rule. This was reversed by the Career Service Board.
Ross sought review of the Board's decision in the district court, which reversed
the Board's decision. This decision was
appealed yet again. * * * On appeal, the
first issue the court addressed was
whether the Authority's rule, which
prohibits discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation, superseded the definition of immediate family. Ross v.
Denver Department of Health and
Hospitals, et al., 1994 WL 115870
(Colo. App., April 7). "Immediate
family" includes a husband or wife, but
not a domestic partner. Ross argued
that denial of sick leave to care for her
domestic partner was discrimination
based on her sexual orientation because
employees are entitled to take sick
leave to care for members of their immediate family. The court found that
there was no intent for the rule to supersede the definition of immediate
family. It further held that there was
no evidence that the regulatory definition of immediate family discriminated
on the basis of sexual orientation, since
the definition in the rule applied
equally to homosexual and heterosexual employees. The court emphasized
that the differentiation in the definition
was not founded on distinctions between heterosexual and homosexual
employees, but rather on distinctions
between married and unmarried employees. * * * Ross argued that her inability to marry her same-sex partner
distinguished her situation from that of
an unmarried heterosexual. The court
rejected this argument, stating that it
was really a "perceived unfairness of
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the state's marital laws" for which the
state legislature is responsible. Ross
also urged the court to adopt a more
expansive, sociologically based definition of family, like the N.Y. Court of
Appeals in Braschi v. Stahl Associates.
The court declined to do so, explaining
that since the term family is defined in
the Rule, the courts are not free to design a new definition. Finally, Ross argued that the definition of "immediate
family" violated the equal protection
and due process guarantees of the Colorado and United States Constitutions
because it created a class of persons
who were denied sick leave benefits on
the basis of sexual orientation. The
court reiterated that the discriminatory
result that Ross experienced stemmed
from her marital status rather than her
sexual orientation. A.T. [Ross v. Denver Dept. of Health & Hospitals, 883
P.2d 516 (Colo.App. 1994). The article'
is by Angela Thompson.]
Summer 1994: DELAWARE COURT
DENIES AIDS-PHOBIA CLAIM: In
Brzoska v. Olsen, 1994 WL 233866
(Del.Super.), the Superior Court of
Delaware dismissed an AIDS-phobia
suit of 38 patients against a now deceased dentist. On March 1, 1991, Dr.
Raymond Owens died of AIDS. Subsequently, the Delaware Division of Public Health notified his patients of their
possible HIV exposure. Each patient
was offered free testing and counselling
for HIV, and all of the patients tested
negative. Upon learning that Dr.
Owens died of AIDS, plaintiffs sued his
estate, alleging that Dr. Owens performed invasive procedures upon them
while he had open skin lesions and that
his infection control procedures were
deficient, which put them at risk for
HIV exposure. * * * Defendants moved
for summary judgment, asserting that
no plaintiff had tested positive for HIV
and it had been over three years since
their last possible contact with Dr.
Owens. Defendants also asserted that
plaintiffs had not been damaged be-
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cause they will not contract AIDS from
exposure to Dr. Owens and that they
may not recover simply for the fear of
contracting AIDS. Alternatively, plaintiffs argued that their tort claims against
Dr. Owens (negligence, recklessness,
battery, fraudulent misrepresentation,
and false pretenses) contained material
issues of fact which remained unsettled
and, therefore, summary judgment
should have been denied. They also argued that they had suffered a compensable injury; the fear of AIDS is
reasonable, it has caused severe emotional distress, and they are entitled to
recover for their damages. Essentially,
plaintiffs' claim was that they should be
able to recover although the risk of
transmission was slight, because the
consequences of contracting the disease
are so great. * * * The court observed
that an AIDS-phobia case had not previously arisen in Delaware, so it reviewed numerous cases from other
jurisdictions. It eventually focused on a
Delaware case which involved fear of
contracting cancer, Marganthaler v. Asbestos Corp. of Am., 480 A.2d 647
(Del. Super. 1984), which involved a
claim by wives of asbestos workers for
fear of contracting cancer as a result of
household exposure to asbestos fibers
on their husbands' clothing. Their
claim was denied as there was no assertion by the plaintiffs-wives that asbestos
fibers were physically present in their
bodies. The court stated: "In any claim
for mental anguish, whether it arises
from witnessing the ailments of another
or from the claimants own apprehension, an essential element of the claim is
that the claimant have a present physical injury." * * * Relying on this reasoning, the Delaware court rejected the
"fear of AIDS" cause of action and
granted summary judgment for the defendants. As none of the plaintiffs
were able to show actual exposure to
HIV, the court stated that they would
not be permitted to pursue recovery
merely for mental distress that they allegedly suffered while they awaited
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HIV test results. * * * This case came
on the heels of renewed media speculation about the Congressional testimony
of Kimberly Bergalis, a 23 year-old Floridian who died of AIDS after claiming
that she contracted HIV through professional care from her dentist. Bergalis went to Washington to press
Congress for mandatory HIV testing
and disclosure of health care workers.
An op-ed piece in the New York Times
(July 10) raised new doubts about Ms.
Bergalis' claim that she was a virgin,
and thus her dentist was her only possible contact with HIV. P.T. [The article
is by Paul Twarog.]
September 1994: FEDERAL COURT
RULES ADA PROHIBITS AIDSBASED DISCRIMINATION: In a
real-life version of the film Philadelphia, an HIV-positive attorney alleges
his firm terminated his employment because he has AIDS. Doe v. Kohn, Nast
& Graf, 1994 WL 416269 (E.D.Pa. Aug.
4). Doe (a pseudonym) alleged a violation of the Americans With Disabilities
Act (ADA), ERISA, the Pennsylvania
Human Relations Act, and Pennsylvania wage laws. Doe also alleged
breach of contract, breach of covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, invasion
of privacy, defamation, civil conspiracy,
and intentional infliction of emotional
distress, claiming both actual and punitive damages. The firm moved for summary judgment, arguing among other
things that HIV infection is not a disability covered by the ADA. The court
denied the employer's motion on all
counts except emotional distress, oral
contract, and the wage law claim; regarding the ADA, the court ruled that
symptomatic HIV infection is a protected disability. * * * Doe began working for defendant in 1991. His
supervisor often praised his work and
the firm awarded him a larger-than-expected bonus. In November, 1992,
Doe's secretary, while processing incoming mail, opened a letter from
Johns Hopkins Division of Infectious
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Diseases; the letter indirectly intimated
that Doe had AIDS. Doe asserts that
within days his supervisor stopped assigning him work, stopped speaking
with him, and avoided physical contact.
In January, 1993, the firm decided not
to give Doe a pay raise. Doe's supervisor told him that his written work did
not meet expectations and that his contract would not be renewed for 1994.
The supervisor memorialized the conversation in a memo for the firm's files,
which also contained a copy of the letter indicating Doe had AIDS. In
March, 1993, Doe hired a lawyer and
sent a box of documents from the office
to support his claim against the firm. A
principal member of the firm
threatened to "blackball" Doe if he
sued. Within days, Doe found the contents of his office boxed up and the office locks changed. Doe sued the firm
and his supervisor in August 1993. Doe
claimed that the stated reasons for his
termination were pretextual and that
the real reasons were his disability
(AIDS) and retaliation for his efforts to
file a claim. * * * District Judge Gawthrop found sufficient evidence to allow
the retaliation claim to proceed on a
mixed motives theory. Applying the
analysis of Title VII cases, the court
found that the plaintiff had made out
the elements of a prima facie case: (1)
protected activity or status, (2) contemporaneous or subsequent discharge,
and (3) a causal link between the two.
The court noted that a retaliation plaintiff may establish protected activity
based on a threat to sue, or consulting
an attorney. In a mixed motives case,
the plaintiff meets the causal burden by
showing conduct or statements by a decision-maker that directly reflect discriminatory animus or at least a
discriminatory attitude. The court
found the evidence sufficient to bring
the claim before a jury. * * * Applying
the same analysis to ADA coverage,
the court turned to the question of
whether the plaintiff had a disability
that would bring him within the scope

[Vol. XVII

of ADA, i.e., "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities" or a
record or perception of such an impairment. Finding no express guidance on
whether this definition includes HIV,
the court looked to interpretive guidelines from the Department of Labor.
Translating the regulations with the
help of a medical dictionary, the court
observed that they protected as disabled persons whom a lay observer
would not consider to have a disability
- for example, persons with high
blood pressure. The court ruled that
plaintiff's fever and skin rashes, and
HIV itself, created physical impairments within the meaning of the regulations. The court then noted that the
impairment must limit a major life activity, but not necessarily a work-related activity, and that the list of such
activities in the regulations was intended to be illustrative rather than exclusive. The court cited Cain v. Hyatt,
734 F.Supp. 671 (E.D.Pa. 1990) (another case involving AIDS discrimination in law firm employment) for the
proposition that procreation is a major
life activity limited by HIV. * * *
Oddly, the court found that Doe did
not have a record of impairment. Distinguishing the case from School Board
of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S.
273 (1987) (teacher with recurrent TB
had a protected disability), the court
observed that Doe's diagnosis was only
about a year old, unlike the thirty-year
history in Arline. The court decided
that Doe's impairment lacked sufficient
duration to constitute a record of impairment. The court did not give a reason why a record must be long in order
to constitute a statutory "record." Also
surprising is the opinion's lack of reference to Chalk v. U.S. District Court,
840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988). Ruling on
a preliminary injunction, the court in
Chalk decided provisionally that AIDS
is a handicap protected by the Rehabilitation Act. Because the ADA definition of disability follows the
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Rehabilitation Act, Chalk lends further
support to the court's decision in Doe.
The court ruled that the evidence of
perceived disability discrimination was
sufficient to bring that claim to the jury.
* * * As to ERISA, the court found sufficient evidence to raise a jury question
of whether the firm terminated Doe's
employment at least partly to deprive
him of benefits under the firm's disability plan, in violation of sec. 510. * * *
On the remaining state law claims, the
court held that analysis under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act is the
same as Title VII analysis, and thus
leads to the same result as the ADA.
The court upheld the breach of contract
claim to the extent that it relied on
Doe's written contract, but cited the parol evidence rule in dismissing claims
based on implied oral promises (including the wage law claim, which had
sought compensation for unused paid
vacation time). The court similarly upheld the claim for breach of covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. The court
ruled that the evidence established jury
questions on the claims for invasion of
privacy, defamation, and civil conspiracy. The court dismissed Doe's claim
for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, ruling that such a claim required truly outrageous conduct, not
merely mean-spirited conduct with an
improper motive. Lastly, the court allowed Doe to proceed on his claims for
punitive damages under all surviving
theories except the breach of contract
claim, ruling that the ADA, the PHRA,
and common law claims (other than
contracts) all allow punitive damages.
O.R.D. [Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graf,
P.C., 866 F.Supp. 190 (E.D.Pa., Oct. 6,
1994), 1994 WL 517989 (E.D.Pa., Sept.
20, 1994), 862 F.Supp. 1310 (E.D.Pa.,
Aug. 4, 1994), 853 F.Supp. 147
(E.D.Pa., May 13, 1994). The article is
by Otis R. Damslet.]
November 1994: COLORADO SUPREME COURT STRIKES DOWN
AMENDMENT 2: On Oct. 11 (coinci-
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dentally, "National Coming Out Day),
the Colorado Supreme Court granted a
permanent injunction against the implementation of the anti-gay voter initiative, known as Amendment 2. In so
doing, it became the first state supreme
court in the country to rule that voter
initiatives that prevent government
from enacting legal protection for lesbians, gay men and bisexuals are unconstitutional. The decision came after the
initial appeal of the preliminary injunction, where the court held that the denial of access to the political process
implicated a fundamental right, which
required strict scrutiny, and a two-week
trial on the state's alleged compelling
justifications. The Amendment 2 case,
Evans v. Romer, 1994 WL 554621, was
also the first of its kind to go to trial.
Six of the seven justices found Amendment 2 unconstitutional. * * * In brief,
Amendment 2 sought to amend the
state's constitution to prohibit state and
local government from enacting any
laws or policies "whereby homosexual,
lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall...
entitle any person... to claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination." After a trial with extensive
testimony and, at times, outrageous assertions by the state's witnesses, trial
judge H. Jeffrey Bayless found that
such a provision either lacked a compelling state rationale or, where a compelling rationale was implicated, the
provision was too broadly drawn. * * *
In its prior decision, the Supreme Court
had held that, based on U.S. Supreme
Court case law, there exists a fundamental right to have equal access to the
political process. Denying lesbians, gay
men and bisexuals the opportunity to
lobby their elected officials to enact legislation protecting their interests (which
would be the effect of Amendment 2)
denied them such access. In the Oct. 11
decision by Chief Justice Rovira, the
court refused to reconsider this holding.
The central issu6 on this second appeal,
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therefore, was whether the state had
proved any compelling justification for
denying access to this class of persons,
and whether Amendment 2 was "narrowly tailored" to achieve such an interest without unnecessarily burdening
the constitutional right of participation.
* * * While the Colorado Supreme
Court's opinion upholding the trial
court's decision lacks the eloquent, impassioned call for justice that has come
through in some other similar decisions,
the court effectively and methodically
picked apart each of the state's asserted
justifications. First, the court rejected
the state's assertion that Amendment 2
protects the sanctity of religious, familial and personal privacy. While religious and familial privacy are certainly
compelling state interests, the court
found that Amendment 2 was not narrowly enough drawn to further those
particular interests. The less restrictive
way to protect religious freedom would
be to include religious exemptions in
civil rights legislation. Further, the
state's interest in preserving the right of
some parents to teach traditional moral
values to their children fails "because it
rests on the assumption that the right of
familial privacy engenders an interest in
having government endorse certain values as moral or immoral." The personal privacy argument fails because
Amendment 2 would forbid government from banning discrimination in
"all aspects of commercial and public
life, no matter how impersonal." The
narrower means of meeting this concern, according to the court, is to exempt, for instance, owner-occupied
housing units from the non-discrimination law, as has been done and accepted
in other contexts. * * * Second, the
court rejected the state's claim that
Amendment 2 serves the compelling
state interest in seeing that limited resources are dedicated to the enforcement of laws protecting those who fall
into suspect classes, rather than diverting some funds to protect lesbians, gay
men and bisexuals from discrimination.
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Preservation of fiscal resources and ad-

ministrative convenience are not compelling state interests. And, even if
they were, Amendment 2 does not
achieve the goal of preserving fiscal resources since the facts from other jurisdictions indicate that enforcing sexual
orientation prohibitions has not had a
significant financial impact on the state.
* * * Third, the state argued that

Amendment 2 allows the state's citizens
to establish public social and moral
norms, which are defined as a) preserving heterosexual families and marriage,
and b) sending the societal message
condemning lesbians, gay men and
bisexuals as immoral. Interestingly, the
court responded by saying it knew of
"no authority to support the proposition that the promotion of public morality constitutes a compelling
governmental interest." At most, according to the court, this interest is substantial, but not compelling.
"[A]ntidiscrimination laws make no assumptions about the morality of protected classes - they simply recognize
that certain characteristics, be they
moral or immoral (sic) - have no relevance in enumerated commercial contexts." Furthermore, employment
termination and evictions on the basis
of sexual orientation are not appropriate ways of advancing even valid moral
beliefs. * * * Fourth, the court rejected

the state's argument that Amendment 2
prevents government from supporting
the political objectives of a special interest group. Because virtually any law
could be regarded as benefitting a "special interest group," the state's argument would "justify striking down
almost any legislative enactment imaginable." * * * Finally, the court rejected

the state's obviously absurd argument
that Amendment 2 would prevent factionalism and divisiveness over the controversial issue of homosexuality. This
is accomplished by eliminating the
"city-by-city and county-by-county battles over this issue." The court pointed
out that the state sought to end debate

2000]

CHRONICLING A MOVEMENT

over the issue by preventing one side
(lesbians, gay men, etc.) from having a
forum to discuss their concerns. * * *
Justice Scott filed a concurring opinion
in which he attempts to resurrect the
privileges and immunities provision of
the Equal Protection Clause as the correct means to analyze the voters' attempt to cut certain people out of the
process. While Judge Scott's concurrence is interesting, significant downsides to his theory are that the
privileges and immunities clause applies only to those who are citizens, and
the clause has been a virtual dead letter
of constitutional law since the 1873
Slaughter-House cases. * * * Justice Erickson dissented from the majority's
view, as he did in the prior appeal, arguing that there is no basis for the
court's claim that there exists a fundamental right to engage in the political
process. Instead, he analyzes the claim
as an Equal Protection argument and
applies rational basis scrutiny to the
claims raised by the state. (Since the
trial court's decision rejecting strict
scrutiny analysis on the basis of sexual
orientation was not raised on appeal,
the majority did not address this issue.)
The State of Colorado announced that
it will seek review by the U.S. Supreme
Court. Now pending before the 6th
Circuit Court of Appeals is the Cincinnati Issue 3 case, in which the trial court
used the same analysis as the Colorado
Supreme Court in finding an equal protection violation. It seems unlikely that
the Supreme Court will take up this
question for review until the 6th Circuit
decides that case. As yet, there is no
split among the state high courts or the
circuit courts on this issue. P.L.E. [Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo.,
Oct. 11, 1994). The article is by Paula L.
Ettelbrick.]
January 1995: ALASKA SUPREME
COURT RULES ON PROPERTY
DISPOSITION IN BREAK-UP OF
LESBIAN COUPLE: In D.M. v. D.A.,
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1994 WL 671558 (Dec. 2), the Alaska
Supreme court considered an appeal in
an action for dissolution of a partnership of a lesbian couple. At issue was
the valuation and allocation of interest
in the couple's principal residence and
of assets of a horse breeding business
which they had jointly held. The sexual
orientation of the parties was not at issue in the decision, save for the care
which the court showed to conceal their
identities and gender. Indeed, gender
could only be determined by a close
reading of the facts. * * * The couple
began an "intimate personal relationship" early in 1985. Except for a 3
month period in 1986, they lived together from early 1985 until March
1991, first in D.M.'s house, then in
D.A.'s. In December 1988, D.A. quitclaimed her interest in her property to
herself and D.M. "in consideration of
love and affection." At the time of
trial, assets of the partnership also included two Arabian stallions, a mare,
and two foals. The couple separate in
March 1991 and signed a separation
agreement a month later dividing their
property. The agreement was never
performed. Instead, D.A. filed a petition for dissolution of the partnership
in May 1991, and D.M. counterclaimed
for enforcement of the agreement and
partition of the principal residence. * *
* The trial court held the agreement
void based on a finding of duress (a history of domestic violence which D.M.
did not dispute on appeal), and concluded that D.M. was entitled to no interest in the principal residence because
the parties were found to have intended
the transfer to D.M. to have been made
solely for tax purposes. Because the
trial court found that D.M.'s contributions to costs relating to the principal
residence above and beyond rental approximately equaled D.A.'s interest in
the partnership, D.M. was awarded all
interest in the horse breeding business.
The trial court also divided up the other
personal property. * * * On appeal, the
Alaska Supreme Court held that the
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trial court had handled the matter too
casually, and ruled that the division of
the property held jointly was to be in
accordance with procedures in place for
any other business relationship., The
trial court made its factual determinations on D.A.'s reformation of her quitclaim deed based upon a
preponderance of the evidence. This
was improper, ruled the Supreme
Court, as the evidentiary standard in
reformation cases was "clear and convincing evidence." The trial court was
to consider on remand whether the
conveyance had been intended to be a
gift, or pursuant to a contract between
the parties, for which parol evidence
could be considered. If the conveyance
was pursuant to contract, D.A. would
have to prove that it was not intended
to have conveyed an undivided half interest and, if so, what interest was intended to be conveyed. In considering
this question, the trial court was directed to consider how tax deductions
for the property were to be allocated,
the cohabitation of the parties, other
joint financial acts, and how other
properties previously held individually
were to be disposed of. The Supreme
Court also ruled that the value of the
horse breeding business was to be recalculated, because the numbers used
by the trial court simply did not add up.
S.K. [D.M. v. D.A., 885 P.2d 94
(Alaska. 1994). The article is by Steven
Kolodny.]
March 1995: CALIFORNIA APPEALS COURT IMPOSES
TARASOFF DUTY ON DOCTORS
IN HIV SEXUAL-TRANSMISSION
CASE: In an opinion by Justice Miriam
Vogel, a California Court of Appeal reversed the dismissal of an HIV+ plaintiff's negligence claim against his
girlfriend's doctors, holding that the
doctors had a duty, even to an unidentified third party, to take reasonable
steps to protect his safety. Reisner v.
Regents of the University of California,
1995 WL 29397 (2nd Dist., Jan. 26).
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Plaintiff Daniel Reisner was the boyfriend of Jennifer Lawson, who was a
patient of the defendants at UCLA
Medical Center. During surgery in
1988, when she was 12, Lawson received a blood transfusion containing
HIV antibodies. The doctors learned
that the blood was tainted the following
day, but told neither Lawson nor her
parents. Approximately 3 years later,
Lawson began dating Reisner, with
whom she eventually had sex. Lawson
learned she had AIDS in 1990 and informed Reisner that he was at risk.
Lawson died a month later and Reisner
learned he was HIV+. * * * The court
based its finding of a duty between the
defendants and Reisner on Tarasoff v.
Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 17 Cal.
3d 425 (1976), which held that a doctor
has a duty to take "steps ... necessary
under the circumstances") to protect
third parties from injury, and Myers v.
Quesenberry, 144 Cal. App. 3d 888
(1983), which held that doctors who allowed a distraught diabetic patient to
drive could be liable to foreseeable
though not readily identifiable third
parties injured when the patient
crashed her car. The court held that a
warning to Lawson or her parents
would have been a reasonable step for
the doctors to take with regard to their
duty to Reisner, and other third parties.
The holding is therefore relative narrow
in that it explicitly rejects the notion
that the defendants' duty would require
them to seek out and warn unknown
and unknowable third parties. Nor will
floodgates of litigation open, the court
reasons, because the plaintiff carries a
heavy burden in showing causation.
(Here, Reisner would have to show that
a warning to Lawson would have been
transmitted to him, that he would have
abstained from sex with Lawson and
that he could not have acquired the disease elsewhere.) * * * Notably, the
court avoids two traps: it does not vilify
Reisner and Lawson for being sexually
active at a young age, nor does it demonize people with HIV and AIDS as
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latter day "Typhoid Marys." We are
not completely out of the woods, however. The court's discomfort with writing about sex is apparent in its use of
the euphemism, "becoming intimate."
D.W. [Reisner v. Regents of the Univ.
of California, 31 Cal.App.4th 1195
(Cal.App. 1995). The article was written by Dirk Williams.]
May 1995: VIRGINIA SUPREME
COURT DEPRIVES BOTTOMS OF
CUSTODY; FINDS "ACTIVE LESBIANISM" A BAR: The Virginia Supreme Court voted 4-3 to reverse the
state court of appeals and confirm the
decision of the Henrico County District
Court awarding custody of Tyler Doustou to his grandmother, Pamela Kay
Bottoms, rather than his mother,
Sharon Lynne Bottoms, who is a lesbian. Bottoms v. Bottoms, 1995 WL
234222 (April 21). Grandmother,
known as Kay Bottoms, instituted the
action after her daughter "came out" to
her. * * * Justice A. Christian
Compton's opinion sets the stage by acknowledging that the court previously
held that parental sexual orientation is
not a per se basis for finding unfitness,
and that there is a rebuttable presumption that a biological parent is entitled
to custody in a dispute with a third
party. Contrary to the court of appeals,
the supreme court found that there was
sufficient evidence of unfitness in the
record to sustain the trial court's finding. Compton stated that on appeal the
trial court's findings of fact "are entitled to the weight accorded a jury verdict, and these findings should not be
disturbed by an appellate court unless
they are plainly wrong or without evidence to support them... Absent clear
evidence to the contrary in the record,
the judgment of a trial court comes to
an appellate court with a presumption
that the law was correctly applied to the
facts. And, the appellate court should
view the facts in the light most
favorable to the party prevailing before
the trial court. Accordingly, we shall

481

summarize the facts in the light most
favorable to the grandmother, resolving
all conflicts in the evidence in her
favor." * * * Given this view of the
court's role, its factual summary, crediting virtually all of Kay Bottoms's negative allegations, provides an apparently
damning bill of particulars against
Sharon, who is described, in sum, as a
high school drop-out ne'er-do-well,
neglectful of her young son's welfare to
the point of hitting the infant so hard as
to leave marks "on his person," conducting sexual relationships with a variety of men and then her lover April
Wade in the same room of the small
apartment as the baby's crib, and having no means of providing financial
support for the child apart from April's
wages. (Sharon's ex-husband has
shown no interest in Tyler and paid no
child support, according to the court.)
The court rehearsed in detail Kay's allegations that Tyler spent about 70 percent of the two years prior to the trial in
Kay's physical custody, that when returning from visits with his mother
Tyler engaged in foul language of a type
not used in Kay's household, and that
Tyler was left with his grandmother so
often that Sharon kept a suitcase of
Tyler's clothes permanently packed for
the purpose. The court also repeated
the allegation that Sharon's lover made
physical threats against Kay when arguments arose about visitation, and had
admitted striking Tyler. The court also
noted as significant that the guardian
ad litem recommended giving custody
to Kay, reciting the guardian's trial testimony at some length. The court asserted that based on these findings it
was plausible for the trial court to conclude that Sharon was unfit. The court
never mentioned evidence introduced
by Sharon about her mother's conduct,
or the abusive circumstances to which
Sharon alleged her mother subjected
her. * * * The court specified as significant factors in determining unfitness
"the parent's misconduct that affects
the child, neglect of the child, and a
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demonstrated unwillingness and inability to promote the emotional and physical well-being of the child. Other
important considerations include the
nature of the home environment and
moral climate in which the child is to be
raised." Repeating his prior observation that a lesbian mother is not per se
unfit, Compton asserted: "Conduct inherent in lesbianism is punishable as a
Class 6 felony in the Commonwealth
...; thus, that conduct is another important consideration in determining custody."
Compton spent several
paragraphs repeating the bill of particulars against Sharon, culminating in her
lesbian relationship: "And, we shall not
overlook the mother's relationship with
Wade, and the environment in which
the child would be raised if custody is
awarded the mother. We have previously said that daily living under conditions stemming from active lesbianism
practiced in the home may impose a
burden upon a child by reason of the
"social condemnation" attached to such
an arrangement, which will inevitable
afflict the child's relationships with its
"peers and with the community at
large." Roe v. Roe, 228 Va. 722, 728,
324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (1985). We do not
retreat from that statement; such a result is likely under these facts. Also,
Wade has struck the child and, when
there was a dispute over visitation, she
has threatened violence when her views
were not accepted." * * * Thus, the
court infers that the child will be
harmed solely on the basis of societal
disapproval of the mother's relationship, and not based on any direct evidence of harm. Holding that the trial
court ruled correctly in light of the evidence when viewed in a light most
favorable to Kay Bottoms, the court reinstated the trial court's custody order.
* * * Justice Keenan dissented, joined
by Justices Whiting and Lacy. Keenan
argued that the court erred by presuming that a lesbian mother in a relationship was unfit, without specific proof
that her relationship negatively affected
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the child. Furthermore, since the trial
court "applied the wrong rule of law in
this custody determination," argued
Keenan, the case should be remanded
for application of the appropriate rule
of law to the factual record. Thus, Keenan would have affirmed the court of
appeals' holding that the trial court
erred, but instead of entering judgment
ordering custody for Sharon would
have remanded for further determination by the trial court under the correct
standard. * * * The damage done by
this opinion might be limited by emphasizing the "factual record" on which
the court based its ruling, which - as
related by the court - paints a negative picture of Sharon's parenting abilities apart from her sexuality. One
might argue, trying to limit its precedential scope, that even a court which
concluded that Sharon's lesbianism did
not have a negative effect on Tyler
could determine that she lacked the aptitude and personality traits to be a
competent mother, if the court believed
Kay's factual allegations and was inclined to give significant weight to the
damning testimony of the guardian ad
litem. On the other hand, the court
makes quite clear that Sharon's "active
lesbianism" (the very use of the term in
this context suggests that Compton
views it as some sort of affliction) is a
major factor in its decision, and while
disavowing a per se disqualification of
gay parents, as much as holds that if
such parents have a sex life, much less a
live-in partner, they are unfit for custody. As such, the opinion puts Virginia among the most regressive
jurisdictions on this issue. * * * Sharon
Bottoms was represented on appeal by
the ACLU of Virginia with amicus assistance from Lambda Legal Defense
Fund, National Center for Lesbian
Rights, and other advocacy groups.
The court's reliance on societal disapproval of Bottoms' relationship as a significant factor in denying custody
suggests a constitutional ground for objection to the decision under Palmore v.
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Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), but the total
lack of discussion on this point in the
court's opinion (or, more significantly,
in the dissent) leaves unclear whether
this ground was adequately preserved
for appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.
A.S.L. [Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d
102 (Va. 1995).]
Summer 1995: WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT SUPPORTS COPARENT VISITATION: On June 13
the Wisconsin Supreme Court became
the first state highest court to hold that
a lesbian co-parent can seek a visitation
order after the breakup of her partnership with a child's biological mother. In
re Custody of H.S.H-K.: Holtzman v.
Knott, 1995 WL 357902. The 4-3 decision drew three dissenting opinions, arguing that the court was engaging in
inappropriate legislative action and violating the biological mother's constitutional rights. The decision for the court
by Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson was
foreshadowed by dissenting opinions by
Justices Abrahamson and William A.
Bablitch in In re Interest of Z.J.H., 471
N.W.2d 202, a 1991 decision in which
the court, by an equally narrow vote,
had dismissed a custody and visitation
petition from a lesbian co-parent. The
membership of the court has changed
since 1991, and one of the dissenting
justices suggested that this was the main
reason for the changed outcome in the
case. Appellate courts in several other
states have rejected such visitation petitions on standing grounds, although the
New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed
a trial court dismissal of such a petition
in A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660 (1992),
cert. denied, 827 P.2d 837 (N.M. 1992).
* * * Sandra Lynne Holtzman and Elsbeth Knott met in February 1983 and
"shared a close, committed relationship
for more than ten years . . . On September 15, 1984, they solemnized their
commitment to each other, exchanging
vows and rings in a private ceremony."
They decided to raise a child together
by having Knott conceive through do-
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nor insemination. Their son was born
on December 15, 1988. "Holtzman and
Knott jointly selected a name for the
baby, using first and middle names
from each of their families and a surname which combined their last names.
Both women were named as the child's
parents at the child's dedication ceremony at their church. Holtzman's parents were recognized as the child's
grandparents and Holtzman's sister was
formally named as his godmother."
This family stayed together through a
move from Boston to Madison, Wisconsin, so Holtzman could attend law
school there, but the relationship later
deteriorated and on January 1, 1993,
Knott told Holtzman "that their relationship was over," although "the two
women agreed that they would
continue to live together in the home
for the child's sake." This did not work
out, however, and Knott and the child
moved out a few months later. Holtzman attempted to maintain contact
with the child, but Knott terminated
contact late in August of 1993. * * *
Knott filed a court petition seeking an
order restraining Holtzman from attempting to contact the child. This was
subsequently dismissed by stipulation,
but Holtzman filed a custody petition
on September 16, 1993, and a visitation
petition on September 21, 1993, and
quickly moved for summary judgment.
The trial judge "reluctantly" granted
the motion for summary judgment, feeling bound by the Z.J.H. decision.
Holtzman sought direct appeal to the
state supreme court, which was granted,
and a visitation order was entered
pending the outcome of the case. * * *
In her decision for the 4-member majority, Justice Abrahamson agreed with
the trial judge that the allegations in
Holtzman's complaint were insufficient
to support her custody petition. Constitutional principles stand in the way of
terminating the custody of a biological
parent who is not shown to be unfit,
and the court found that Holtzman's allegations about Knott did not rise to
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this level. The dissenting judges also
agreed with this part of the decision.
However, while also finding that Holtzman did not have standing to petition
for a visitation order under the visitation statute, Wis. Stat. section 767.245,
the provision under which Holtzman
had filed her petition, Abrahamson asserted that the statute did not evince
any legislative intent to "occupy the
field," thus leaving the state courts free
to exercise their residual equitable
powers to entertain a visitation petition
from a non-parent. * * * Describing this
judicial authority, Abrahamson set
forth the following summary before undertaking a lengthy analysis of legislative history, statutory construction, and
case law. "Finally, mindful of preserving a biological or adoptive parent's
constitutionally protected interests and
the best interest of a child, we conclude
that a circuit court may determine
whether visitation is in a child's best interest if the petitioner first proves that
he or she has a parent-like relationship
with the child and that a significant triggering event justifies state intervention
in the child's relationship with a biological or adoptive parent. To meet these
two requirements, the petitioner must
prove the component elements of each
one." In spelling out the component elements, the court emphasizes the origin, nature and quality of the
relationship between the child and the
petitioner, and in effect identifies a situation such as that in this case as a suitable "triggering event" for judicial
intervention. * * * In his concurring
opinion, Justice Bablitch emphasized
the needs of children living in nontraditional families when the families
break up. "My focus is on the completely innocent victim in this case, and
the thousands of others like him: the
children of dissolving non-traditional
relationships. The issue is the best interests of these children, and the role of
the court in protecting them." Criticizing the dissenting opinions for leaving
the courts "powerless in the face of...
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legislative silence" about how to deal
with nontraditional families, Bablitch
asserted scornfully: "The dissents would
have us believe that the legislature intends these children to somehow engage in a societal Dickensian drift, with
both the children and possibly society
paying what could be an incalculable
price for the errors of others. I do not
believe the legislature could intend that
harsh a result." Bablitch also emphasized that the court's opinion did not
provide automatic visitation rights; on
remand, Holtzman would face a considerable burden to prove the elements
specified in Justice Abrahamson's opinion. * * * Each of the dissenting justices
wrote separately, although Justice Day
also joined Justice Steinmetz's dissent.
They insisted that the visitation statute
was, in common with the marriage statute, the custody statute, and the adoption statute (which the court recently
construed to forbid adoption by a lesbian co-parent of her partner's children), intended to occupy the field and
oust the courts of any traditional equitable powers they might have in the
field of family law. They also emphasized U.S. Supreme Court cases that
identified strong parental rights of control over children in the Due Process
Clause of the 14th Amendment, and argued that the majority's approach to
the case violated the constitutional
right of Knott to determine with whom
her child should associate. The dissents
provide a roadmap for Knott's attorney, should Knott seek further review
of the decision in federal court. The
Washington Blade reported July 7 that
Knott's attorney intended to file an action in federal district court, presumably seeking a declaration of his client's
constitutional rights to exclude biological strangers from visitation with her
child. The attorney indicated he might
also file a petition with the U.S. Supreme Court. A.S.L. [Custody of
H.S.H.-K.: Holtzman v. Knott, 533
N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995).]

2000]

CHRONICLING A MOVEMENT

September 1995: CLINTON ENDS
GAY SECURITY CLEARANCE
BAN: Overturning a federal policy that
dates from the early days of the Cold
War, President Bill Clinton issued an
Executive Order on Access to Classified Information on August 4 that forbids discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation in making determinations about access. Part 3 of the Order, titled Access Eligibility Standards,
states in pertinent part: "Sec. 3.1 Standards... (c) The United States Government does not discriminate on the basis
of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability or sexual orientation in
granting access to classified information. (d) In determining eligibility for
access under this order, agencies may
investigate and consider any matter
that relates to the determination of
whether access is clearly consistent with
the interests of national security. No
inference concerning the standards in
this section may be raised solely on the
basis of the sexual orientation of the
employee." The order also provides
new procedures for appealing denials of
security clearances, and imposes strict
new financial disclosure requirements
on those holding clearances, responding
to the infamous Aldrich Ames case.
A.S.L.
September 1995: MASSACHUSETTS
HIGH COURT APPROVES
SCHOOLS CONDOM PROGRAM:
A program allowing junior and senior
high school students to obtain condoms
in schools and receive literature on
HIV and AIDS does not violate parents' constitutional rights to oversee the
upbringing of their children, ruled the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts on July 17. Writing for the court,
Chief Justice Paul J. Liacos held in Curtis v. School Committee of Falmouth,
420 Mass. 749, 652 N.E.2d 580, that the
voluntary program "does not supplant
the parents' role as advisor in the moral
and religious development of their children. * * * In January 1992, the Fal-
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mouth school committee authorized the
superintendent of schools to establish a
"program of condom availability." Students in grades 7 - 12 could request
condoms from school nurses, and students in the town's high school could
purchase condoms from a vending machine. Before receiving condoms from
the school nurse, students would be
counseled and given literature on HIV
and AIDS. The committee also directed the superintendent to stress abstinence as the only certain method of
avoiding sexually transmitted diseases.
* * * A parents group brought suit,

claiming that the lack of an opt-out provision violated their 14th amendment
due process rights by depriving them of
the power to control their children's education, and also violated their right to
free exercise of religion under the 1st
amendment. A lower court granted
summary judgment to the school committee. In the Supreme Judicial Court,
amicus briefs were filed by the ACLU,
the state's Attorney General, and the
American Jewish Congress. * * * Up-

holding the summary judgment, Liacos
noted, "The condom availability program is in all respects voluntary and in
no way intrudes into the realm of constitutionally protected rights." Citing
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968), Liacos wrote, "Courts do not
and cannot intervene in the resolution
of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems and which do
not directly and sharply implicate basic
constitutional values." He asserted that
the condom distribution program is
wholly unlike the compulsory requirements at issue in Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), and Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), relied
on by the plaintiffs. In this case, the
plaintiffs "have failed to demonstrate
how interests are burdened by the condom availability program to an extent
which would constitute an unconstitutional interference by the State." The
requirement that parents send their
children to school "does not vest the
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condom program with the aura of 'compulsion' necessary to make out a viable
claim of deprivation of a fundamental
constitutional right." * * * "Students
are not required to seek out and accept
condoms, read the literature accompanying them, or participate in counseling
regarding their use," Liacos declared.
"In other words, the students are free
to decline to participate in the program." And while the existence of the
program "may offend the religious sensibilities of the plaintiffs, mere exposure at public schools to offensive
programs does not amount to a violation of free exercise of religion."
Under the doctrine set out in Epperson,
he noted, "parents have no right to tailor public school programs to meet
their individual religions or preferences." * ** The plaintiffs pointed to a
ruling by the New York Appellate Division, Alfonso v. Fernandez, 195 App.
Div. 2d 46 (1993), in which the court
found condom distribution to be a medical service requiring parental consent.
They also raised Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992), to support
their claim that parents have a constitutionally protected interest in a child's
decision to bear children. In refuting
these precedents, Liacos said that Alfonso turned on a question of state statutory construction, and the Supreme
Judicial Court disagreed with its reasoning. The analogy to the requirement
of parental notification for abortion in
Casey is also inapt, he noted, because
"the two situations are hardly comparable: abortion involves a medical procedure, while obtaining a condom does
not." The court's decision was unanimous. M.N.S. [The article is by Mark
N. Sperber.]
December 1995: APPELLATE
COURTS APPROVE CO-PARENT
ADOPTION IN NEW YORK AND
NEW JERSEY: Within a week of each
other, the New York Court of Appeals
and the Appellate Division of the New
Jersey Superior Court interpreted the
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state adoption laws to allow the domestic partner of a lesbian birth mother to
adopt her partner's children without
cutting off the birth mother's parental
rights. Sometimes referred to as "second parent adoptions," these types of
proceedings had previously been approved by the highest courts in Vermont, Massachusetts and the District of
Columbia, and by numerous lower level
courts in other states (including the Illinois Court of Appeals). However, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court has refused
to interpret the law to allow such adoptions, and some lower court judges have
followed suit (including those in the
New York and New Jersey cases described here). * * * Interestingly, the
New York and New Jersey courts
reached their results through different
routes, New Jersey focusing on an expansive interpretation of a "stepparent" adoption provision while New
York focused on a limiting interpretation of the "cut-off" provision, which
describes the effect of an adoption on
the rights and duties of birth parents. *
* * The New Jersey case, Matter of
Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R.,
1995 WL 649120, 22 Fam.L.Rep.
(BNA) 1028 (Appellate Division, Oct.
27), involved a lesbian couple,
"Hannah" and "Mary," who decided to
have a child through donor insemination. Hannah, the elder, tried to become pregnant first but was
unsuccessful. Mary then became pregnant and bore twins. Hannah petitioned to adopt the twins, with Mary's
consent. The Children's Aid and
Adoption Society home study strongly
supported the adoption, but the trial
judge, deciding that the adoption statute did not authorize such an adoption,
dismissed the petition without reaching
the question whether the adoption
would be in the child's best interest. * *
* The appellate division panel was split
2-1, with Presiding Judge Sylvia
Pressler holding for the court that
Hannah should be treated analogously
to a stepparent. "As we understand the
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trial judge's reasoning, he was of the
view that since the plaintiff was not the
legal spouse of the natural mother, she
could not qualify as a stepparent and,
consequently, her adoption petition
could not be granted since it would
have the inevitable and unintended effect of terminating the biological
mother's parental rights. We are, however, persuaded that statutory provision, read in context and construed in
light of both the liberal-construction
mandate and the best-interests test,
does not support the trial judge's denial
of the petition. In sum, we conclude
that the stepparent exception to the
natural parent's termination of rights
should not be read literally and restrictively where to do so would defeat the
best interests of the children and would
produce a wholly absurd and untenable
result." * * * In New York, the Appellate Division in the 4th Department,
ruling in Matter of Jacob, held that the
male domestic partner of a single
mother could not adopt her child, and
the Appellate Division in the 2nd Department, ruling in Matter of Dana,
held that a lesbian co-parent could not
adopt her partner's child, conceived by
agreement of the couple through donor
insemination. The cases were consolidated for review, so the issue facing the
court was whether the unmarried domestic partner of a birth mother, regardless of gender or sexual
orientation, could adopt the child without cutting off the parental rights of the
birth mother. Although New York has
a stepparent provision similar to New
Jersey's, the opinion for the court by
Chief Judge Judith Kaye in Matter of
Jacob, 1995 WL 643833 (Nov. 2), focused on interpreting the "cut-off" provision, which provides, in essence, that
after an adoption the parental rights
and duties of birth parents are terminated. Three members of the sevenjudge court dissented from the majority's interpretation of the statute. * * *
Judge Kaye began her analysis with a
section devoted to "context," in which
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she established the basic premise for
her opinion: although adoption statutes
are to be strictly construed since adoption is "solely the creature of statute," it
is the "legislative purpose" as much as
the "legislative language" that is to be
"applied rigorously." "Thus," she asserted, "the adoption statute must be
applied in harmony with the humanitarian principle that adoption is a means
of securing the best possible home for a
child." In that light, these two cases
seemed to fall easily into a best interests analysis supporting the adoption
petitions: "This policy would certainly
be advanced in situations like those
presented here by allowing the two
adults who actually function as a child's
parents to become the child's legal parents," wrote Kaye, going on the describe some of the advantages to the
child of formalizing these relationships.
* * * Another part of this "contextual"
introduction to the analysis focused on
the history of New York's adoption
statute, which is a patchwork of old
provisions and newer amendments
rather than a unified code. "The statute today contains language from the
1870's alongside language from the
1990's," Kaye found, thus countering
the dissent's contention that the statute
is a "methodical and meticulous" expression of legislative judgment. * * *
Turning to interpretation, Kaye first rejected the argument that sec. 110 of the
N.Y. Domestic Relations Law, which
provides that an "an adult unmarried
person or an adult husband and his
adult wife together may adopt another
person," necessarily excludes adoptions
by the unmarried domestic partners of
birth parents. The lower courts found
that they were compelled to reject the
adoption petitions under this language.
Kaye saw no such compulsion, pointing
to modern amendments to the statute
that had expanded the circle of prospective adoptive parents (including the
stepparent provision), and concluded
that recognizing standing by the petitioners in these cases "is therefore con-
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sistent with the words of the statute as
well as the spirit behind the modernday amendments: encouraging the
adoption of as many children as possible regardless of the sexual orientation
or marital status of the individuals
seeking to adopt them." * * * Turning
to sec. 117, the "cut-off" provision,
which provides that after "the making
of an order of adoption the natural parents of the adoptive child shall be relieved of all parental duties toward and
of all responsibilities for and shall have
no rights over such adoptive child or to
his property by descent or succession,"
Kaye argued that "neither the language
nor policy underlying section 117 dictates" that the birth mother's parental
status would be terminated by granting
the adoption petitions in these cases.
Focusing first on the language, Kaye
contended that it was concerned primarily with issues of descent and distribution, pointing especially to a subsection
of the provision added by amendment
after the initial enactment of sec. 117,
which Kaye contended "appears to
limit the applicability of the entire first
half of section 117 - including the language concerning termination in subsection (1)(a) - 'only to the intestate
descent and distribution of real and
personal property'" (emphasis supplied
by Judge Kaye). Perhaps even more
importantly, Kaye demonstrated that a
variety of amendments to sec. 117 over
the years had created quite a few internal inconsistencies and ambiguities. * *
* In light of the ambiguities in the statute, Kaye sought to find an overall
theme or purpose to the section that
could be used to give it a rational interpretation. She proposed that the overall legislative purpose is to avoid the
problem of the new family created by
an adoption suffering interference from
the child's former family, or, as she put
it, "to prevent unwanted intrusion by
the child's former biological relatives to
promote the stability of the new adoptive family." Given such a purpose,
there would be no reason to apply sec.
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117 to the kinds of adoptive families
that would be created by granting the
petitions in these cases, because the
child's only biological parent is the domestic partner of the petitioner, and the
adoptive family will include both of
these individuals as parent. Kaye
pointed to the 1951 amendment of sec.
117 that added the stepparent adoption
provisions as an example of legislative
acknowledgment that the cut-off provision should not apply when the purpose
of sheltering an adoptive family from
the instability of intrusion from birth
parents was no longer an issue. She
also found other amendments, authorizing "open adoptions" and "adoptions
by minors," as further evidence of legislative openness to exceptions to the
cut-off policy under appropriate circumstances. * * * While describing as a
"statutory puzzle" the ambiguities and
contractions created by the various
amendments to sec. 117, Kaye drew one
conclusion: "that section 117 does not
invariably require termination in the
situation where the biological parent,
having consented to the adoption, has
agreed to retain parental rights and to
raise the child together with the second
parent," and that the various exceptions contained in amendments provided this "common denominator" that
could guide the court in interpreting
the statute. Since section 117 lent itself
to various interpretations, Kaye asserted that it should be construed in a
way that advances the legislature purpose. She noted that this was particularly appropriate in Dana, since the
lesbian co-parents could not marry to
take advantage of section 117's specific
authorization of joint adoptions by
married partners. (And she suggested,
without further developing the point,
that denying these adoptions might set
up a constitutional challenge to the
adoption statute by same-sex couples.)
* * * Unlike the New Jersey court,
which determined that the factual record was sufficient to grant the adoption, the New York court remanded the
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two cases back to their respective family courts of origin for the factual findings necessary to make a best interests
determination. In his opinion for the
dissenters, Judge Bellacosa focused on
the limited role of the court in a statutory interpretation case, arguing that
regardless of the merit of the result
reached in this case, the court should
leave to the legislature the task of unraveling any inconsistencies or ambiguities in the law. * * * The New Jersey
case was argued by Montclair attorney
Barbara Fox, with assistance from the
ACLU of New Jersey. In New York,
Jacob was argued by Nicholas S. Priore,
and Dana was argued by Beatrice
Dohrn, Legal Director of Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund, which
represented the petitioner on appeal.
Since these opinions are premised on
statutory interpretation, they are subject to legislative reversal. In New
York, there were some rumblings of
discontent from the Republican governor and state senate majority leader, so
the story of co-parent adoption under
New York law may not be at an end. In
the District of Columbia, where the
highest appellate court authorized such
an adoption earlier this year, there
were signs that the decision might be
overruled by Congress as part of the
annual District of Columbia appropriations bill. A.S.L. [Adoption of Two
Children by H.N.R., 285 N.J.Super.1,
666 A.2d 535 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.
1995); Matter of Jacob, Matter of Dana,
86 N.Y.2d 651, 636 N.Y.S.2d 716, 660
N.E.2d 397, 64 USLW 2294 (N.Y., Nov.
2, 1995).]
January 1996: FEDERAL COURT
FINDS CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION IN REMOVAL OF LESBIAN
NOVEL FROM HIGH SCHOOL LIBRARIES: In a reaffirmation of the
right of high school students to access a
diversity of ideas, a Kansas federal district court, in Case v. Unified School
District No. 233, 1995 WL 708288 (Nov.
29), held that a school board's removal
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of Annie on My Mind, an award-winning book about a romantic relationship between two teenage girls, from
the district's libraries violated the First
Amendment and its analogue in the
Kansas constitution. * * * Accompanied by substantial publicity, Project 21
(since renamed the P.E.R.S.O.N. project) donated several copies of the
book, along with copies of All American Boys, a similar story involving teenage boys, to the Kansas City-area
school district for placement in the district's high school libraries. Ironically,
the libraries already had a number of
copies of Annie. All of the district's
high school librarians agreed that Annie had literary merit, but that Boys did
not. A school official then wrote Project 21, accepting Annie but declining
Boys. * * * The school district's superintendent then intervened and unilaterally determined that all of the district's
copies of Annie, including those previously present, would be removed. Subsequently, the school board ratified the
superintendent's action at a public
meeting, and several current and former district students, their parents, and
a district teacher commenced this litigation. * * * Initially, the court made
significant standing determinations.
While the current high school. students,
their parents, and the high school
teacher had standing, the former high
school students, and a student who was
in grade school when Annie was removed, did not,"the court held, as
neither had had access to the high
school libraries at the time of the
book's removal. * * * Turning to the
merits, the court adopted the holding of
the plurality opinion in Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S.853 (1982), as
this was the only Supreme Court opinion specifically addressing the removal
of books from a public school library.
That opinion declared that school officials' conduct was unconstitutional if
the officials intended to deny students
access to ideas with which the officials
disagreed, and if this was the decisive
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factor in the officials' decision. The

court found the board's action invalid
under this rule, as the four board members voting to support the removal of
Annie stated that they had done so because the book "glorified and promoted" homosexuality. In making this
assessment, the court looked behind
the board members' invocation of "educational unsuitability," which the
court found to represent nothing more
than viewpoint discrimination. The
court also deemed it important that the
board disregarded its own established
procedures for reviewing the suitability
of library books, and that the board
failed to consider less restrictive alternatives to the complete removal of the
book. * * * Rejecting the board's claims

in defense, the court held that the
board did not have unfettered discretion to "transmit community values,"
while the book's availability in other libraries in the area did not cure the constitutional violation. * * * Also rejecting

the plaintiffs' secondary claims, the
court found no due process violation, as
the plaintiffs had no liberty or property
interest in the book's presence in the library, and the holding of an open
school board meeting had provided the
plaintiffs with procedural due process.
R.M. [Case v. Unified School Dist. No.
233, 908 F.Supp. 864 (D.Kan. 1995).
The article was written by Robin
Miller.]
March 1996: LOCAL ZONING LAWS
OR RESIDENTIAL RESTRICTIVE
COVENANTS DO NOT PROHIBIT
USE OF RESIDENCES AS GROUP
HOMES FOR AIDS PATIENTS: In
two cases from opposite ends of the nation, state courts gave rulings making it
more difficult for communities to oust
group homes for AIDS patients under
local zoning rules or residential restrictive covenants. * * * The Supreme

Court of New Mexico in Hill v. Community of Damien of Molokai, 1996
WL 55953 (N.M. Jan. 9), ruled that a
group home for four persons with

HUM. RTS.
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AIDS, by virtue of their communal
meals and spiritual activities, as well as
their mutual reliance on each other for
social, emotional and financial support,
made the home more akin to a traditional family residence than a commercial rooming house. The court held that
the undefined term "family" as used in
the restrictive family covenant which
regulated the neighborhood should be
broadly defined to include more than a
group of individuals related by blood or
law. The court found that the group
home exhibited the stability, permanency and functional lifestyle of a traditional family unit, which would be the
controlling factor in determining
whether a group of unrelated individuals living together as a single housekeeping unit constituted a family.
"[T]here is a strong [federal and state]
public policy in favor of including small
group homes within the definition of
the term 'family,'" wrote Justice Frost
for the court. * * * The court also
found that the Federal Fair Housing
Act prohibited enforcement of the restrictive covenant because it had the effect of discriminating on the basis of
handicap. Although no discriminatory
motive was found, the covenant was
found to have the effect of denying
housing to disabled individuals who
need congregate living arrangements in
order to live in traditional neighborhoods and communities. In its balancing test, the court found the negative
effects of increased traffic were outweighed by the home's interest in maintaining a home for people with AIDS.
The plaintiff-appellee's arguments that
the group home created vehicular traffic in excess of what would be expected
in an average residential area was irrelevant in determining whether the group
home violated the residential covenant,
since nothing in restrictive covenant
regulated either traffic or parking. * * *
Meanwhile, in Eichlin v. Zoning Hearing Board of New Hope Borough, 1996
WL 61.330 (Pa.Cmwlth., Feb. 14), the
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
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upheld a ruling that a non-profit corporation could renovate a structure for
use as a family home for eight HIV-infected persons without running afoul of
local zoning rules. The court found that
under local ordinances the use of the
dwelling would be the functional
equivalent of a traditional family home,
as characterized by its nurturing environment and lack of profit-making motive. Because the individuals would
live, cook, clean, worship, socialize and
share the premises as a single housekeeping unit, the court determined the
property owner to have established a
caring, nurturing environment, thus allowing the home to operate under the
zoning ordinance. The fact that the residents would pay rent and have leases
were inconclusive in either determining
a profit motive or that the cohabitation
was impermanent. "[E]ven though children will not be raised in the home, the
group home in this case will exhibit the
characteristics of affection and companionship common to a traditional family
...[making it] the equivalent of a traditional family, as defined in... the Ordinance," wrote Judge Colins. R.D.L.
[Hill v. Community of Damien of Molokai, 911 P.2d 861 (N.M. 1996); Eichlin
v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of New Hope
Borough, 671 A.2d 1173 (Pa.Cmwlth.
1996). The article was written by Ross
D. Levi.]
May 1996: EN BANC FOURTH CIRCUIT APPROVES "DON'T ASK,
DON'T TELL" MILITARY POLICY:
In a 9-4 decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit, sitting en banc,
has upheld the military's "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" policy as a legitimate use of
congressional power. Deference to legislative judgment was the selling point
for Chief Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson (a
Reagan appointee), who wrote for the
majority in Thomasson v. Perry, 1996
WL 157451 (April 5). Of the 8 other
judges who signed onto the majority
opinion, all but one were Republican
appointees. * * * Thomasson, an exem-
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plary officer, was dismissed from the
Navy after he revealed his homosexuality in a letter to four of his commanding
officers. The "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
policy provides that this type of statement "creates a rebuttable presumption
that the officer engages in homosexual
acts or has a propensity or intent to do
so." Finding the requirement of rebuttal degrading, Thomasson refused to do
so and was thus dismissed. Thomasson
filed suit to prevent his discharge and,
after losing in the District Court, appealed to the Circuit Court claiming the
Government's policy toward gays in the
military violated Equal Protection, the
First Amendment, and the Due Process
Clause. * * * Writing for the court,
Judge Wilkinson stressed that the policy
was the result of strenuous debate by
both houses of Congress and warned
that judicial judgment should only supplant legislative judgment in rare cases,
lest the democratic will of the people be
disenfranchised by an overreaching judiciary. In addition, Wilkinson pointed
out that the authority to raise and regulate the military is constitutionally allocated to the Legislative and Executive
branches. Traditionally the Supreme
Court has shown great deference to
congressional decisions regarding matters of national security and military
regulation. Finally, the majority cited
authority for the proposition that service members are not afforded full protection under the First Amendment.
Wilkinson noted that First Amendment
challenges to military regulations are
handled more deferentially than similar
civilian laws. * * * The court concluded
that based on the deference owed to
the democratic decision-making apparatus, the correct level of judicial scrutiny to evaluate Thomasson's equal
protection challenge is rational basis,
under which the government would
simply have to show that the policy is
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. The court determined that banning homosexual acts
and creating a rebuttable presumption
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that declared homosexuals have a propensity to engage in prohibited sexual
conduct is rationally related to serving
the military interest in preserving unit
cohesion. * * * As for Thomasson's
First Amendment challenge, the court
held that the policy is not directed at
speech, but at the conduct that the
speech evidences. The military can validly proscribe homosexual activity, and
a service member who "tells" creates a
rebuttable presumption that the service
member has a propensity or intent to
engage in the prohibited activity. * * *
Judge Luttig, in a concurring opinion
joined by five other judges, forcefully
asserted that the policy, as enacted by
Congress, maintains the ban on military
service by gay people and is not, as it
has been recharacterized by lawyers for
the Government, a conduct-based restriction. This, ironically, is the same
argument made by Thomasson. Judge
Luttig, however, felt that it is fully
within the power of Congress to exclude homosexuals from military service, regardless of their conduct. * * *
After examining the records of the congressional hearings concerning the new
policy, Luttig determined that Congress
enacted the policy only after it was convinced that the ban on gays in the military would be retained. The new policy
differed from the old only in that a new
recruit or service member would not be
questioned about his or her sexual orientation, unless there was some manifestation of homosexuality (either
through action or statement), in which
case discharge would be required unless
the service member could prove that he
or she is not a homosexual. * * * Luttig
pointed out that the Solicitor General,
in an attempt to avoid a constitutionality question, recharacterized the policy
as a conduct-based restriction. When
Congress enacted the policy mandating
dismissal for service members who
demonstrate a "propensity" to engage
in homosexual acts, they intended "propensity" in its common sense meaning
of "natural inclination" rather than
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"likelihood," as it was subsequently
redefined by the Administration and
Government lawyers. So defined, the
policy targets known homosexuals,
rather than homosexual acts. This is
demonstrated by the fact that pursuant
to the policy, a heterosexual who engages in homosexual acts (apart from
sodomy) will not be dismissed if he
demonstrates that he is not a homosexual. Luttig would strike down the policy as implemented by the
administration as contrary to statutory
mandate, but uphold the statute as enacted by the Congress as rationally related to a legitimate government
interest. * * * In a dissenting opinion,
Judge Hall chastised the majority for
giving legal force to private prejudices.
He argued that the government's proffered interest in maintaining "unit cohesion" is nothing more than a request
to tolerate the intolerances of other service members. This, he maintained, is
an impermissible governmental purpose. In addition, Judge Hall argued
that the policy is directed at suppressing
speech since it targets only admitted
homosexuals. Granting that the military may suppress speech when it is
likely to interfere with vital prerequisites to military effectiveness, Hall
pointed out that the "vital prerequisite"
involved is the accommodation of the
prejudices of non-gay service members.
Accommodating private prejudices, he
argued, can never be a legitimate legislative end. E.T.G. [Thomasson v. Perry,
80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996) cert. denied,
117 S,Ct. 358 (1997). The article was
written by E. Terry Giuliano.]
June 1996: AMENDMENT 2 HELD
UNCONSTITUTIONAL: In a decision
that a dissenting member asserted contradicts Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court ruled 6-3 that Colorado's
Amendment 2 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.
Romer v. Evans, 1996 WL 262293 (May
20). * * * In his decision for the Court,
Justice Anthony Kennedy declared that
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the state ballot initiative that repealed
all laws or policies protecting homosexuals or bisexuals from discrimination
and prohibited enactment of such policies failed to meet the usually lenient
rational basis test of judicial review.
Justice Antonin Scalia's dissent, joined
by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and
Justice Clarence Thomas, argued that
the Hardwick precedent, which went
unmentioned in the Court's opinion,
compelled the opposite result. Joining
Kennedy's opinion were Justices John
Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor,
David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
(Justice
and Stephen Breyer.
O'Connor was part of the Court's majority in Hardwick, while Justice Stevens had written one of the dissenting
opinions in that case.) The decision
was the first to attain a majority of the
Court in support of gay rights since
Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370
U.S. 478 (1962), in which the Court
held that non-obscene gay-related matter could not be excluded from the U.S.
mails. * * * The Romer case began
when Colorado voters approved
Amendment 2 in November, 1992. A
coalition of plaintiffs, including the
three cities whose sexual orientation
discrimination laws were affected and
several lesbian and gay Coloradans,
filed suit in Denver District Court, obtaining a preliminary injunction that
has kept the measure from ever taking
effect. The case went to the Colorado
Supreme Court twice. The first time,
that court upheld preliminary injunctive relief, adopting a theory that
Amendment 2 violated a fundamental
right of equal participation in the political process by posing special barriers to
proponents of non-discrimination for
gays, lesbians and bisexuals. The case
was then remanded for trial, after
which both the district court and the
state supreme court found that the state
had failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that Amendment 2 was narrowly tailored to meet a compelling
state interest. The U.S. Supreme Court

493

granted the state's petition for certiorari and heard oral argument on October 10, 1995. Legal observers predicted
based on the oral argument that
Amendment 2 would be overturned,
but there was widespread uncertainty
about what theory the Court might use
to do so, the Colorado Supreme Court's
theory having been widely criticized as
lacking a firm basis in constitutional
precedents. * * * In the event, the
Court's decision issued on May 20 expressly disavowed reliance on the Colorado Supreme Court's political
participation theory, although several
comments in Justice Kennedy's opinion
suggested that the Court may have
been tacitly embracing the main elements of that theory. Introducing his
opinion, Kennedy quoted from the dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896), in which the Court had upheld
racial segregation in public accommodations over the dissenter's protest that
the Constitution "neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens." Justice Kennedy's theme for the opinion
was that Amendment 2 established
classes of citizenship, relegating lesbians and gay men to inferior status.
(Kennedy omitted mention of bisexuals
throughout the opinion, even though
Amendment 2 explicitly mentions
them. This omission drew speculative
comment in the aftermath of the opinion, but there is no evident explanation
for the omission.) Coming full circle at
the end of his opinion, Kennedy quoted
a similar comment from the Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), in
which the Court had scornfully referred
to "class legislation" as being "obnoxious to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment." * * * After
reciting the history of Amendment 2
and describing its effect, as found by
the Colorado Supreme Court, Kennedy
immediately focused on the constitutional objection to the measure:
"Sweeping and comprehensive is the
change in legal status effected by this
law. . . Homosexuals, by state decree,
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are put in a solitary class with respect to
transactions and relations in both the
private and governmental spheres. The
amendment withdraws from homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection from the injuries caused by
discrimination, and it forbids reinstatement of these laws and policies." Kennedy then described how the various
states, discerning the inadequacy of
common law nondiscrimination requirements imposed on operators of
public accommodations, had begun to
enact laws specifying prohibited
grounds for discrimination, and extending the protection beyond public
accommodations to housing, employment, insurance, and other transactions,
noting that such laws went beyond the
"suspect classifications" of race and
alienage identified in the Court's Equal
Protection jurisprudence. Amendment
2 would exclude gays from participation
in this kind of statutory protection. * *
* In addition, Kennedy observed,
Amendment 2 would repeal Colorado
Governor Romer's 1990 executive order banning discrimination by the state,
and similar policies that had been
adopted in public colleges and universities in the state. Further, Kennedy
noted the controversial argument made
to the Court that Amendment 2 might
even intrude into the enforcement of
laws of general application. The Colorado courts had not found this to be so,
and Kennedy observed that it was unnecessary for the Supreme Court to
reach the question, because the depredations of civil rights of homosexuals
already described were sufficient to
render the measure unconstitutional. *
* * In light of this history of the development of civil rights protection in the
U.S., Kennedy explicitly rejected the
state's argument that Amendment 2
"does no more than deny homosexuals
special rights." Kennedy found this argument "implausible," asserting: "To
the contrary, the amendment imposes a
special disability upon those persons
[i.e., homosexuals] alone. Homosexuals
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are forbidden the safeguards that
others enjoy or may seek without constraint. They can obtain specific protection against discrimination only by
enlisting the citizenry of Colorado to
amend the state constitution or perhaps, on the State's view, by trying to
pass helpful laws of general applicability. This is so no matter how local or
discrete the harm, no matter how public
and widespread the injury. We find
nothing special in the protections
Amendment 2 withholds. These are
protections taken for granted by most
people either because they already
have them or do not need them; these
are protections against exclusion from
an almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary civil life in a free society." * * *
Having concluded that Amendment 2
raises an Equal Protection issue, Kennedy turned to the appropriate standard of judicial review. Here the
opinion took a surprising turn. Kennedy insisted that Amendment 2 would
not yield to the established analytic
method of suspect classification or fundamental rights, asserting that it "defies[ ] . . . this conventional inquiry."
This was a case, wrote Kennedy, in
which a challenged measure "lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state
interests." Amendment 2 thus joins
that exclusive, small group of legislative
measures to have been invalidated on
the basis of total irrationality, a result
that most commentators would have
found unlikely in light of the Court's
1993 decision in Heller v. Doe, 113
S.Ct. 2637, in which the Court had
seemed to erect insurmountable barriers to constitutional invalidation via
Equal Protection of almost any measure that did not implicate a fundamental right or a suspect classification. * * *
Kennedy premised this development on
two factors: "First, the amendment has
the peculiar property of imposing a
broad and undifferentiated disability on
a single named group, an exceptional
and, as we shall explain, invalid form of
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legislation. Second, its sheer breadth is
so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems
inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state
interests." In short, Kennedy found
that the proponents' interest in stigmatizing homosexuality was the motivation for the measure, and the various
"state interests" articulated during the
many stages of the litigation were mere
pretexts or makeweights. * * * "It is not
within our constitutional tradition to
enact laws of this sort," wrote Kennedy.
"Central both to the idea of the rule of
law and to our own Constitution's guarantee of equal protection is the principle that government and each of its
parts remain open on impartial terms to
all who seek its assistance... A law declaring that in general it shall be more
difficult for one group of citizens than
for all others to seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal
sense." Is this not merely a restatement
of the Colorado Supreme Court's
"equal participation in the political process" theory? Kennedy went on to assert that measures like Amendment 2
"raise the inevitable inference that the
disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected," and quoted with apparent
approval from Justice William Brennan's opinion for the Court in Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528 (1973), in which the Court had
invalidated a provision of the food
stamp law that was intended to exclude
hippie communes from qualifying for
the benefits of the law. * * * Concluding that Amendment 2 was not "directed to any identifiable legitimate
purpose or discrete objective," Kennedy stated: "It is a status-based enactment divorced from any factual context
from which we could discern a relationship to legitimate state interests; it is a
classification of persons undertaken for
its own sake, something the Equal Pro-
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tection Clause does not permit... We
must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a
proper legislative end but to make
them unequal to everyone else. This
Colorado cannot do. A State cannot so
deem a class of persons a stranger to its
laws. Amendment 2 violates the Equal
Protection Clause, and the judgment of
the Supreme Court of Colorado is affirmed." * * * Kennedy's opinion was
immediately criticized as deficient in
analysis, and not only by those who disagreed with its conclusion. The opinion
never mentioned or attempted to deal
with Bowers v. Hardwick, and surprisingly so, in light of the frequent citation
of Hardwick by lower federal and state
courts in rejecting Equal Protection
claims raised by gay litigants. Furthermore, Kennedy never really explained
why the asserted state interests argued
by Colorado were deficient; he merely
asserted their deficiency in conclusorily.
Kennedy did offer an attempt to distinguish this case from Heller v. Doe (in
which he was in the majority of the
Court that had appeared to reject most
rational basis challenges under the
Equal Protection Clause), but few
found the attempt satisfying. * * * The
first, and most vehement, critic, was
Justice Scalia, whose dissenting opinion
was dripping with scorn for the Court
and the challengers of Amendment 2.
"The Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite," he began,
sending legal analysts to their political
science dictionaries for some clue to his
ambiguous meaning. Scalia apparently
comes at the issues raised by Amendment 2 with certain implicit premises
not shared by the majority of the Court.
One is that homosexuality is entirely a
matter of behavioral choice, so Scalia
rejects Kennedy's description of
Amendment 2 as "status-based" legislation. Another is that all government
enactments forbidding discrimination
against particular groups of people are,
in essence, "special rights" laws, because in the absence of such legislation,
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employers, landlords and others are
free to decide with whom they will associate and do business. And, finally
and most importantly for Scalia, because the Court in Hardwick held that
the states may make "homosexual conduct" a crime, any lesser state disparagement of or discrimination against
homosexuals could not credibly be said
to raise a constitutional issue. * * * In
this last point, Scalia was stating a proposition that has become commonplace
among the federal courts of appeals
dealing with gay Equal Protection
cases. Beginning with the D.C. Circuit
in Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97
(1987), and continuing through the military cases in various circuits, the federal appeals courts have cited Hardwick
as the premise for denying any heightened scrutiny for Equal Protection
challenges to anti-gay policies, and
have generously deferred without much
question to whatever arguments the
government has made in support of
those policies. (The main exception, at
least in part, has been the 9th Circuit,
which may well take encouragement in
its on-going consideration of military
challenges from the Romer Court's
willingness to cast a suspicious eye on
official justifications for anti-gay policies based on fear or dislike of gay people.) * * * Thus, to Scalia it is
outrageous that the Court casts down
Amendment 2 without even confronting the effect of Hardwick. "In
holding that homosexuality cannot be
singled out for disfavorable treatment,"
he wrote, "the Court contradicts a decision, unchallenged here, pronounced
only 10 years ago, see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), and places
the prestige of this institution behind
the proposition that opposition to homosexuality is as reprehensible as racial
or religious bias." Well, thank-you Justice Scalia for that carelessly broad
overstatement. (In a footnote, he backtracks and observes that the Court has
not in this case designated sexual orientation a suspect classification, which
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would have been the logical import of
his fulmination in the main text.) * * *
Scalia asserted, to the contrary, that
having been among the first states to
decriminalize consensual sodomy in its
adoption of the Model Penal Code,
Colorado could yet (without any imputation of ill will toward homosexuals)
legitimately wish to deter homosexual
conduct and enforce public morality by
treating homosexuals with disfavor or,
at the least, excluding them from the
"special protection" of civil rights laws.
Ultimately, Scalia argued, a facial constitutional challenge to Amendment 2
must fail in light of Hardwick, because
the logical implication of that case is
that Colorado may, at least, legitimately discriminate against persons
who engage in homosexual conduct,
and such action would come within the
broad ambit of Amendment 2. (Scalia
argues by analogy that the Court has
never questioned the constitutionality
of state constitutional prohibits of polygamy, citing a 19th century case that
upheld a Utah territorial law depriving
polygamists of all civil rights, including
the right to vote.) * * * Scalia's extended diatribe is too long to describe
here in further detail, other than to
note that it unfolds with apparent logic
from the premises described above. At
the end, Scalia concludes that the
Court's decision is political rather than
legal, and charges that it reflects the
cultural views of the majority of the
Court's members, "reflecting the views
and values of the lawyer class from
which the Court's Members are
drawn." Scalia notes that the nation's
law schools, through the Association of
American Law Schools, have voted to
ban anti-gay discrimination in their
placement offices, and offers this up as
evidence of the elitist views of the legal
profession which he asserts undergird
the Court's decision. * * * "Today's
opinion has no foundation in American
constitutional law," insisted Scalia,
"and barely pretends to." Strong words
indeed, considering that an amicus brief
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written by Prof. Laurence Tribe of
Harvard and co-signed by several of the
nation's leading constitutional law
scholars, urged the very approach taken
by the majority. "The people of Colorado have adopted an entirely reasonable provision which does not even
disfavor homosexuals in any substantive sense, but merely denies them preferential treatment. Amendment 2 is
designed to prevent piecemeal deterioration of the sexual morality favored by
a majority of Coloradans, and is not
only an appropriate means to that legitimate end, but a means that Americans
have employed before. Striking it
down is an act, not of judicial judgment,
but of political will. I dissent." * * *
The decision drew widespread media
coverage and comment, although President Clinton, whose Justice Department refused to file an amicus brief in
the case, tersely described the opinion
as "appropriate." Governor Romer of
Colorado, who had opposed Amendment 2 but then served as the defendant in the litigation (and argued that
the result of the initiative process
should be respected), voiced relief at
the outcome and hope that the state
could unite in accepting the Court's ruling. The Romer decision cast immediate doubt on the 6th Circuit's 1995
decision upholding a similar amendment passed in Cincinnati, Ohio, and
seemed likely as well to dictate the outcome in pending litigation challenging a
similar measure enacted in Alachua
County, Florida. The Supreme Court
was expected to announce its disposition of the Cincinnati case, for which a
certiorari petition was pending, by the
first week in June. A.S.L. [Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).]
Summer 1996: N.J. SUPREME
COURT UPHOLDS BLOOD BANK
INDUSTRY LIABILITY FOR 1994
HIV-INFECTED TRANSFUSION:
The New Jersey Supreme Court joined
the minority of courts holding that
blood transfusion recipients may hold
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the blood banking industry liable for
negligent infection with HIV. Snyder v.
American Assn. of Blood Banks, 1996
WL 290907 (June 4). William Snyder
received blood products infected with
HIV in 1984, several months before the
HIV blood test became available. In
1987, the blood bank determined that
the blood he had received was HIV+,
and Snyder subsequently tested positive. Snyder and his wife alleged various negligence theories of liability
against the hospital, doctors, and blood
banks. The case went to trial against a
lone defendant, the American Association of Blood Banks (AABB), a blood
bank trade association, the other defendants having settled or been dismissed.
A jury found that the AABB had negligently failed to recommend surrogate
testing, which would have weeded out
blood samples from donors considered
to be at high risk for HIV. * * * Writing
for a 6-1 majority, Justice Pollock begins by tracing the early history of HIV
disease and the public policy struggle in
the early 1980s when it began to appear
that HIV was being transmitted via
blood transfusions. Although by 1983
some scientists at the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) advocated surrogate testing - testing blood samples
for blood abnormalities common to
people who went on to develop AIDS
- the AABB resisted implementing
such tests. The AABB held a central
position in the blood banking industry;
it created authoritative standards in the
field and many states deferred to its
standards in their regulations. * * * The
AABB had a duty of care to the plaintiff, the court held. The AABB assumed the duty of assuring the safety of
the nation's blood supply by promulgating its own standards and by accrediting
blood banks. The AABB "wrote the
rules and set the standards" for blood
banks, the court reasoned, and therefore had a duty to protect blood recipients. Although evidence of blood
transfusions causing AIDS may have
been inconclusive, it was nonetheless
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foreseeable that blood transfusions
could spread the virus. Among other
evidence of foreseeability, the CDC believe in 1982 that AIDS could be transmitted by blood transfusions and a 1984
New England Journal of Medicine article confirmed the link between blood
transfusions and AIDS. By the time of
Snyder's transfusion, therefore, the
AABB should have foreseen the risk
that a blood transfusion could transmit
AIDS. * * * The court also refused to
extend qualified immunity to the
AABB on the ground that it was performing a quasi-governmental function,
because to do so would give the AABB
a benefit without the burdens of public
office. In other words, the AABB was
not subject to public scrutiny, governmental oversight or procedural safeguards. The court also dismissed the
argument that the AABB should be
given charitable immunity, because it
was a trade association focused on promoting its members' interests and not
devoted solely to a charitable purpose.
* * * In a lengthy dissent, Justice Garibaldi argued that the AABB should
have been extended qualified immunity
for its quasi-governmental acts. Because the AABB performed tasks that
the state would otherwise have had to
perform, it should be qualifiedly immune from liability for doing so, she argued. The AABB acted with implicit
and explicit state approval as a regulatory body. Courts have granted qualified immunity to private entities acting
in quasi-governmental capacities in a
variety of contexts. Without qualified
immunity, private groups would be
hesitant to take part in the formulation
of public health policy, Garibaldi reasoned. D.W. [Snyder v. American
Assn. of Blood Banks, 676 A.2d 1036
(N.J. Jun. 4, 1996). This article was
written by Dirk Williams.]
September 1996: 7TH CIRCUIT
FINDS CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR GAY PUBLIC
SCHOOL STUDENT: On July 31, the
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7th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a

decision of the United States District
Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, which had granted summary
judgment against a high school student
who claimed that the school system discriminated against him based on his homosexuality by failing to enforce its
sexual harassment policy on his behalf.
Nabozny v. Podlesny, 1996 WL 428031.
The decision, the first to find that a
school district might be liable for failing
to address anti-gay harassment of students, was rendered by an appellate
panel of three judges appointed by Republican presidents, William J. Bauer
(Ford), Joel M. Flaum and Jesse F.
Eschbach (Reagan). * * * Jamie Na-

bozny was a student in the Ashland
Public School District in Ashland, Wisconsin. He acknowledged that he was
homosexual in the seventh grade. From
that time forward, he was continuously
harassed and physically abused by fellow students because of his homosexuality. On numerous occasions,
Nabozny reported this harassment and
abuse to school officials and asked
those officials to protect him and punish his assailants. His numerous requests fell on deaf ears, and on more
than one occasion he was mocked by
school officials due to his homosexuality or told he would have to expect harassment because he was gay. On one
occasion, a group of Nabozny's fellow
students harassed him by performing a
mock rape on him. When Nabozny
complained to the Principal, Mrs.
Podlesny's alleged response-was "Boys
will be boys." Nabozny twice attempted suicide and eventually
dropped out of school as a result of the
harassment. * * * Nabozny filed suit

against several school officials and the
school district alleging that, among
other things, the school district and officials violated his 14th Amendment right
to equal protection by discriminating
against him based on his gender and his
sexual orientation, and violated his
right to due process by exacerbating the
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risk that he would be harmed by fellow
students and by encouraging an environment in which he would be harmed.
The defendants moved for summary
judgment which the District Court
granted in its entirety. On appeal, that
decision was reversed in part and affirmed in part. * * * Since at least 1988,
the Ashland Public School District has
had a formal policy of prohibiting discrimination against students on the basis of gender or sexual orientation. The
District's policy and practice includes
protecting students from student-onstudent sexual harassment. Nabozny
maintained that the defendants denied
him the equal protection of the law by
denying him the protection extended to
other students, based on gender and
sexual orientation. The district court
found that Nabozny had proffered no
evidence to support his equal protection claims; and, in the alternative, the
court granted the defendants qualified
immunity. The Court of Appeals disagreed. * * * Writing for the court,
Judge Eschbach found that the evidence suggests that Nabozny was
treated differently from other students.
The defendants stipulated that they had
a commendable record of enforcing the
District's anti-harassment policies when
female students were harassed by male
students, but Nabozny provided ample
evidence that the District did not enforce their policies as applied to him.
The court found it hard to believe that
had a female student been the subject
of a mock rape the school administration would have responded "Boys will
be boys." The court reversed summary
judgment on the gender discrimination
issue, finding that Nabozny, a male, was
treated differently from female students
who brought harassment complaints. *
* * The district court never specifically
addressed Nabozny's sexual orientation
discrimination claim. It appears that
the district court's intention was to fully
dispose of all of Nabozny's claims. The
appeals court found that there can be
little doubt that homosexuals are an
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identifiable minority subject to discrimination in our society. In addition, the
Wisconsin legislature specifically recognized the need to enact laws to protect
homosexuals from harassment. In analyzing this issue, Judge Eschbach applied the rational relationship test, the
lowest form of scrutiny in a 14th
Amendment case, but the court was unable to garner any rational basis for
permitting one student to assault another student based on the victim's sexual orientation and reversed the district
court's ruling on the sexual orientation
discrimination issue. In a footnote to
part of the opinion rejecting the defendants' attempt to rely on Bowers v.
Hardwick to sustain their position that
Nabozny could not state an equal protection claim, the court noted that the
recent decision in Romer v. Evans, 116
S.Ct. 1620 (1996), suggested that Bowers would be of limited relevance in
equal protection cases in the future.
However, the court did not rely on
Romer in rendering its decision, because in a suit against public officials
who have qualified constitutional immunity, the issue is whether they would
have known at the time of the incident
that their action might violate the constitution, so Romer could not be applied retroactively to judge the
defendants' conduct in this case. * * *
On Nabozny's due process arguments,
the court cited J.O. v. Alton Community School District 11, 909 F.2d 267
(7th Cir. 1990), in which the 7th Circuit
found that school administrators do not
have a special relationship with students and absent that special relationship, a state actor has no duty to protect
a potential victim. The court found that
the school district did nothing to exacerbate Nabozny's risk of harm from his
fellow students, and affirmed the district court on this issue. Nabozny also
argued that defendants violated his
right to due process by acting with deliberate indifference in maintaining a
policy of failing to punish his assailants,
thereby encouraging a harmful environ-
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ment. The court found that since the
harm suffered by Nabozny was at the
hands of his fellow students and not
perpetrated by school employees, there
was no state action. The district court's
decision was affirmed on this issue. * *
* The case is being remanded to the district court on the equal protection gender and sexual orientation
discrimination claims. Of course, we
will carefully follow this matter and report any future developments. T.V.L.
[Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446 (7th
Cir.1996). This article was written by
Todd V. Lamb. The case was settled
during the remand trial for almost $1
million in damages.]
January 1997: ILLINOIS APPEALS
COURT HOLDS CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS TO BE "SEXUAL
ORIENTATION NEUTRAL": Child
custody determinations in the state of
Illinois are "sexual orientation neutral";
furthermore, the potential for social
condemnation due to a parent's homosexuality is not, in itself, enough to justify a change in custody, it was
unanimously declared in the Dec. 16
decision In re Marriage of R.S. and
S.S., 1996 WL 724557 (I11. App., 3rd
District). This was reported to be the
first time an appellate court in Illinois
has upheld custody for a bisexual or lesbian mother. * * * This positive decision overturned a trial court ruling
from Jan. 31, 1996, which had been
stayed pending this appeal, reversing
the existing custody arrangement involving the two children of Rebecca
and Stuart Schroeder. Presiding Justice
Peg Breslin wrote on behalf of the
three-judge appellate panel, finding
that the original arrangement giving
custody of the children to the mother,
to which both parents had initially
agreed, should not be overturned simply because the mother was now living
with a woman in a sexual relationship. *
* * The Schroeders were divorced in
1991. In 1993, Rebecca, who identifies
as bisexual, met J.S., who also identifies
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as bisexual. They began a sexual relationship and J.S. moved into Rebecca's
home later that year. In 1993 Stuart remarried, and in August of 1993 he filed
for modification of custody, alleging
that a substantial change in circumstances had occurred due to his new
marriage and to his ex-wife having "embraced an openly homosexual lifestyle"
which placed "her sexual desires ahead
of the emotional, moral and educational needs of the children." In June
1994, Rebecca sold her home and
moved with her children into J.S.'s
home in a nearby town. * * * The Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act creates a presumption in
favor of current custodial arrangements
so as to promote stability and continuity, in children's lives. In order to
modify custody, the burden of proof
rests with the party requesting modification, who must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that there has been
a change in the circumstances of the
child or the custodial parent, and that
modification is necessary in order to
serve the best interests of the child. * *
* The trial court, straining to find in
favor of the father, had noted three factors which, together, it found amounted
to a substantial change in circumstances: (1) the father's remarriage and
the children's familial relationship with
the father's wife and children; (2) the
mother's reduction in the children's
contact with their paternal grandmother, and (3) the mother's involvement in a conjugal lesbian relationship.
Based on these circumstances, the court
found that it was in the best interests of
the children to modify custody and
award it to the father. The mother appealed. The sole issue on appeal was
whether Stuart Schroeder presented
clear and convincing evidence at trial to
show that a change in custody was necessary to serve the best interests of the
children. * * * In her review of the record, Judge Breslin noted preliminarily
that two of the trial court's findings
were unsupported by the record. First,
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although the trial court found that Stuart and his new wife had "other children" with whom the parties' children
had forged a familial relationship, there
was in fact only a newborn. Additionally, Judge Breslin found no evidence
that Rebecca's living arrangements
were unstable or lacking in familial relationship. She thus agreed that while
the father could provide a good home
for the children, the children's relationship with his new family in and of itself
did not support a modification of custody. Second, the trial court had found
that Rebecca had limited the children's
contact with the grandmother. However, Judge Breslin found that this was
due to the maturing of the children,
their move to a nearby town, and the
grandmother's reluctance to initiate
contact on her own. She found no evidence that Rebecca actively interfered
with the relationship between the children and their grandmother. * * * Thus,
the sole change in circumstances to
warrant a change in custody was the
mother's lesbian relationship. Judge
Breslin noted that the trial court had
made no finding that the children were
adversely affected by the relationship.
Indeed, the parents, the paternal grandmother, the children's teachers, and
two clinical psychologists all agreed
that the children were healthy and well
adjusted, although the trial court's psychologist did find that there would be a
"slight" advantage to the father's having custody because of the risk of societal condemnation of homosexual
relationships. * * * The father argued
that he was entitled to a change in custody based solely on the "immorality"
of the mother's sexual relationship, citing an old Illinois case, Jarrett v. Jarrett,
400 N.E.2d 421 (1979), in which it was
found that the "open and notorious"
nature of the mother's sexual relationship with an unmarried man endangered the moral well-being of the
children and required a change in custody. However, as the appellate court
here noted, four years after Jarrett, the
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Illinois Supreme Court overruled Jarrett with In re Marriage of Thompson,
449 N.E.2d 88, 93 (1983), holding that
Jarrett did not establish a conclusive
presumption that the child is harmed by
a parent's living with a member of the
opposite sex, and that all the circumstances must be considered that affect
the best interests of the child. Judge
Breslin concluded that while cohabitation with a member of the same sex differs from that with a member of the
opposite sex, "the clear import" of
Thompson is that Illinois courts should
not adopt any absolute rule that would
require a change in custody based on
conduct of the custodial parent if that
conduct does not impact the children. *
* * Although the trial court did not find
that the children had suffered any negative consequences as a result of their
mother's sexual relationship, it theorized that the children might suffer
some future social condemnation. Citing Virginia's infamous Bottoms v. Bottoms, 249 Va. 410, 457 S.E.2d 102
(1995), for the proposition that the potential for social condemnation is a factor to be considered when making a
custody determination, the trial court
concluded that this threat was reason to
change custody. In addition, Stuart
Schroeder argued that the court should
not wait until actual harm had occurred
before modifying the prior custody order. * * * The issue, according to Judge
Breslin, is that while the court may consider the custodial parent's homosexual
relationship when making a custody determination, the trial court's function is
solely to determine the effect of the
parent's conduct upon the children.
The judge noted that Bottoms also
stood for the proposition that a lesbian
mother is not to be presumed to be an
unfit parent, but rather that custody determinations are made by considering
several factors, including "misconduct
that affects the child." Unlike Bottoms,
which found evidence of harm including significant abuse, neglect, and abandonment, in the instant case there was
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no evidence of any harm to the children
due to their mother's living situation.
Although there was risk of social condemnation as a result of her sexual relationship, Judge Breslin noted that this
risk would not be eliminated by awarding custody to the father. Furthermore,
the fact that the trial court's psychologist found that there was a "slight" advantage to the father's having custody
due to potential societal condemnation
was not enough. The law does not
change custody when one arrangement
is slightly better than another; rather
the proposed arrangement must be
shown necessary by clear and convincing evidence. * * * Similarly, the father's claim that the mother's conduct
endangered the moral well-being of the
children must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence. Judge Breslin
noted that Stuart Schroeder failed to
present any evidence on this issue at all.
Thus, he failed to meet his burden of
proof and his request to modify custody
was denied. * * * Patricia M. Logue,
managing attorney for Lambda Legal
Defense and Education Fund's Midwest Regional Office, argued the case.
Her co-counsel was Zane Lucas of
Carter & Grimsley in Peoria, Illinois.
Amicus briefs were filed by the National Association of Social Workers,
the Illinois Chapter of the National Association of Social Workers, the National Organization for Woman Legal
Defense and Education Fund, and the
Bloomington Illinois chapter of Parents, Families and Friends of Lesbians
and Gays. J.H. [In re Marriage of R.S.
and S.S., 677 N.E.2d 1297 (Ill. App. Ct.,
3rd. Dist.,1996). The article was written
by Julia Herd.]
March 1997: Professional Notes: Supporters of civil rights and civil liberties
mourned the death of Thomas B. Stoddard, 48, from AIDS on Feb. 12. Stoddard was a pioneering leader in the
struggle for lesbian and gay rights, civil
liberties and privacy. As legislative director of the N.Y. Civil Liberties
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Union, executive director of Lambda
Legal Defense & Education Fund, director of the Campaign for Military
Service, and vice-president of the
American Foundation for AIDS Research (AMFAR), Stoddard played a
key role in the important struggles of
the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. He was also
among the first to teach a gay rights law
course, at N.Y. University in the early
1980s, where he continued to serve until recently as an adjunct professor and
also taught courses on legislation.
NYU Law School established the Tom
Stoddard Fellowship in 1996, to fund
law students working with gay rights
public interest organizations. Perhaps
most importantly, as an eloquent public
spokesperson, Stoddard provided an
important role model for lesbians and
gay men in the legal profession and for
lesbian and gay youth seeking positive
images in the media. The loss is enormous. Commenting on his death, the
New York Times stated: "Few New
Yorkers - or few Americans, for that
matter - have done as much to bring
issues affecting gay men and lesbians
into the mainstream of legal and political debate, or been as successful at
changing laws and attitudes." (Feb. 19)
Stoddard is survived by his spouse,
Walter Rieman, a partner at Paul Weiss
Rifkind Wharton & Garrison in New
York, and other family members.
A.S.L.
VERMONT SUPREME COURT
RULES AGAINST LESBIAN COPARENT IN VISITATION DISPUTE:
In a surprising change of stance for a
gay-friendly jurisdiction, the Vermont
Supreme Court rejected a lesbian partner's effort to establish visitation with
her former partner's adopted child,
holding that there is no legal right by
which the court might fashion an equitable remedy, and that the court was
unwilling to create a new legal right of
"equitable parentage" for third parties
seeking visitation, as was suggested by
the firmly-worded dissent. Titchenal v.
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Dexter, 1997 WL 82730, 23 Fam. L.
Rep. (BNA) 1224 (Feb. 28). * * * The
dispute arose from the breakup of a relationship between Chris Titchenal and
Diane Dexter, who had both participated in raising a child adopted by Dexter. In 1985, the parties began an
intimate relationship in which they
jointly purchased a home, held joint
bank accounts, and jointly owned their
cars. They both contributed financially
to their household, and regarded each
other as life partners. At some point,
they decided to have a child. When attempts to conceive via a sperm donor
failed, they decided to adopt. In July
1991, defendant adopted a newborn
girl, who was named Sarah Ruth Dexter-Titchenal. The parties held themselves out to Sarah and all others as her
parents. For the first 3-1/2 years of Sarah's life, Titchenal cared for the child
approximately 65 percent of the time.
Plaintiff did not seek adoption of Sarah
because the parties believed that the
adoption statute would not allow both
of them to do so. * * * In 1994, the parties' relationship deteriorated and the
defendant moved out, taking Sarah.
For the next five months, Sarah stayed
with Titchenal twice a week. By spring
of 1995, defendant had severely curtailed plaintiff's contact with Sarah and
refused plaintiff's offer of financial assistance. * * * In October 1995, realizing that the family court lacks
jurisdiction to adjudicate her claim,
plaintiff requested the superior court to
exercise its equitable jurisdiction to establish and enforce regular unsupervised visitation between her and
Sarah. The court granted defendant's
motion to dismiss, refusing to recognize
a cause of action for parent-child contact absent a common law or statutory
basis. Titchenal argued on appeal that
the superior court has equitable jurisdiction under the state's parens patriae
authority to consider her claim, and
that public policy and the doctrines of
in loco parentis and de facto
parenthood allow the court to exercise
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equitable authority in cases such as this.
* * * Chief Justice Allen, writing for the
court, found no legal basis for the plaintiff's proposal, stating that the courts
cannot' exert equitable powers unless
they first have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. "[A] court
may exert its equitable powers to grant
appropriate relief only when a judicially
cognizable right exists, and no adequate
legal remedy is available." The inquiry
then changed to whether there is an underlying legal basis for plaintiff's claim
that would allow the superior court to
apply its equitable powers, which courts
may exert based on common-law, statutory, constitutional rights or on public
policy considerations. The court found
no legal basis for plaintiff's claimed as
an equitable or de facto parent, nor for
her argument that public policy compels such a result. "[T]here is no common-law history of Vermont courts
interfering with the rights and responsibilities of fit parents absent statutory
authority to do so." Making clear the
exception of parens patriae power to
adjudicate custody matters in neglect
petitions, the court topped its reasoning
off with the common-law rule that "parents have the right to the custody, control and services of their minor children
free from governmental interference."
* * * The court further explained that
"persons affected by this decision [including same-sex couples] can protect
their interests" by adoption, which
Titchenal did not attempt because the
parties believed that Vermont's adoption laws at the time would not permit
it. Effectively telling the plaintiff that
she brought this problem on herself, the
court stated that she actually could
have adopted Sarah since "as of December 1991, when Sarah was only five
months old, at least one Vermont probate court had allowed the female partner of a child's adoptive mother to
adopt the child as a second parent."
Moreover, in June of 1993, more than a
year before the end of the parties' relationship, the Vermont Supreme Court
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construed the adoption statute to allow
same-sex couple adoptions, under
which unmarried adoptive partners
could petition the family court regarding parental rights and responsibilities
or parent-child contact. * * * On public
policy considerations, the court further
sank the plaintiff's case by citing cases
on the dangers of forcing parents to defend third-party visitation claims and
the risk of abuse of the process to
continue unwanted relationships or to
harass the legal parents. "[Nothing]
would ... prevent parents from having
to defend themselves against the merits
of petitions brought by a potentially
wide range of third parties claiming a
parent-like relationship with their
child," citing as examples In re Hood,
847 P.2d 1300 (Kan.1993) (day-care
provider); L. v. G., 497 A.2d 215
(N.J.Super.Ct. Ch.Div.1985) (adult siblings); Bessette v. Saratoga County
Comm'r, 619 N.Y.S.2d 359 (N.Y.App.
Div. 1994) (former foster parents). * *
* However, in what seems to be an olive branch offering, the court insists
that its opinion should not be read to
impede same-sex partners from childrearing (although it does respect the
public policy concerns "in this age of
the disintegrating nuclear family"), but
absent statutory authority extending
the family court's jurisdiction to adjudicate third-party visitation requests, legal parents retain the right to
determine whether third-party visitation is in their child's best interest. The
court concludes that equity will not aid
those who fail to take advantage of a
remedy available at law, and that if the
plaintiff wanted to adopt Sarah, she
should have attempted to do so. Instead, plaintiff made no such attempt,
but now seeks equitable relief years
later. * * * The dissent, penned by Justice Morse and joined by Justice Johnson, suggests the doctrine of equitable
adoption, as an alternative, well-established remedy that is well suited to the
factual circumstances of this case. This
"equitable-parentage" theory is based
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on the doctrine of equitable adoption
used in cases of intestate succession to
permit participation in the estate by a
foster child who was never legally
adopted by the decedent. Upon the
foster parent's death, a court declares
the child is entitled to share in the estate as of she were legally adopted.
Across the country, this doctrine has
been invoked to entitle a child to maintain an action for wrongful death, death
benefits under workers' compensation
statutes, and to support the parental
rights of a non-biological father to the
daughter born while he was married to
the mother. * * * Morse proposes applying the original Vermont equitable
adoption concept established in
Whitchurch v. Perry, 408 A.2d 627
(1979), but in a "novel factual context."
Titchenal "contends that she would
have adopted [Sarah] when she was
born in 1991, but that the adoption statute then appeared to allow only one unmarried person to adopt, and defendant
was designated as the adoptive parent."
Given the subsequent rule changes,
Plaintiff should be allowed to prove "an
intent to establish an adoptive relationship with the child that was never formally consummated because of the
then current state of the law" and
Titchenal's relationship with the defendant. Family court would be the proper
venue because it is expressly empowered to "hear and dispose of issues pertaining to parental rights and
responsibilities [of] . .. two unmarried
persons, who have adopted a minor
child," 15A V.S.A. sec. 1-112, and is
further vested with full 'equitable . . .
powers' to determine whether one of
the parties is entitled to adoptive parent status. 4 V.S.A. sec. 453(a)." * * *
The five-page dissent concludes that the
case should be remanded to the family
court to determine if Titchenal would
have adopted Sarah except for the legal
impediment and, if so, she would be
deemed the equitable adoptive mother
and the court presumably could accord
her all the rights of a legal adoptive
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parent. * * * The court rejected this approach on several grounds. First, regarding family court jurisdiction, it
argued that family court lacks the
proper jurisdiction because, despite the
dissent's analysis, the fact remains that
the plaintiff never adopted the child,
the fact that triggers family court jurisdiction. The court cannot "remand" to
family court as the dissent suggests,
since the appeal is from superior court
and the plaintiff never claimed that
family court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute. Second, the court
rather colorfully chides the dissent for
"stretching the doctrine ...beyond recognition in an effort to provide relief to
this particular plaintiff" while providing
no "principled" justification or limitation. To do so would foreclose all
others having legitimate reasons for
failing to adopt from seeking equitable
relief. The majority acknowledges that
not many courts have embraced the equitable-parent doctrine and of those
that did, the court does not find that
any have limited it in the manner proposed by the dissent. The dissent responds claiming that it is simply
invoking an application much closer to
the original equitable-adoption concept: to find, in retrospect, an intent to
adopt by a person who had never formally done so, for the purpose of
achieving a just result. Responding to
the issue of "principled justification,"
the dissent argues that its proposal is no
more "unprincipled" than any other equitable doctrine, "unless the court also
considers equitable estoppel, equitable
servitudes, constructive trusts, specific
performance, and every other equitable
remedy to be unprincipled." * * * Finally, the court advances that the plaintiff somehow could, and should, have
attempted to adopt the minor child
prior to the couple's separation in 1994.
The dissent states that it would be unfair to conclude that the plaintiff, or anyone similarly situated, should have
known that she had the legal right to
adopt prior to the effective date of the
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new adoption statute. "It is one thing to
presume that parties are aware of, and
bound by, general enactments of the
Legislature that amend the law; it is
quite another, however, to impute to a
non-attorney specific knowledge of one
probate decision and a later, confirming
appellate court decision." Although
the court denies the parties' presumed
knowledge of the state of the law at a
given time, it does contend that for the
doctrine to apply, there must either be
an agreement to adopt or an undertaking to effect a statutory adoption,
neither of which took place. In addition, equitable adoption "merely confers a right of inheritance," not to be
construed as an actual adoption.
Whitchurch, 408 A.2d at 632. * * * Julie
A. Frame and Jennifer E. Nelson represented the plaintiff- appellant; John R.
Durrance, Jr., represented the defendant-appellee. An amicus curie brief in
support of plaintiff was filed by Gay &
Lesbian Advocates & Defenders
(GLAD) of Boston. K.J.R. [Titchenal
v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682 (Vt. 1997). The
article was written by K. Jacob
Ruppert.]
May 1997: FLORIDA APPEALS
COURT ENFORCES LIVING-TOGETHER AGREEMENT OF FEMALE COUPLE: When a court begins
its opinion, "Emma. . . and Nancy...
were close friends and more," good
things must surely follow. Thus begins
a Florida Court of Appeals opinion enforcing a living together agreement between two women. Posik v. Layton,
1997 WL 136208 (Fla. App. 5th Dist.,
Mar. 27). * * * As a condition of following Nancy Layton to a different job in a
different county, Emma Posik insisted
they execute an agreement which provided that, inter alia, Layton would
make substantial monthly payments of
"liquidated damages" to Posik if the relationship ended. Four years later, the
parties broke up and Posik sued to enforce the agreement. A trial judge refused to enforce the liquidated damages
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provision, feeling it amounted to a penalty because Posik's actual damages
(loss of employment and costs of relocation) were ascertainable. The Court
of Appeals disagreed and, calling the
agreement a "nuptial" agreement between "live-ins," held that it was enforceable. * * * The court studiously
avoids the question of whether public
policy proscribes the enforcement of
the parties' agreement: it interprets
anti-gay and -lesbian adoption and marriage cases not to prohibit the right of
parties to create such obligations by
contract. Florida's sodomy law is simply never mentioned. The liquidated
damages provision was enforceable, the
court opined, because Posik's damages
included more than lost wages and
moving expenses, and the liquidated
damages were reasonable under the circumstances. The monthly payments
were less than Posik had made in years
before she entered the agreement and
less than she would have received had
other long term provisions of the contract been performed, e.g., Layton's
agreement to make Posik the sole heir
of all of her probate and non-probate
assets. * * * The court interpreted several other provisions of the agreement
in Posik's favor and concluded, pithily,
"Contracts can be dangerous to one's
well-being. That is why they are kept
away from children. Perhaps warning
labels should be attached. In any event,
contracts should be taken seriously."
D.W. [Posik v. Layton, 695 So.2d 759
(Fla. App. 5th Dist., 1997). The article
was written by Dirk Williams.]
June 1997: SEXUALITY ISSUES IN
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY JURISPRUDENCE: Transsexual Man Denied
Recognition as Father: On April 22, in
X, Y and Z v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights held
(by 14-6) that a refusal to permit a postoperative female-to-male transsexual
person (X) to be registered as the father of the child by donor insemination
(Z) of his non-transsexual female part-
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ner of 18 years (Y) did not violate Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention. If X
were considered a man under English
law, he would automatically be the legal father under sec. 28(3) of the
Human Fertilisation and Embryology
Act 1990. The Court found that the Article 8 right to "respect for family life"
was applicable, because "de facto family ties link the three applicants." However, "given that transsexuality raises
complex scientific, legal, moral and social issues, in respect of which there is
no generally shared approach among
the [Convention's] Contracting States,
the Court [was] of the opinion that Article 8 cannot, in this context, be taken
to imply an obligation for the respondent State formally to recognize as the
father of a child a person who is not the
biological father." The Court considered that "the State may justifiably be
cautious in changing the law, since it is
possible that the amendment sought
might have unforeseen or undesirable
consequences for [AID] children." It
also noted the inconsistency of treating
X as the father of Z but as female for
other legal purposes. The Court's judgment was a disappointment after the
Report of the European Commission of
Human Rights, adopted on June 27,
1995 (Application No. 21830/93), which
had found a violation of Article 8 (by
13-5). For more information about the
case, please contact X, who is in fact
law professor Stephen Whittle, School
of Law, Manchester Metropolitan University, Elizabeth Gaskell Campus,
Hathersage Road, Manchester M13
OJA (s.t.whittle@mmu.ac.uk; fax: 44161-224-0893). * * * Failure to Recognize Gender Reassignments Violates
Convention:
Transsexual applicants from Britain
have consistently failed before the
Court where they have sought marital
or parental rights. However, a preliminary victory has been achieved in Sheffield v. U.K. (Application No. 23390/
94) and Horsham v. U.K. (Application
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No. 22985/93). In Reports adopted on
Jan. 21, the Commission held (by 15-1
in both cases) that the male-to-female
transsexual applicants' inability to obtain legal recognition of their gender
reassignments constitutes "a failure to
respect [their] right to private life"
under Article 8, and (by 9-7 and 10-6)
that it was not necessary to examine
separately the applicants' complaints
under Article 12 (right to marry). The
Commission has referred both cases to
the Court. R.W. [This article was written by Robert Wintemute.]
September 1997: N.Y. APPELLATE
COURTS EXHIBIT CONTINUED
HOSTILITY TO GAY TENANT
SUCCESSION CLAIMS: Exhibiting
unmistakable hostility to lesbian and
gay apartment succession claims and ignoring the spirit of Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co., 74 N.Y.2d 201 (1989), two
New York appellate decisions, announced within days of each other,
each yielding a strong dissenting opinion, held that a family relationship had
not been established under Rent Stabilization Code provisions modeled after
the Braschi family definition guidelines
(9NYCRR 2520.6(o)). * * * In West
End Associates v. Wildfoerster, 1997
WL 417216 (App. Div., 1st Dept., July
27), affirming by a 3 to 1 majority an
Appellate Term decision upholding a
grant of possession to the landlord after
a non-jury trial, the court adhered to
the trial court's finding that prior to the
tenant's AIDS-related death, he and
Frederick B. Wildfoerster, III, had a
"very close, loving relationship" of 20
years, that Wildfoerster was totally dependent upon the tenant financially,
the latter paying for all household expenses and providing Wildfoerster complete financial support. Wildfoerster
worked as the tenant's business assistant and personal secretary, lived with
the tenant for 2 years prior to the tenant's death as well as during an earlier 2
year period, and from the time the tenant first showed signs of AIDS, cared
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for the tenant "as a family member
would."
In support of their finding of no family
relationship, the majority pointed principally to the absence of financial protection by the tenant for Wildfoerster
by will, insurance, or monetary gift, and
also to evidence that Wildfoerster received his mail at a different address,
which he listed on credit applications,
his driver's license and tax returns, and
that there was no commingling of finances, no joint ownerships, and no indication of sharing of household
expenses.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice E. Leo
Milonas repeatedly invoked Braschi
and concluded that in the context of
"the totality of their relationship,"
Wildfoerster demonstrated the dedication, caring and self-sacrifice necessary
to meet his burden under the statute,
and established that a family relationship existed. In addition to the evidence
referred to and rejected by the majority, Milonas cited undisputed testimony
that the two worked out of the apartment, traveled together, attended business and social functions and
entertained together, were visited by
friends and Wildfoerster's parents as a
couple, and behaved as a family.
Milonas also cited undisputed testimony of several witnesses found credible by the trial court that the two
shared a very close and loving relationship, including testimony by a 31-year
friend of the tenant that the latter had
declared to him his love for Wildfoerster. * * * In explanation of the absence
of financial sharing and post-death provision for Wildfoerster, and Wildfoerster's use of a different mailing address
after he moved in with the tenant,
Milonas found that those facts painted
an "entirely consistent portrait" with
the finding by the trial court that the
tenant was an intensely private man
who took pains to hide his homosexuality; refused to acknowledge publicly his
relationship with Wildfoerster or even
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the nature of his illness; the tenant's
passion for personal secrecy was so
great that Wildfoerster and the tenant's
close friends exhibited a reluctance to
disclose personal information about the
tenant even after his death; and that the
foregoing was consistent with Wildfoerster's facade to the outside world downplaying their relationship. Milonas
concluded that, instead of considering
the totality of the relationship, the trial
court had focused on a single factor, the
absence of a will. * * * Gay Men's
Health Crisis filed an amicus brief in
support of Wildfoerster's appeal. * * *
In 54 Featherco, Inc. v. Correa and
Maisonet, N.Y.L.J., July 30, 1997, p. 21,
Col. 1 (App. Term, 1st Dept.), affirming
by a 2 to 1 majority the trial court's denial to Maisonet of succession rights,
Maisonet and Correa, the tenant of record, had been live-in lovers for 13
years, until Correa moved out to deal
with family problems in Puerto Rico.
They had shared holidays, social activities, and travel, hosted parties, attended
events at relatives' homes, were in the
words of one witness "always together,"
called themselves "lovers," and were financially interdependent. Correa had
supported Maisonet, who was disabled,
and Maisonet turned over her welfare
checks to Correa, who signed them
over to the landlord. * * * Giving deference to the findings of fact and credibility of the trial judge (Pierre B.
Turner), who derogatorily defined "lovers" as "somebody is going to bed with
(somebody)... That doesn't mean ...
a long term caring relationship," the
court held Maisonet failed to sustain
her burden of proof. Acknowledging
that Correa and Maisonet had lived and
socialized together for over ten years,
the majority termed them no more than
"close friends" and based their denial
of succession rights on the absence of
documentation corroborating the intermingling of finances, sharing of household expenses, or formalizing their joint
obligations, and on a letter Correa had
sent to the Department of Social Ser-
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vices terming Maisonet a "boarder." * *
* In her dissenting opinion, Justice
Helen Freedman found that the two
had a close, loving relationship in which
they shared their lives and finances "in
every sense of the word." Invoking
Braschi and itemizing the RSC family
definition criteria, Freedman countered
the majority's emphasis on their lack of
formalized legal obligations by pointing
out that Correa and Maisonet had limited income and few possessions and
were financially unsophisticated; and
that the only thing of value they had
was the apartment lease, which Correa
had attempted to "will" to Maisonet by
writing a letter asking that Maisonet be
allowed to retain it. Freedman concluded that in such cases courts deemed
the absence of formalized legal obligations non-dispositive. Freedman criticized the trial court's derisive reference
to lovers, noting that under the definition in the American Heritage Dictionary (2d. College Ed., 1991), lovers are
"a couple in love with each other,"
which implies more than a sexual relationship. * * * The issue arose in a nonpayment proceeding against Correa as
tenant of record. The court held that
Maisonet was without standing to defend and that Correa continued to be
obligated to pay rent, leaving open the
possibility that if Correa had paid the
rent in her own name, the succession issue might not have arisen. A.J.L. [West
End Associates v. Wildfoerster, 661
N.Y.S.2d 202 (N.Y. App.Div., 1st
Dept., 1997); 54 Featherco, Inc. v. Correa and Maisonet, N.Y.L.J., 7/30/97,
p.21, col. 1 (N.Y.Sup.Ct., App. Term.,
1st Dept.). This article was written by
Arthur J. Levy.]
November 1997: SIXTH CIRCUIT
RECOGNIZES EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIM BASED ON SEXUAL
ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION
IN SELECTIVE PROSECUTION
CASE: On Oct. 8, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 6th Circuit revived an
equal protection claim brought by a
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woman against whom DUI laws were
selectively enforced based on her supposed sexual orientation. Stemler v.
City of Florence, Chipman v. City of
Florence, 1997 WL 615760. * * * According to the facts related by Circuit
Judge Boggs, while dancing at a bar
with boyfriend Steve Kritis, Conni
Black met Susan Stemler. They went to
the women's restroom to discuss their
respective boyfriends; Black told Stemler that she wanted to leave Kritis.
Kritis burst into the restroom cursing,
grabbed Black, threatened to kill her,
slammed her against a toilet stall, then
pulled her out of the restroom. Black
briefly passed out after Kritis pulled
her out of the restroom a second time
and slammed her into a wall. Kritis
menaced Black with his fist. At Black's
request, Stemler agreed to drive her
home. As they were leaving, Kritis hit
Stemler in the head with a blunt object.
* * * Kritis chased Stemler's car with
his truck, headlights off. Kritis rear-ended Stemler and tried to trap her car in
a residential cul-de-sac. When Kritis
got out of his truck to pound on the
window of Stemler's car and yell at
Black (waking additional witnesses who
called 911), Stemler drove around the
truck. Kritis resumed the chase at sixty
m.p.h. on a residential sidewalk. The
911 caller and a witness already following the two vehicles followed in their
cars. At a traffic light one of the witnesses flashed his lights at police Lt.
Thomas Dusing (responding to the 911
call) and told him that Kritis appeared
to threaten the safety of the women.
Dusing cut-off the two vehicles at the
intersection; Stemler ran out of her car
to Dusing and cried, explaining that the
drunk Kritis assaulted the two and
threatened murder. While Stemler was
talking to Dusing, Kritis told Officer
Reuthe that Stemler was a lesbian who
was kidnaping his girlfriend. (Stemler
denies that she is a lesbian.) Reuthe
told Dusing that he smelled alcohol on
Kritis and that Stemler was a lesbian.
Despite his obvious intoxication, no
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one conducted a sobriety test on Kritis
or asked him to step out of the truck.
(Later testing put his blood alcohol at
the time of the stop at .155-.175, at least
one-and-a-half times the legal limit.)
Kritis repeated to Dusing that Stemler
was a lesbian and asked him to bring
Black to his truck. Dusing told Kritis
that he would see what he could do and
asked Kritis if he would testify against
Stemler. Dusing's report claimed that
he did not smell alcohol on Kritis, despite his contemporaneous statements
to two witnesses that he did. * * * Dusing ordered Officer Wince to test Stemler's sobriety despite her lack of DUI
indicators (e.g. impaired balance), finding a blood alcohol level of .105 by a
breathalyzer which Stemler alleges was
improperly calibrated. All the officers
heard Kritis claim that Stemler was a
lesbian, and they agreed with Dusing's
decision to arrest Stemler for DUI. On
Stemler's pointing at Kritis (who hadn't
turned his headlights on) to ask Wince
"Why don't you check him?," Wince
pulled her arm behind her back and
handcuffed her. A witness, angered by
Stemler's arrest, told the complete story
of the chase to two other officers. They
told him that he didn't know what was
going on but would be contacted to testify against Stemler. Mysteriously, all
records of this witness were lost. Meanwhile, two officers made a point of telling the 911 caller that Stemler was a
lesbian; their certainty surprised the
witness given Stemler's out-of-state license plates. Dusing ordered Black arrested for public intoxication "if she
didn't want to leave with the male."
Two officers then lifted the insensate
Black out of Stemler's car and placed
her in the passenger seat of Kritis'
truck. Kritis immediately drove off
with Black, who again passed out. Five
minutes later Kritis' truck broadsided a
guardrail, throwing Black partially out
of the passenger side window and severing her head in two. Kritis drove another 2.5 miles before stopping to flag
down a passing motorist, who described
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Kritis as nonchalant, though obviously
drunk. Police arriving at the scene saw
probable cause to arrest Kritis without
need of a field sobriety test. * * * Stemler states that she had half of a beer and
two Irish coffees that night. An hour
after testing Stemler's blood alcohol
level at .105, Wince allegedly tested
Stemler at .17. A forensic scientist concluded that the integrity of this sample
was destroyed as Wince (for the first
time in his career) held the sample for
five days, didn't submit required documentation, then drove it to the lab personally. At Stemler's first DUI trial
(resulting in a hung jury), Wince admitted that he had not completed an evidence card which he produced at her
second trial, claiming it was completed
at the time of arrest. Stemler was acquitted. Black's estate has a wrongful
death appeal pending against the police. * * * Stemler then sued the City of
Florence and law enforcement officials
in federal court, alleging a violation of
her rights to due process and equal protection of the laws. Because the state
court found that the police had probable cause to arrest Stemler, her false arrest and malicious prosecution claims
were properly dismissed by the district
court. The court of appeals found itself
"powerless" to review the due process
issue of Wince's evidence-tampering,
reasoning that Stemler didn't raise it in
her complaint but only after Wince was
dismissed from suit. * * * However,
"this is the rare case in which a plaintiff
has successfully stated a claim of selective prosecution. . . [T]he. . . officers
chose to arrest and prosecute her for
[DUI] because they perceived her to be
a lesbian, and out of a desire to effectuate an animus against homosexuals...
Kritis was similarly situated to Stemler
(or, indeed, far drunker than she)," but
they chose not to arrest him at the time
they arrested Stemler because they perceived him to be heterosexual. The
court rejected defendants' citation of
Bowers v. Hardwick as support for the
proposition that it is always constitu-
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tional to discriminate on the basis of
sexual orientation, holding that the police would violate the core principle of
the Equal Protection Clause by basing
enforcement decisions on an "arbitrary
classification," and noting that the
availability of such a claim is not limited to groups accorded heightened
scrutiny under equal protection jurisprudence. The district court's decision
on the equal protection claim was reversed with respect to the individual
police defendants and remanded for
further proceedings. M.M. [Stemler v.
City of Florence, Chipman v. City of
Florence, 126 F.3d 856 (6th Cir. 1997).
This article was written by Mark
Major.]
December 1997: ATLANTA'S DOMESTIC PARTNER BENEFIT ORDINANCE HELD CONSTITUTIONAL: The city of Atlanta has won
round two of its battle to extend substantive benefits to the domestic partners of its employees. In a 5-2 opinion,
the Supreme Court of Georgia upheld
the constitutionality of Atlanta's revised domestic partner benefit ordinance, reversing the judgment of the
Fulton County Superior Court. City of
Atlanta v. Moran, 1997 WL 677314
(Nov. 3). The ordinance was challenged
by Lamar Moran, a city resident who
contended that Georgia's constitution
did not permit local governments to extend insurance benefits to domestic
partners. * * * Georgia law authorizes
municipalities to provide insurance and
other benefits to their employees and
the employees' dependents, although
the statute does not define who qualifies as a dependent. The City of Atlanta Council had passed two domestic
partner ordinances: a registration ordinance, and an ordinance defining 'dependents' as registered domestic
partners of city employees. In an earlier decision, the court had upheld the
first but struck down the second ordinance, ruling that it extended the definition of dependent in a manner
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inconsistent with state law. The court
held that the benefits ordinance impermissibly recognized domestic partners
as a family relationship, and defined
'dependent' based on status rather than
financial dependency. * * * On Sept. 3,
1996, the City of Atlanta Council tried
again and passed Ordinance 96-0-1018.
This ordinance defined an eligible dependent as "one who relies on another
for financial support." The ordinance
grants insurance benefits only to those
dependents who are registered as domestic partners. The court has now approved of this structure, in an opinion
by Justice Hunstein. * * * First, the
Hunstein compared the ordinance's
definition of 'dependent' with the
term's dictionary definition, as well as
its definition in other statutory and
common law contexts. By not defining
dependent in a way so as to recognize a
new family relationship similar to marriage, the ordinance avoided constitutional flaws raised in the prior case.
The court also held that since a municipality need not legislate to the fullest
extent of its home rule authority, the
City Council was within its right to extend benefits to fewer than all of its employees' dependents. * * * Justices
Carley and Thompson dissented, in an
opinion by Justice Carley. The dissent
argued that the court's prior decision
had only upheld the domestic partner
registration ordinance precisely because it did not confer any substantive
rights to registered partners. The dissent accused the majority of ruling contrary to the letter and spirit of its prior
holding by now extending insurance
benefits to domestic partners. The dissent posited that the city has no authority to create a contract comparable to
marriage, and concluded that the domestic partner ordinance was preempted by marriage and divorce laws. *
* * The Moran decision is another step
towards recognizing family relationships other than heterosexual marriage.
The practical long-term significance of
the case is less certain, however, since
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the Georgia legislature retains the authority to defining the term dependent
so as to exclude domestic partners. Opponents of the Atlanta ordinance say
they feel particularly encouraged to
press for legislative action in light of
Congress' recent passage of the Defense of Marriage Act. Domestic partner proponents must wait and hope
that this issue will remain a two-round
fight. * * * The ordinance was defended by Atlanta City Attorneys Kendric E. Smith and Robin Joy Shahar,
with amicus assistance from Harry H.
Harkins, Jr., and J. Patrick McCrary.
I.C.-T. [City of Atlanta v. Moran, 492
S.E.2d 193 (Ga. 1997). This article was
written by Ian Chesir-Teran.]
February 1998: MISSOURI APPEALS
COURT REVERSES GROUND ON
GAY PARENTS; ADOPTS NEXUS
TEST IN CONTESTED CUSTODY
CASE: Potentially putting an end to
more than two decades of gay-parent
bashing in the Missouri state courts, a
panel of the Western District Court of
Appeals ruled on January 20 that the
courts should no longer presume that it
will not be in the best interest of children to be in the custody of their gay
parents. DeLong v. DeLong, 1998 WL
15536. Instead, the court ruled that the
burden would be on the parent who opposes giving a gay parent custody to
show that the gay parent's homosexuality is having a harmful effect on the
child. * * * Beginning in 1980 and
continuing through seven different decisions by various panels of the Missouri appellate courts, the courts of
that state have consistently taken the
position that it can never be in the best
interest of children to be raised by a
gay parent, and had even gone so far as
to require that when gay parents exercise visitation rights, they have another
non-gay adult with them at all times.
The courts had rested their determinations on the idea that exposure to a gay
parent will endanger the moral development of the child, or that the child
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would inevitably suffer social disadvantage through being associated with a
gay parent. Now, an appellate panel of
the state has rejected this approach for
the first time. * * * The turnabout came
in the divorce case of Frederick and
Janice DeLong. They married in 1985.
At that time, Frederick was an attorney age 36 earning $80,000 a year, while
Janice was a beginning school teacher
age 24 earning $13,000. Before the
wedding, they signed an antenuptial
agreement under which Janice agreed
to give up her career to stay home and
take care of Frederick's son from an
earlier marriage and the children they
hoped to have together. In the agreement, she also gave up her right to
claim marital property in the event of a
divorce, limiting her entitlement to
whatever assets she brought to the marriage plus a payment of $2,000 for each
year of the marriage and a $10,000 payment upon signing the agreement. Fred
also required that Janice undergo an
evaluation by a psychologist to determine her compatibility with married
life. * * * During the first five years of
the marriage, they had three children,
but by 1991 Janice had figured out that
she was really more interested in
women and began a series of extramarital affairs. After the couple broke up,
Fred also had an extramarital affair.
Janice was careful to keep from her
children any knowledge about her lesbianism. * * * During the divorce proceeding, Fred sought sole custody of the
children, and Boone County Circuit
Court Judge Ronald M. Belt, following
the Missouri precedents, found that the
children's best interest would be served
by placing them with Fred. Citing
Janice's promiscuous series of four homosexual affairs," the court also restricted visitation, requiring Janice to
"keep any and all aspects of the homosexual lifestyle away from the minor
children during the children's periods
of visitation with her." In addition,
Belt ordered that the children not be
exposed to any known lesbians or "any
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other female, unrelated by blood or
marriage, with whom [she] may be living." The court also ordered the guardian ad litem, appointed to represent the
children's interest, to supervise a "telling session" at which Janice would tell
the two older children about her sexual
orientation. (This seems inconsistent
with the visitation order, but consistency isn't a strong suit of homophobic
judges.) * * * The Court of Appeals decision, written by Presiding Judge Robert Ulrich, totally rejected this
approach. After reviewing the past history of gay parenting decisions in the
Missouri appeals courts, Ulrich asserted: "To the extent that Missouri
case law automatically presumes that a
homosexual parent is per se unfit to be
custodian of his or her child, it is not
followed in this case." * * * Instead, the
court explicitly adopted the "nexus
test" that has been advanced by gay
rights litigators: A parent's sexual conduct, including homosexual conduct, is
not to presumed to be a negative factor, and is only relevant if it can be
shown to be harming the child. * * *
Furthermore, the court rejected the
idea that parental homosexual conduct
can always be assumed to be harmful to
the child. "Generalizations regarding
the possible impact a parent's sexual
conduct outside the presence of a child
may have on a child are impermissible,"
wrote Ulrich. "Likewise, the disapproval of morals or other personal
characteristics, without evidence of how
the morals or characteristics adversely
impact the child, should not be used to
determine the fitness of a parent to care
for a child." Disclaiming any purpose
to "condone" homosexuality, Ulrich asserted that the sole purpose of the court
in a custody case should be to determine what placement will be in the
child's best interest. * * * Turning to
this case, Ulrich noted that the trial
court had focused on the mother's homosexuality without making any real
inquiry into how her sexual orientation
actually affected (or didn't affect) her
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children. Thus, the lower court "misapplied the law" and the case had to be
remanded to the lower court for reconsideration of custody and visitation. * *
* Janice had also challenged the premarital property agreement. Two of
the three judges on the panel agreed
that the property agreement was unconscionably one-sided at the time it
was made, and so should be set aside.
Also reversing the trial court on this
point, the court directed that a property
determination be made by the lower
court consistent with Missouri legal
principles. * * * This decision by the
Western District court is only binding in
the western portion of the state, but
Frederick DeLong has announced he
will petition for rehearing and, if unsuccessful, will attempt to take the case to
the Missouri Supreme Court (which in
the past has apparently avoided ruling
on this issue). If the decision is upheld
by the state supreme court, it will become a statewide precedent. * * *
Janice is represented by the San Francisco-based National Center for Lesbian Rights, a public interest law firm
that has specialized in litigating custody
and visitation claims on behalf of gay
parents. A.S.L.
The rest of the story:
October 1998: MISSOURI SUPREME
COURT RENDERS MIXED RULING IN CUSTODY CASE: In its first
substantive ruling in a custody and visitation case involving a lesbian mother,
the Missouri Supreme Court unanimously upheld the trial court's award of
custody to the heterosexual father, but
disapproved of the trial court's order
that the children not be exposed to any
known lesbians while the mother is exercising her visitation rights and remanded for reconsideration of the
visitation issue. _J.A.D. v. F.J.D. III-,
1998 WL 652165 (Mo. En Banc, Sept.
24). * * * Joseph petitioned to have the
case transferred to the Supreme Court,
which petition was granted. * * * In its
per curiam opinion, the court devoted
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much of its attention to criticizing the
work of Janice's attorney in preparing
the appeal papers, asserting that the appeal failed various technical requirements of pleading under Missouri law,
and that appellant was improperly asking the court to undertake a virtual de
novo review of the trial court's factual
findings. However, the court went
ahead to decide some substantive questions raised by the appeal. * * * On the
issue of custody, the court rejected
Janice's assertion that the trial court
had based its custody order solely on
her sexual orientation. "This contention is false," the court asserted. "The
judgment recites that custody was
placed with father for a number of reasons. Without question, the guiding
star in a custody determination is the
best interest of the children. A homosexual parent is not ipso facto unfit for
custody of his or her child, and no reported Missouri case has held otherwise. It is not error, however, to
consider the impact of homosexual or
heterosexual misconduct upon the children in making a custody determination." (The court cites a 1985 Missouri
Supreme Court opinion in support of
this point, but the cited opinion is not a
ruling on the merits on this point, but
rather a ruling on an evidentiary point
concerning spousal privilege in the context of a custody dispute. The 1985 decision, T.C.H. v. K.M.H., 693 S.W.2d
802, does, however, quote with apparent approval a lower Missouri court
statement that requires that harm to the
children due to the parent's homosexual activity be shown in order for such
activity to be a factor in determining
custody.) The court concluded that
there was substantial evidence in the
record supporting the trial court's findings underlying the custody decision. *
* * However, the court found the restrictions imposed on visitation to be
"too broad," because they prohibit exposure of the children to a broad class
of people without regard to whether
any individual in the class would be
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"harmful to the children." In remanding the case, the court directed the trial
court "to limit the conditions to apply
only to those individuals whose presence and conduct may be contrary to
the best interests of the children." * * *
The per curiam opinion is quite disingenuous in its characterization of the
trial court's ruling. Most of the factors
cited by the trial court either relate to
the mother's status as a lesbian or derive from the court's characterization of
virtually any homosexual conduct or relationship by a lesbian parent as being
"misconduct." (The unspoken subtext
here is the Missouri penal code, under
which, in fact, almost any homosexual
conduct by a parent could be characterized as "misconduct" because it is potentially illegal. In Missouri, even
mutual masturbation is illegal.) Further, the trial court (as the court of appeal had found) virtually presumed
harm to the children from such conduct
without requiring the father to prove
that such harm had occurred or would
occur. Thus, while on its face the
court's ruling appears quite "tolerant,"
in fact it does no more than to track
prior Missouri appellate decisions that
have piously proclaimed that they are
not ruling against lesbian mothers because of their sexual orientation, while
proceeding to terminate their custody
because of their "misconduct," which
consists of living in a loving relationship
with another woman. A.S.L. [DeLong
v. DeLong, 1998 WL 1.5536 (Mo. App.
W.D. Jan. 20, 1998), aff'd in part, reversed in part, remanded in part, sub
nom. J.A.D. v. F.J.D. III, 978 S.W.2d
336 (1998).]
March 1998: 6TH CIRCUIT RULES
AGAINST FOOD-HANDLER'S DISCRIMINATION CLAIM: On Feb. 4,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th
Circuit ruled that a supermarket did
not violate the Americans with Disabilities Act when it fired a produce clerk
who refused to submit to a medical examination after revealing he had tested
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positive for HIV. EEOC v. Prevo's
Family Market, 1998 WL 39370. The
majority purported to base its decision
on the "unique" facts and circumstances of the case. Nonetheless, the legal analysis underlying the court's
holding belies this assertion. The case
will undoubtedly narrow the scope of
the ADA's protection for employees
with HIV and other infectious diseases
in the 6th Circuit. * * * Steven Sharp
was a part-time produce clerk in a family-owned grocery store in Michigan.
After working there for several months,
Sharp informed his employer that he
had tested positive for HIV and
planned to speak at a neighborhood
AIDS awareness and education program. The president of the chain suggested that Sharp be reassigned to the
receiving area of the supermarket with
comparable hours and pay, and Sharp
agreed. However, several days later he
complained that he missed working
with customers and was concerned
about his co-employees who began asking why he had been reassigned. Sharp
then agreed to be placed on a leave of
absence with pay and health benefits
(to which he was otherwise not entitled
as a part-time employee) to give everyone an opportunity to "handle the situation." Sharp consented to verify his
HIV status with his personal physician
and to report his findings to his employer. * * * The supermarket expressed concern about the increased
risk of HIV transmission as a result of
the frequent cuts and nicks suffered by
food clerks like Sharp in the course of
preparing produce for sale. Sharp's
employer also believed he would be
susceptible to other infectious diseases
like hepatitis. and tuberculosis, compounding the risk to co-workers and
customers. Sharp failed to show up for
a medical examination scheduled and
paid for by his employer despite several
promises to do so. He also refused to
accept an alternate position developing
marketing information for the supermarket at home. Instead, Sharp sent
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his employer a letter from his physician
stating he tested negative for hepatitis
and tuberculosis and was ready to resume his duties as a produce clerk.
When continued efforts to have Sharp
examined by a physician chosen by the
supermarket failed, he was terminated
- almost one year after he first told
the supermarket that he had tested positive for HIV. * * * The district court
granted summary judgment to the
EEOC on the issue of liability, ruling
that Sharp's employer violated the
ADA when it required Sharp to submit
to a medical examination without showing that the examination was job-related and consistent with business
necessity. The issue of damages was
tried by a jury. Sharp was awarded
$10,000 in compensatory damages and
$45,000 in punitive damages. The district court also ordered that Sharp be
reinstated to his original position as
produce clerk. * * * A divided panel for
the 6th circuit reversed. The majority
opinion by Circuit Judge Eric L. Clay,
joined by Judge Suhrheinrich, concluded that requiring Sharp to submit
to a medical examination was permissible under the ADA because it served a
legitimate business purpose: to protect
the health of Sharp, its other employees
and the general public from HIV infection. The majority rejected the
EEOC's position that an individual
medical examination was unnecessary
since available medical information already showed that the risk of HIV
transmission by food handlers like
Sharp was negligible. Instead, the court
credited evidence in the record suggesting that issues such as Sharp's intellect and personal hygiene could affect
the risk of his transmitting HIV to
others at the supermarket. The court
concluded that the ADA and rules
promulgated by the EEOC permitted
an individualized examination to assess
these subjective facts as they related to
the supermarket's operation. * * * On
a bolder and more fundamental note,
the majority concluded that the de-
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mand for a medical examination was
justified because the supermarket was
not required to take Sharp at his word
as to his HIV status. The court appeared concerned if not miffed that the
record never confirmed whether Sharp
was indeed HIV+, faulting Sharp for
preventing his employer from knowing
whether he "had a condition for which
federal law may require accommodation." Yet the majority did not reveal
why this was legally material, since
Sharp never requested an accommodation from his employer. The broader
implication of this is particularly distressing, as it suggests that if an employee reveals that he or she has a
medical condition that might conceivably require an accommodation under
the ADA at some unknown point in the
future (even though the employee does
not request an accommodation at the
time), the employer may subject the
employee to a medical examination to
verify the employee's diagnosis. * * * In
her dissenting opinion, Circuit Judge
Karen Nelson Moore highlighted how
the majority's analysis did not conform
to the statutory mandates of the ADA.
Her recurring theme was that the majority's position condoned an employer's choice of "fear over fact,
ignorance over information, and mythology over medical evidence." * * *
First, Moore emphasized that the supermarket failed to meet its duty to
seek out current objective medical information about the risk of HIV/AIDS
transmission before it reassigned Sharp
or required him to submit to a medical
examination. Sharp referred the supermarket to several organizations, and
even gave Mr. Prevo the name of his
personal physician, who is an infectious
disease specialist. The supermarket
president spoke only to a neighbor and
to human resources personnel. Contrary to the majority's position, Judge
Moore held that this did not satisfy federal regulations that employers obtain
the "best available medical evidence"
when determining if an employee posed
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a direct threat to co-workers or customers. * * * The supermarket's own expert
witness testified that under ordinary
circumstances food handlers do not
pose any threat of HIV transmission
and need no restrictions in their employment. Moore cited statistics in the
record that the odds of Sharp infecting
a co-worker with HIV were one in 10
million under normal circumstances.
Even in the most egregious situation if one of Sharp's co-workers had a fresh
cut, held the wound right open, and
Sharp bled into it - the likelihood of
transmission was one in 3,000. Moore
argued that even if these odds were statistically significant, Sharp could nonetheless be reasonably accommodated
with steel gloves or a separate set of
produce knives, for example. With
these accommodations, Sharp would
constitute a "qualified worker" under
the ADA and could not be reassigned
or subjected to a medical examination.
* * * Moore's most compelling argument was based on that portion of the
ADA which addresses employment of
food handlers with infectious diseases.
Based on 11th-hour congressional negotiations, the ADA requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
prepare an annual list of infectious and
communicable diseases that can be
transmitted through food handling.
Employers are permitted to reassign
employees infected with these diseases.
Since 1990, however, neither HIV nor
AIDS has ever appeared on this list.
By ignoring this omission, claimed
Moore, the majority overstepped the
boundaries of the statute, and adopted
as the law of the 6th Circuit the very
fear, prejudice and ignorance which the
ADA sought to eliminate, [EEOC v.
Prevo's Family Market, 135 F.3d 1089
(6th Cir. 1998). This article was written
by Ian Chesir-Teran.]
April 1998: SUPREME COURT
FINDS SAME-SEX HARASSMENT
ACTIONABLE UNDER TITLE VII:
The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously
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upheld a plaintiff's right to sue for sexual harassment under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, regardless of
the harasser's sex or sexual orientation.
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 118 S.Ct. 998 (March 4). * *
* Plaintiff Joseph Oncale suffered a
nasty campaign of physical and verbal
sexual harassment by co-workers and
supervisors on an oil rig. (See Law
Notes, October 1995, June 1996, and
January 1998). The harassment included simulated sexual assaults, even
though everyone involved was heterosexual and male. After complaining
unsuccessfully to supervisory personnel, Oncale quit, requesting his pink
slip reflect that he "left due to sexual
harassment and verbal abuse." Oncale
sued but the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana dismissed,
bound by Garcia v. Elf Atochem North
America, 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994)
(same-sex harassment not actionable
under Title VII). The Fifth Circuit affirmed, following Garcia. * * * The Supreme Court reversed. Writing for a
unanimous Court, Justice Antonin
Scalia looked to the plain language of
the statute, which prohibits "discriminat[ion] because of ... sex" in
the "terms" or "conditions" of employment. "Our holding [in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57
(1986)] that this includes sexual harassment must extend to sexual harassment
of any kind that meets the statutory requirements," Scalia wrote. * * * Addressing floodgate arguments, Scalia
quoted Meritor: "Conduct that is not
severe or pervasive enough to create an
objectively hostile or abusive work environment - an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or
abusive - is beyond Title VII's purview." However, Scalia noted that the
same actions might have different implications in different contexts: "A professional football player's working
environment is not severely or pervasively abusive, for example, if the coach
smacks him on the buttocks as he heads
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onto the field - even if the same behavior would reasonably be experienced as
abusive by the coach's secretary (male
or female) back at the office." * * *
Scalia refuted the claim that Title VII
was intended solely to prevent one sex
from discriminating against the other.
"As some courts have observed, maleon-male sexual harassment in the workplace was assuredly not the principal
evil Congress was concerned with when
it enacted Title VII. But statutory
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable
evils, and it is ultimately the provisions
of our laws rather than the principal
concerns of our legislators by which we
are governed." One hopes this reasoning might prevail over "original intent"
arguments elsewhere as well, for example enforcing the Equal Protection
clause to stop states denying same-sex
couples the equal protection of the laws
governing marriage. * * * Justice Clarence Thomas joined the unanimous
opinion and added a one-sentence concurrence: "I concur because the Court
stresses that in every sexual harassment
case, the plaintiff must plead and ultimately prove Title VII's statutory requirement that there be discrimination
'because of ...sex.'" * * * The Court
disposed of two other same-sex harassment cases on March 9. It denied certiorari in Fredette v. BVP Management
Associates, 112 F.3d 1503 (11th Cir.
May 22, 1997) (cert. denied sub nom.
BVP Mgmnt. Assoc. v. Fredette, 1998
WL 97294), allowing a male employee
to sue for harassment by a male supervisor. The Court vacated Doe v. City of
Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir., July
17, 1997) (see Law Notes, September
1997), remanding for reconsideration in
light of Oncale, in which Scalia characterized Belleville as holding "that workplace harassment that is sexual in
content is always actionable, regardless
of the harasser's ... motivations." (In
fact, Belleville found workplace harassment that included an assault on the
victim's testicles actionable because the
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victim necessarily experienced it "as a
male.") [This article was written by Otis
R. Damslet.]
May 1998: SUPREME COURT OF
CANADA READS SEXUAL ORIENTATION INTO ALBERTA'S
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW: For
the first time, lesbian and gay Canadians have achieved a complete victory
before the Supreme Court of Canada.
On April 2 in Vriend v. Alberta, File
No. 25285, the Court held (by 8-0) that
the Alberta legislature's failure to include sexual orientation in its anti-discrimination legislation violates sec.
15(1) of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, and (by 7-1) that
the appropriate remedy is the "reading
in" of sexual orientation into the Alberta legislation with immediate effect.
* * * Delwin Vriend was dismissed
from his job as a laboratory coordinator
at King's College in Edmonton after
disclosing that he was gay. The Alberta
Human Rights Commission refused to
accept his complaint of employment
discrimination because sexual orientation was not one of the prohibited
grounds in the Individual's Rights Protection Act or IRPA, which covers race,
religious beliefs, colour, gender, physical disability, mental disability, age, ancestry and place of origin. Vriend and
three lesbian and gay organizations
brought a constitutional challenge to
the omission of sexual orientation
under the equality rights provision of
the Canadian Charter (sec. 15(1)). * * *
Justice Cory (writing for the Court with
Justice Iacobucci) began by considering
whether the application of the Charter
to provincial legislatures under sec. 32
(the "government action" provision)
could extend to a legislative omission.
He concluded that sec. 32 does not require "a positive act encroaching on
rights" and does not preclude application of the Charter to legislation "that
is underinclusive as a result of an omission," rather than an explicit exclusion.
It was not necessary to decide whether
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the legislature's deliberate decision to
omit sexual orientation was an "act," or
whether a complete failure to legislate
(e.g., the absence of any anti-discrimination legislation) could be challenged
under the Charter. As for the argument that the IRPA applies, unlike the
Charter, to private activity, and that a
decision in favour of Vriend would
have the indirect effect of prohibiting
private sector sexual orientation discrimination, Justice Cory responded
that the Charter applies to "laws that
regulate private activity" and that the
case concerned an Act of the Alberta
legislature, not the acts of King's College or any other private entity. * * *
Trning to sec. 15(1), Justice Cory
asked "first, whether there is a distinction which results in the denial of
equality before or under the law, or of
equal protection or benefit of the law;
and second, whether the denial constitutes discrimination on the basis of an
enumerated or analogous ground." In
finding a distinction, he rejected the argument that the IRPA's silence with regard to sexual orientation is "neutral,"
and that "the IRPA extends full protection on the grounds contained within it
to heterosexuals and homosexuals
alike" (e.g., both lesbian and heterosexual women can complain of gender discrimination).
"Lesbian and gay
individuals are still denied protection
under the ground that may be the most
significant for them: sexual orientation." The IRPA draws a distinction
(denying formal equality) "between
homosexuals and other disadvantaged
groups which are protected under the
Act," and a distinction (denying substantive equality) "between homosexuals and heterosexuals," in that "the
exclusion of the ground of sexual orientation clearly has a disproportionate
impact on [gays and lesbians] as opposed to heterosexuals." * * * Were
these distinctions on the basis of an
"enumerated or analogous ground" and
were they "discriminatory?" The Court
had already held unanimously in Egan
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v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, that sexual orientation is "analogous to the
other personal characteristics enumerated in sec. 15(1)," which are race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion,
sex, age or mental or physical disability.
In looking for evidence of "discrimination," Justice Cory found it unnecessary
to decide whether the Alberta legislature's purpose in excluding sexual orientation was itself discriminatory,
noting that "a finding of discrimination
does not depend on an invidious, discriminatory intent," and that "either an
unconstitutional purpose or an unconstitutional effect is sufficient." The exclusion's discriminatory effects were
clear, especially in view of the comprehensive nature of the IRPA (i.e., it did
not target just one type of discrimination). Apart from the absence of effective legal recourse, the exclusion "sends
a strong and sinister message," suggesting that "discrimination on the
ground of sexual orientation is not as
serious or as deserving of condemnation as other forms of discrimination,"
which may be "tantamount to condoning or even encouraging discrimination
against lesbians and gay men." Psychological harm may result: "[f]ear of discrimination will logically lead to
concealment of true identity and this
must be harmful to personal confidence
and self-esteem;" and the exclusion
strengthens "the view that gays and lesbians are less worthy of protection as
individuals," which may harm their
"dignity and perceived worth." The Alberta legislature "has, in effect, stated
that 'all persons are equal in dignity
and rights,' except gay men and lesbians. Such a message, even if it is only
implicit, must offend sec. 15(1)." * * *
The respondents argued that a decision
in favour of Vriend would mean that all
federal, provincial and territorial antidiscrimination legislation would have to
"mirror" the Charter, by including the
nine enumerated sec. 15(1) grounds
and the three analogous sec. 15(1)
grounds the Court has identified to
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date (citizenship, marital status and sexual orientation). Justice Cory acknowledged that "the omission of one of the
enumerated or analogous grounds from
comprehensive human rights legislation
would always be vulnerable to constitutional challenge." But no "simplistic
: , * mirroring" would be required.
"Whether an omission is unconstitutional must be assessed in each case,
taking into account the nature of the
exclusion, the type of legislation, and
the context in which it was enacted," as
well as any justification for the exclusion under sec. 1 of the Charter. * * *

Justice Iacobucci dealt with the Alberta
government's attempt to justify the violation of sec. 15(1) under sec. 1 as a
"reasonable limit[] prescribed by law
[that] can be demonstrably justified in a
free and democratic society." He held
that, under the first stage of the sec. 1
justification test, the Alberta government had failed to demonstrate that the
omission of sexual orientation had a
"pressing and substantial objective."
Regardless of whether "moral considerations" would be sufficient, they had
not been argued. And the respondents'
"explanations" for the omission (the
IRPA cannot address parental acceptance; the IRPA cannot change attitudes; insufficient examples of
discrimination had been provided;
"[c]odification of marginal grounds
which affect few persons raises objections from larger numbers of others, adding to the number of exemptions") did
not constitute ai "objective."

* * *

Even assuming that the IRPA as a
whole had a pressing and substantial
objective (providing protection against
discrimination), Justice Iacobucci found
no "rational connection" between this
objective and the exclusion of gay men
and lesbians from the IRPA. Indeed,
"denying protection to a group which
this Court has recognized as historically
disadvantaged [is] antithetical to that
goal." As for the argument that the Alberta government must be permitted to
use "incremental means" in expanding
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the IRPA, Justice Iacobucci found no
evidence of incrementalism with regard
to gays and lesbians or of a substantial
budgetary impact that would justify judicial deference. Indeed, incrementalism was not generally an appropriate
justification: "groups that have historically been the target of discrimination
cannot be expected to wait patiently for
the protection of their human dignity
and equal rights while governments
move toward reform one step at a
time." * * * The Alberta government
also argued that there had been "minimal impairment" of sec. 15(1) rights because the IRPA is social policy
legislation requiring the legislature to
mediate between competing interests:
religious freedom and homosexuality.
Justice Iacobucci again found no need
for judicial deference. Any conflicts
with religious freedom can be dealt
with on a case-by-case basis under the
IRPA's exceptions. (The fact that
King's College is a "private fundamentalist Christian college" was not, strictly
speaking, an issue in this suit against
the province for omitting sexual orientation from the IRPA.) The exclusion
of sexual orientation "constitutes total,
not minimal, impairment of the Charter
guarantee of equality." * * * As for the
appropriate remedy, Justice Iacobucci
observed that "striking down the IRPA
would deprive all Albertans of human
rights protection and thereby unduly interfere with the scheme enacted by the
Legislature." Reading sexual orientation into the preamble and seven sections of the IRPA (dealing with
employment, goods, services and housing) was to be preferred because "it is
reasonable to assume that, if the Legislature had been faced with the choice of
having no human rights statute or having one that offered protection on the
ground of sexual orientation, the latter
option would have been chosen," especially in view of the size of the excluded
group. The term "sexual orientation"
did not require a definition, and the Alberta legislature could deal with "mat-
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ters of detail not dictated by the
Constitution," such as the application
to sexual orientation cases of an IRPA
exception dealing with retirement, pension and insurance plans. Suspension
of the remedy (e.g., for one year) was
not warranted because "[tihere is no
risk of harmful unintended consequences upon private parties or public
funds" and IRPA mechanisms "require
no significant adjustment." At the end
of an extensive defense of judicial review of legislation, Justice Iacobucci
concluded that "parliamentary safeguards" remain. * * * "Governments
are free to modify the amended legislation by passing exceptions and defenses
which they feel can be justified under
sec. 1 of the Charter. Moreover, the legislators can always turn to sec. 33 of the
Charter, the override provision." * * *
Whether or not the Supreme Court
would permit it, repeal of the IRPA
(now known as the Human Rights, Citizenship and Multiculturalism Act) is
not politically feasible. This left the Alberta government with two main options: (a) avoid complying with Vriend
by invoking sec. 33 and re-enacting the
IRPA without sexual orientation; or (b)
accept Vriend but limit its impact by
amending the IRPA and other legislation (in ways that the Supreme Court
might uphold). * * * The sec. 33 override is a unique feature of the Canadian
Charter. It permits a legislature to expressly declare that an Act "shall operate notwithstanding a provision of sec.
2 or sec. 7 to 15" (roughly equivalent to
U.S. Constitutional Amendments 1, 46, 8 and 14), but the declaration ceases
to have effect after five years. The sec.
33 override represents a political compromise that was necessary to obtain
the consent of all provinces but Quebec
to the Constitution Act, 1982, which added the Charter to the Canadian Constitution and provided a procedure for
amending the Constitution in Canada
(rather than Britain). Some see it as a
gaping hole in the Charter's protection,
while others see it as a valid means of
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reconciling judicial review of legislation
and democracy by giving the legislature
the final say. * * * On April 9, after a
week of heated public debate and a
stormy closed-door meeting, two-thirds
of the governing Progressive Conservative Party's legislators voted to accept
the Supreme Court's decision. But a
cabinet committee will look at creating
"fences" around other Alberta legislation so as to limit the impact of Vriend.
Issues to be considered may include
same-sex marriages, the definition of
"spouse" in 63 provincial statutes, employment benefits for same-sex partners, adoptions by gays and lesbians,
and the inclusion of material about homosexuality in school curricula. * * *
To U.S. lawyers, Vriend must seem a
fairly radical decision, both with regard
to the constitutional violation and the
remedy. It goes well beyond Romer v.
Evans (U.S.Sup.Ct. 1996) by requiring
that anti-discrimination laws include
sexual orientation, regardless of the
views of the legislature or the electorate. An argument that the U.S. Constitution imposes a similar requirement
is almost certainly a non-starter. * * *
The main effect of Vriend will be to fill
in the gaps in legislative protection
against sexual orientation discrimination. Express protection exists at the
federal level, in 8 of 10 provinces (British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec, New
Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland), and in the Yukon Territory.
Vriend will effectively require judicial
reading in, not only in Alberta, but also
in Prince Edward Island, the Northwest
Territories and the soon-to-be-created
Inuit territory of Nunavut. The result
will be "coast-to-coast" protection in
Canada. [Vriend v. Alberta, 50 C.R.R.
(2nd) 1, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 (1998). This
article was written by Robert
Wintemute. Mr. Wintemute, author of
Sexual Orientation and Human Rights:
The United States Constitution, the European Convention, and the Canadian
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Charter (Oxford Univ. Press), teaches
law at King's College, London, U.K.]
CLINTON ISSUES EXECUTIVE
ORDER BANNING SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION IN
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH: In a
much-delayed follow-up on a promise
from the 1992 election campaign, U.S.
President Bill Clinton signed an Executive Order on May 28, formally amending Executive Order 11478 (Equal
Employment Opportunity in the Federal Government), to add "sexual orientation" to the characteristics covered
by the federal government's equal opportunity policy. This action was
largely symbolic, since most of the departments, agencies and bureaus of the
Executive Branch had adopted their
own non-discrimination policies several
years ago in response to a Clinton directive to the heads of all agencies urging such a course of action. The policy
applies only to civilian employment,
and thus does not affect the policy of
excluding openly lesbian and gay people from uniformed military service as
agreed by Congress and Clinton in
1993. * * * Furthermore, although victims of discrimination may seek redress
through informal administrative procedures within their agencies, the executive order does not create any rights
enforceable in the federal courts, because the president does not have any
legislative authority. Acknowledging
this basic limitation.on his handiwork,
Clinton accompanied the order with a
renewed call to Congress to pass the
Employment Non-Discrimination Act
(ENDA), a pending bill that would ban
disparate treatment on the basis of sexual orientation in public and private
employment to the extent of Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause.
This call was nothing new, either, as
Clinton has endorsed the bill several
times in the past, and little likelihood is
given for its passage so long as control
of Congress lies in Republican hands. *
* * In an unusual high point of support,
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49 Senators voted for ENDA shortly
before the 1996 elections, as part of a
deal under which the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which bans federal
recognition of same-sex marriages and
purports to excuse the states from any
obligation they have to recognize such
marriages when contracted in other
states, was brought to the floor under a
rule precluding floor amendments.
Under the circumstances, Senators had
an opportunity to demonstrate that
their support for DOMA was not intended as "gay-bashing" while secure in
the knowledge that ENDA would not
be enacted because it hadn't a prayer of
even coming to the floor in the House
of Representatives. These unusual circumstances are unlikely to recur soon.
A.S.L.
Summer 1998: SUPREME COURT
RULES 5-4 THAT "ASYMPTOMATIC" HIV-INFECTION MAY BE
COVERED AS A DISABILITY BY
ADA: A majority of the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled in Bragdon v. Abbott, 1998
WL 332958 (June 25), that asymptomatic HIV infection can be covered as a
disability under the Americans With
Disabilities Act, but vacated and remanded a decision by the 1st Circuit for
further proceedings on the issue of
whether an HIV-infected dental patient
would present a "direct threat" of injury to a dentist, as that term is defined
in the ADA. This was the first decision
by the Supreme Court to undertake a
substantive interpretation of the ADA,
and also the first decision by the Court
directly to address legal questions
raised by the AIDS epidemic. * * * Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote for the
Court, with concurring opinions by Justices John Paul Stevens (joined by Justice Stephen Breyer) and Ruth Bader
Ginsburg. Justice David Souter was the
fifth member of the majority. Chief
Justice William Rehnquist dissented,
joined by Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and, in part, Sandra Day
O'Connor, who also wrote a separate

522

N.Y.L. SCH. J . HUM.

brief dissent. * * * The case arose in
September 1994 when Dr. Randon
Bragdon declined to fill a cavity for Sidney Abbott, who had disclosed her
HIV+ status, in his Bangor, Maine,
dental office. Bragdon maintained that
his office did not have sufficient infection control capacity to deal with an
HIV+ patient, and offered to fill the
cavity in a hospital dental clinic setting
instead. Abbott rejected this offer and
sued under Title III of the ADA, alleging discrimination in the provision of
public accommodations. In a deposition, Abbott stated that upon learning
her HIV status she had decided not to
have children, out of concern that she
might infect her sexual partner, pass the
infection to her child, and be unable to
raise a child should she progress to
symptomatic AIDS. Abbott also stated
that she was not presently limited in
any of her other life activities by her
HIV-infection. * * * Under the ADA,
an individual with a disability is defined, inter alia, as a person who has a
"physical or mental impairment" that
"substantially limits a major life activity" of that person. There was little dispute that HIV infection is a physical
impairment, but Bragdon argued that
Abbott, who did not have symptomatic
AIDS, was not substantially limited in a
major life activity. Abbott argued that
reproduction is a major life activity, and
that her HIV infection imposes a substantial limitation on her ability to engage in such activity. Bragdon's
rejoinder was that reproduction is not a
major life activity, and even if it were,
that the possibility of transmitting HIV
to a sexual partner or child or of being
unable to complete the process of raising the child did not constitute substantial limitations, since they did not
actually prevent Abbott from becoming
pregnant and bearing a child. * * * The
ADA also provides that a person with a
disability may be denied services if providing the services would present a "direct threat" to the health or safety of
others. The statute defines "direct
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threat" as a "significant risk.., that
cannot be eliminated by a modification
of policies, practices, or procedures or
by the provision of auxiliary aids or services." Abbott argued that the risk to
Dr. Bragdon in filling her cavity was so
slight as to be insignificant, particularly
if Bragdon followed the guidelines issued by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (which have been
given the force of law through their
adoption by the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration as safety
standards for dental offices). Bragdon
countered that in light of the severe
consequences should HIV be transmitted, even the slight possibility that
transmission might take place when the
guidelines are being followed are sufficient to present a "significant risk" of
transmission, referring to the analysis
of numerous lower federal courts that
have ruled against discrimination
claims by HIV+ health care workers
based on their assessment of the risk of
HIV transmission from health care
workers to patients. * * * Granting
summary judgment in favor of Abbott,
the lower courts resolved both of these
issues against Bragdon. The Supreme
Court affirmed as to the first issue whether asymptomatic HIV-infection is
a disability - by a 5-4 vote, but was
more divided over the "direct threat"
issue. Seven members of the Court
(three in the majority on the first issue,
and four in the dissent on the first issue) concluded that the case should be
remanded to the 1st Circuit for further
proceedings, although those who were
members of the majority on the first issue had a different view from the dissenters as to the standard to be
employed by the lower courts in resolving the question. Two members of the
majority, Justices Stevens and Breyer,
would have affirmed the lower courts
outright on the second issue. * * * Justice Kennedy's opinion on the first issue
presents a careful, step-by-step analysis
of each part of the statutory definition.
First, noting the impact of HIV infec-
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tion on the hemic and lymphatic systems, Kennedy concluded that HIV
infection is a physical impairment.
Kennedy provided a detailed summary
of current knowledge about the natural
history of HIV infection in humans that
is remarkable for a court opinion. In a
passage that directly contradicts the
holdings of several of the circuit courts
of appeals, Kennedy concluded: "In
light of the immediacy with which the
virus begins to damage the infected
person's white blood cells and the severity of the disease, we hold that it is
an impairment from the moment of infection. . . HIV infection must be regarded as a physiological disorder with
a constant and detrimental effect on the
infected person's hemic and lymphatic
systems from the moment of infection.
HIV infection satisfies the statutory
and regulatory definition of a physical
impairment during every stage of the
disease." Indeed, Kennedy suggested
that the term "asymptomatic" cannot
properly be applied to HIV infection at
any stage. * * * The next issue is
whether the impairment "affects a major life activity." Abbott was argued
that HIV infection affected her ability
to reproduce, which she contended is a
major life activity. Because the Court is
constitutionally limited to deciding actual cases, the meticulously cautious
Justice Kennedy would not be pulled
into the more general question of
whether HIV infection is a per se disability, but rather focused this section of
the opinion on whether the life activity
identified by Abbott sufficed to meet
the statutory definition. However, he
noted: "Given the pervasive, and invariably fatal, course of the disease, its effect on major life activities of many
sorts might have been relevant to our
inquiry. Respondent and a number of
amici make arguments about HIV's
profound impact on almost every phase
of the infected person's life. In light of
these submissions, it may seem legalistic to circumscribe our discussion to the
activity of reproduction." But because
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the lower courts had dealt solely with
reproduction, Kennedy said, the Court
would follow its practice of speaking
only to the issues properly raised on appeal. * * * As to that, Kennedy said,
the majority of the Court had "little difficulty" in concluding that reproduction
is a major life activity, noting with approval the 1st Circuit's construction of
"major" as denoting "comparative importance" and "significance." "Reproduction and the sexual dynamics
surrounding it," wrote Kennedy, "are
central to the life process itself." Kennedy went on to reject Bragdon's argument, embraced in the dissents, that
Congress intended to focus only on
those life activities that had a "public,
economic or daily dimension." * * *
Kennedy then considered whether
HIV's effect on reproduction was such
as to constitute a substantial limitation
on that activity. The Court found that
the impairment was substantial in two
ways: the risk of transmitting HIV to a
sexual partner, and the risk of transmitting HIV to a child during gestation and
childbirth. The Court rejected the contention that because an HIV+ woman
was physically able to conceive a child,
her reproductive ability was not substantially limited. "The Act addresses
substantial limitations on major life activities, not utter inabilities," Kennedy
insisted. "Conception and childbirth
are not impossible for an HIV victim
but, without doubt, are dangerous to
the public health. This meets the definition of a substantial limitation. The
decision to reproduce carries economic
and legal consequences as well. There
are added costs for antiretroviral therapy, supplemental insurance, and longterm health care for the child who must
be examined and, tragic to think,
treated for the infection. The laws of
some States, moreover, forbid persons
infected with HIV from having sex with
others, regardless of consent." * * *
Kennedy rejected the argument that refraining from reproduction due to HIV
infection was merely a matter of per-

524

N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTS.

sonal choice, and asserted that "when
significant limitations result from the
impairment, the definition is met even
if the difficulties are not insurmountable." Concluding that there was no triable issue of fact remaining on this
issue, a majority of the Court held that
Abbott had established her coverage as
an individual with a disability, and sustained the lower courts' grant of summary judgment on this issue. * * * In
his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist revived the arguments accepted by some
of the circuit courts that so-called
"asymptomatic" HIV infection does not
limit a person's daily life activities and
thus cannot constitute a disability, even
alluded approvingly to some lower
court decision that hold that people
with rather serious medical conditions
were not protected by the ADA because there were medications that
could alleviate their physical symptoms.
(Although the majority opinion did not
directly address this point, its very silence on the issue, in light of the flood
of amicus briefs on both sides of the
medical questions, might implicitly suggest a lack of sympathy for this argument. Indeed, the notion that the
existence of medical remediation of
symptoms eliminates the disability contradicts the logical basis for Kennedy's
conclusion that "asymptomatic" HIV
infection is a disability.) * * * There was
some speculation after the opinion was
announced that the Court's narrow
treatment of the disability issue left
open the question of whether an HIV+
gay man who had never expressed an
interest in having children, or an HIV+
individual who was otherwise incapable
of reproductive activity (e.g., a person
who had been surgically sterilized prior
to learning of their HIV status), would
be protected by the ADA. On this
point, Kennedy's dicta, reinforced by a
short concurring opinion in which Justice Ginsburg enumerated the array of
activities affected by HIV infection,
suggested that the lower courts should
recognize virtually all persons with HIV

[Vol. XVII

infection as being covered under the
statute. Although the Court noted that
Abbott stated her decision to refrain
from having children, the opinion did
not seem to rest heavily on that point.
Also, the analytical method Kennedy
followed suggested that a majority of
the Court was generally receptive to a
broad construction of the definition of
disability. * * * And if there were any
doubts about the broader effect of the
ruling, Kennedy added two points that
suggested such a broader effect. First,
he noted that agencies and courts had
construed the Rehabilitation Act's relevant provisions to apply to HIV infection, and observed that Congress had
expressly provided that the ADA
should be construed to be at least as
protective as the earlier statute. Second, he noted the broad reading that
regulatory agencies have given to the
definition of disability, emphasizing the
deference that the Court normally pays
to such interpretations. On the issue of
"direct threat," Kennedy was hesitant
to render a final decision. He noted
that the relevant statutory language
stemmed from the Court's prior decision in School Board v. Arline, 480 U.S.
273 (1987), and Congressional reaction
to that decision embodied in amendments to the Rehabilitation Act, which
were then carried forward using the
same language and concepts in the
ADA. "The existence, or nonexistence,
of a significant risk must be determined
from the standpoint of the person who
refuses the treatment or accommodation, and the risk assessment must be
based on medical or other objective evidence," he wrote. Significantly, Kennedy rejected Dr. Bragdon's argument
that if he had a good faith belief that
the risk was significant, he should be
excused from treating Abbott. Kennedy asserted that "petitioner receives
no special deference simply because he
is a health care professional." Instead,
Kennedy said that the judgment should
be based on an objective assessment of
scientific information, and as to that,
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"the views of public health authorities,
such as the U.S. Public Health Service,
CDC, and the National Institutes of
Health, are of special weight and authority... The views of these organizations are not conclusive, however. A
health care professional who disagrees
with the prevailing medical consensus
may refute it by citing a credible scientific basis for deviating from the accepted norm." * * * However, having
reviewed the record, Kennedy was not
satisfied that the 1st Circuit's holding
was necessarily supported by the summary of the evidence found there. In
particular, Kennedy was concerned that
the circuit court may have placed too
much weight on 1993 CDC Guidelines
that did not contain an express risk assessment, and on a 1991 American
Dental Association statement that,
Kennedy speculated, may have had
more to do with notions of professional
ethical obligation than with scientific
risk assessment. Kennedy acknowledged that there was evidence in the record of statements by public health
officials that it was safe for dentists to
treat HIV+ patients, but noted that the
timing of those statements was not
clear. * * * In remanding the case,
Kennedy suggested that the 1st Circuit
might well, on the basis of the record,
reaffirm its earlier decision, but that it
was necessary for the lower court to
conduct a searching review of the record, and if need be remand for further
hearings, to make sure it had relevant
evidence on the state of knowledge as
of September 1994 when Dr. Bragdon
refused his services to Abbott. * * *
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice
Breyer, agreed with Kennedy's discussion of the legal standard, but felt that
the 1st Circuit's decision on this issue
was sufficiently grounded in the record
to justify affirmance. However, concerned that a remand by seven members of the Court who were split 3-4 on
the appropriate standard would create
confusion (and, Stevens left unspoken,
might even suggest that Chief Justice
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Rehnquist's dissent was speaking for
the Court as a "plurality opinion" on
this point), Stevens and Breyer joined
the Court's decision to remand on the
basis of Justice Kennedy's legal analysis. * * * In dissent, Rehnquist argued
that no special weight should be given
to the views of public health officials in
deciding whether a health care worker
was justified in refusing services due to
concern over the health or safety of
himself or his patients. Rehnquist asserted that Bragdon had presented sufficient evidence to avoid summary
judgment on the "direct threat" issue,
by showing that as of September 1994
the CDC was investigating seven instances of possible transmission of HIV
from patients to dental workers. "One
need only demonstrate 'risk,' not certainty of infection," argued Rehnquist.
"Given the 'severity of the risk' involved here, i.e., near certain death,
and the fact that no public health authority had outlined a protocol for
eliminating this risk in the context of
routine dental treatment, it seems likely
that petitioner can establish that it was
objectively reasonable for him to conclude that treating respondent in his office posed a 'direct threat' to his
safety." In this quotation, Rehnquist
exactly mirrored the reasoning of several lower courts that have refused to
protect HIV+ health care workers from
employment discrimination under the
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. * * *
Rehnquist also noted the evidence that
as of that time there were 42 documented cases of HIV transmission from
patients to health care workers other
than dentists, as bearing the reasonableness of Bragdon's objections to
treating Abbott in his office. * * *
Thus, although the Court's decision establishes, by majority vote, that HIV+
women of childbearing capacity are
covered by the ADA, and that most
probably so is everybody else who suffers HIV infection, regardless of symptomatic status, the Court did not
ultimately decide the important ques-
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tion whether health care workers have
an obligation under the ADA to perform invasive procedures that may involve blood exposure upon HIV+
patients. Justice Kennedy's discussion
of this issue strongly suggests, in light of
current information and more recent
statements by the CDC and other public health agencies, that the answer to
that question today should be "yes,"
but more litigation will be necessary to
establish the point. The question is important not only for determining the
right to treatment of HIV+ patients,
but also bears on the degree of protection the ADA might afford to HIV-infected health care workers. * * *
Abbott's case was argued before the
Supreme Court by Bennett Klein, a
staff attorney specializing in AIDS law
at Gay and Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, a Boston-based public interest
law firm. Numerous amicus briefs were
filed in support of Abbott's position,
some of which were cited and expressly
relied upon by the Court, particularly
as to the scientific grounds for the disability decision. A.S.L. [Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S.Ct. 2196 (1998).]
Summer 1998: WASHINGTON APPEALS COURT DISCOUNTS
CLAIM OF HOMOPHOBIC
PREJUDICE BY JURORS: In Frye v.
Jack, 1998 WL 283055 (June 1), the
Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One, held that the jurors' comments about Barbara Frye's sexual
orientation during deliberations did not
justify granting Frye a new trial because
the comments that "inhered" in the verdict were inadmissible to impeach the
verdict, and those that did not inhere in
the verdict did not rise to the level of
showing that juror bias affected the verdict. * * * The case involved an automobile accident involving Barbara Frye
and Sandra Jack in June 1994. Although the parties disputed who had
the right of way, Jack nevertheless hit
Frye, knocking her off her motor
scooter, causing headaches, thumb and

[Vol. XVII

knee pain, which "greatly diminished
[Frye's] ability to work and enjoy her
favorite activities." Frye's roommate,
Annie Thoe, testified as to Frye's condition prior to the accident. During the
trial, Frye and Thoe revealed that they
were co-owners of a house in which
they lived, worked at the same location,
traveled together and shared the same
group of friends. * * * The jury ruled
unanimously (12-0) in favor of Jack, but
immediately thereafter, one of the jurors telephoned the trial judge to express her concern about comments
made by several other jurors during deliberations, and tried to change her
vote. According to three other jurors,
the initial vote was 8-4 in favor of Jack.
As the jury reconsidered, one juror
questioned the "true" nature of the relationship between Frye and Thoe, saying, "I wonder what their relationship
really is and if they're hiding that I
wonder what else they're hiding." * * *
Another juror then speculated that
Frye and her "girlie" friends had been
drinking beer at dinner prior to Frye's
accident, and that Frye probably "blew
through the stop sign" in order "to get
home to be with her 'girlie friend' to do
whatever it is that 'girlie friends' do to
each other." After considering these
comments, the jury voted again, this
time 9-3 in favor of Jack. Finally, the
three jurors (who had submitted affidavits to the judge about the comments
made during deliberations) changed
their votes. Afterwards the three jurors
claimed they were not aware that a
hung jury was an option in a civil trial,
even though the judge had instructed
them that ten votes were necessary for
a verdict. The trial judge found that the
comments of the two jurors speculating
about Frye's sexual orientation was inappropriate because there had been no
evidence submitted concerning the issue. The trial judge ordered a new trial,
finding that the juror misconduct had
prevented Frye from receiving a fair
and unbiased jury trial. Jack appealed
the decision. * * * Reversing the trial
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court, Appeals Judge Coleman briefly
discussed the standard of review, noting
that "[plarties are entitled to a fair but
not necessarily perfect trial by a panel
of impartial, indifferent jurors." Coleman then analyzed the conduct of the
jurors, noting that the first juror's comments questioning the nature of the relationship between Frye and Thoe, and
their truthfulness in other matters did
not reflect either pro- or anti- homosexuality bias. Instead, "it was merely one
juror's evaluation of Frye's credibility
that was based on perceived truthfulness, not upon sexual orientation."
Judge Coleman then considered
the second juror's comments about
"girlie friends," and found that while it
is "derogatory and suggestive of
prejudice," those statements, "without
more, do[] not support an inference
that the declarant or other jurors were
unable to evaluate the evidence fairly."
He noted the distinction between words
that possibly signify prejudice and those
that provide evidence that the declarant
prejudged the issue due to bias. The
court asserted that the comments about
"what 'girlie friends' do" were indistinguishable from comments from a juror
"with a disapproving opinion on unmarried heterosexual couples opin[ing]
that the plaintiff did not stop at a stop
sign because he or she was in a hurry to
get home to do whatever it is that 'unmarried couples' do." * * * The court
also characterized the comments as "inhering" in the verdict, and therefore
inadmissible to impeach the verdict.
Judge Coleman asserted that "[t]he
mental processes by which individual
jurors reached their respective conclusions, their motives in arriving at their
verdicts, the effect the evidence may
have had upon the jurors or the weight
particular jurors may have given to particular evidence, or the jurors' intentions and beliefs are all factors inhering
in the verdict itself, and averments concerning them are inadmissible." Judge
Coleman summarily dismissed the two
jurors' comments about Frye's sexual
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orientation as "inher[ing] in the verdict" and refused to "use[ ] the jurors'
thought processes to impeach the verdict." * * * Apparently ignoring the
risk of homophobia in the jury box,
Judge Coleman insisted that "innumerable situations could be imagined
where an opinion is communicated
about a particular group of individuals
that is not based upon evidence
presented at trial. However, as long as
the opinion does not affect the declarant's ability to fairly judge the evidence,
a new trial should not be granted." It is
unclear whether the court's analysis
was influenced by the initial vote in
favor of Jack; Judge Coleman dismissed
the jurors' confusion about the hung
jury option with one sentence. [This article was written by Sharon McGowan.]
September 1998: PENNSYLVANIA
SUPREME COURT HOLDS SEXCHANGE OPERATION NEED NOT
PRECEDE LEGAL NAME
CHANGE: The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania ruled that a trial court
abused its discretion by denying a preoperative transsexual's name change
petition absent a factual basis for doing
so. In the Matter of Robert Henry McIntyre,. 1998 WL 407203 (July 21).
Fifty-three year old appellant Robert
McIntyre, described in the opinion as
"struggling with personal gender identity issues since" age ten, began dressing and holding herself out to the
community as a woman, Katherine McIntyre, in 1991. McIntyre holds her
apartment, bank and credit accounts,
and membership in local organizations
as Katherine; and is undergoing hormonal therapy and psychotherapy in preparation for gender-reassignment
surgery. * * * Prerequisite to genderreassignment surgery is that candidates
undergo the "real-life test" whereby
they live for a minimum of one year in
all aspects of life in the gender they are
to become. McIntyre established at
trial that she was unable to satisfy this
requirement because her employer will
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not recognize her as female until it receives legal recognition of her name
change. The trial court first blocked
McIntyre's petition on the technical
ground that she failed to present testimony addressing the statutory requirement that she be free of judgments.
McIntyre obtained reconsideration and
proved herself judgment free; at which
point the trial court (citing a 1978 precedent) held that it would not grant legal name change until after genderreassignment surgery on the theory that
the name change would deceive the
public. * * * Justice Zappala's opinion
for the Supreme Court acknowledges
the trial court's discretion to deny name
changes upon lawful objection or if the
petitioner seeks to defraud the public,
but clarifies the purpose of the change
of name statute as preventing fraud by
petitioners attempting to avoid financial obligations. Justice Nigro's concurrence gives examples of non-financial
fraud that the statute seeks to prevent,
which are also inapplicable to McIntyre. As it was undisputed that McIntyre was not seeking to evade debts or
judgments or commit fraud, the Supreme Court granted the petition, stating "details surrounding Appellant's
quest for sex-reassignment surgery are
not a matter of governmental concern."
Pennsylvania joins New Jersey in this
view, quoting a Superior Court opinion
stating ". . . judges should be chary
about interfering with a person's choice
of a first name . . . we perceive that the
judge was concerned about a male assuming a female identity in mannerism
and dress. That is an accomplished fact
in this case, a matter which is of no concern to the judiciary, and which has no
bearing upon the outcome of a simple
name change application." * * * A
footnote reveals that Justice Saylor,
who did not participate in the McIntyre
decision, opined in a 1997 dissent that a
transsexual name change be granted
only on completion of surgery. The
1997 decision required proof of petitioners' permanent commitment to liv-
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ing as members of the desired gender
before granting the change. [Matter of
Robert Henry McIntyre, 715 A.2d 400
(Pa. 1998). This article was written by
Mark Major.]
October 1998: SECOND CIRCUIT
REJECTS CHALLENGE TO MILITARY POLICY: The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 2nd Circuit has rejected a constitutional challenge to the
"don't ask, don't tell" policy governing
military service by lesbians and gay
men. The September 23 ruling in Able
v. United States, 1998 WL 647142, was
decided by a unanimous three-judge
panel, reversing a ruling by U.S. District Judge Eugene Nickerson. * * *
The current military policy was enacted
in 1993 as an amendment to the annual
defense appropriations bill, in response
to a public debate generated by President Bill Clinton's promise to end the
ban on gay military service. 10 U.S.C.
sec. 654(b) provides, in essence, that
lesbians and gay men may serve in the
military only so long as the military can
maintain the fiction that they are not
present. If they engage in any conduct
or speech that identifies them as being
lesbian or gay, the military will presume
that they either are engaging in forbidden homosexual conduct or have a propensity to engage in such conduct, and
they will be discharged unless they 6an
prove that they do not have such a propensity. (By contrast, heterosexual military members who engage in same-sex
sexual activity may be subject to penalties under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which bans all "sodomy"
regardless of the gender of participants,
but are not subject to discharge for engaging in such activity if they can prove
that they are not, in fact, gay.) * * *
This case was planned as a challenge to
the constitutionality of the military policy by Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund and the Lesbian & Gay
Rights Project of the American Civil
Liberties Union. Lambda's Legal Director, Beatrice Dohrn, appeared as

2000]

CHRONICLING A MOVEMENT

lead attorney in the case, and was
joined by Lambda's Ruth Harlow and
ACLU Project Director Matthew
Coles. Six military members, some active duty and some reserve, agreed to
serve as co-plaintiffs, representing all
the services, and the nominal defendants are Secretary of Defense William
Cohen and Secretary of Transportation
Rodney Slater. (The Coast Guard,
which maintains a policy identical to
the Defense Department, comes under
the jurisdiction of DOT.) * * * The action was filed in the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of New York,
and was assigned to Judge Eugene H.
Nickerson, who has twice ruled the policy unconstitutional. The first time,
Nickerson found the requirement that
individuals be discharged if they identified themselves as gay to violate the
First Amendment's protection for freedom of speech. On appeal, a 2nd Circuit panel reversed, finding that this
part of the policy was a rational way of
effectuating Congress's intent to discharge any member with a propensity
to engage in homosexual conduct.
However, the 2nd Circuit then remanded the case, in light of the Supreme Court's equal protection ruling
in Romer v. Evans, 116 S.Ct. 1620
(1996), for a determination of whether
the military policy as a whole violates
the equal protection component of the
Due Process Clause of the 5th Amendment. * * * Judge Nickerson subsequently found the policy violative of
equal protection, subjecting it to rational basis review and determining
that the government had no rational
basis for excluding lesbians and gay
men from serving on the same basis as
heterosexuals. Nickerson found that
the only plausible rationale offered by
the government was the claim that the
morale and unit cohesion of non-gay
service members would be undermined
by allowing openly gay members to
serve, and that this rationale was impermissible since it was grounded in the
presumed biases of non-gay service
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members. * * * Reversing Nickerson's
ruling in an opinion by Judge John J.
Walker, Jr., the court essentially concluded that the question whether to exclude openly lesbian and gay people
from serving in the military was not
subject to any serious judicial review.
Relying on a series of Supreme Court
decisions directing the federal courts to
grant great deference to the opinions of
military officials on issues within their
sphere of expertise, Walker found that
there was little scope for judicial review
of Congress's decision to enact this policy following extensive hearings and detailed findings based on the testimony
of military leaders. * * * "In the military setting," wrote Walker, "constitutionally-mandated deference to military
assessments and judgments gives the judiciary far less scope to scrutinize the
reasons, legitimate on their face, that
the military has advanced to justify its
actions. Moreover, in this case the military's justifications are based on factors
which are unique to military life. The
military argues that the prohibition on
homosexual conduct is necessary for
military effectiveness because it maintains unit cohesion, reduces sexual tension and promotes personal privacy.
These concerns distinguish the military
from civilian life and go directly to the
military's need to foster 'instinctive
obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit de corps.'" * * * Since, under the
limited rational basis review available
for military policy decisions, the policy
would enjoy a "strong presumption of
validity,... we will not substitute our
judgment for that of Congress," Walker
concluded. Without expressly passing
on the detailed record compiled by the
plaintiffs to expose the fatuous nature
of the government's arguments in support of the policy, Walker focused
solely on the testimony of military leaders in support of the policy - testimony that was faithfully parroted by
Congressional staffers in their draft of
the policy findings enacted as part of
the statute. Having already found that
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the policy provisions mandating discharge for declarations of homosexuality did not offend the 1st Amendment,
the court now added its finding that
under the highly deferential rational
basis review afforded military policies,
the underlying ban on homosexual conduct is constitutional as well, and thus
reversed Nickerson's ruling. * * * The
possibility of taking this case further
appears slim. The three-judge panel
that decided this appeal represents an
ideological cross-section of the circuit
court (the judges were appointees of
Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, and
George Bush), and it seems unlikely
that a petition for en banc review would
spark a rehearing. In any event, it
seems most unlikely that the Supreme
Court will grant certiorari in a challenge to the military policy so long as
there is unanimity among the courts of
appeals in upholding the policy, so a petition for rehearing en banc would appear to be the logical next step if taking
this case to the Supreme Court is the
plaintiffs' goal. This case was planned
as the vehicle to bring the issue before
the Court, and a careful trial record was
compiled for just that purpose, but the
strategy necessarily relied on the possibility that the 2nd Circuit would uphold
Judge Nickerson and create the circuit
split necessary to precipitate Supreme
Court review. * * * Joining the government in defending the policy was the
Family Research Council, an anti-gay
organization, which filed an amicus
brief. Amicus support for the plaintiffs
came from the Servicemembers Legal
Defense Network, as well as a coalition
of professional associations representing institutions of higher education, and
the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York. A.S.L. [Able v. United
States, 155 F.3d 628 (2d. Cir. 1998).]
December 1998: GEORGIA SUPREME COURT DUMPS SODOMY
LAW; FINDS STATE PRIVACY VIOLATION: The Georgia Supreme Court
ruled on Nov. 23 that the state's felony
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sodomy law, OCGA sec. 16-6-2(a),
which authorized up to 20 years of imprisonment for anybody convicted of
engaging in oral or anal sex regardless
of consent, violates the Georgia constitutional right of privacy. Powell v.
State, 1998 WL 804568. The statute
that the court struck down is the same
one that was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in its infamous decision in
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986). Although the ruling came in a
heterosexual sodomy case, the invalidation of the statute, which does not distinguish between heterosexual and
homosexual conduct, appears total. * *
* This new challenge to the Georgia
sodomy law arose from the prosecution
of Anthony San Juan Powell, who was
charged with rape and aggravated sodomy against his wife's 17-year old niece.
Powell testified that their sexual activity, which included cunnilingus, was
consensual. At the conclusion of the
trial, the judge charged the jury that
even if they believed Powell's testimony, they could convict him of consensual sodomy under Georgia criminal
law. The jury convicted Powell of consensual sodomy, and he appealed. * * *
The opinion for the court by Chief Justice Robert Benham based the decision
on a little-known ruling, Pavesich v.
New England Life Insurance Co., 50
S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905), which was described.
as the first decision by a state high
court to find a constitutional right of
privacy to be implied by a general guarantee of due process of law. In that
case, the Georgia court held that a man
had a claim for invasion of privacy
under the state constitution against a
life insurance company that had used
his photograph in a newspaper advertisement without his permission. * * *
In the course of its 1905 decision, the
court used sweeping rhetoric to describe a fundamental right of privacy
embedded in the guarantee of due process of law in the state's constitution.
Tracing the right of privacy back to ancient Roman law, the court described
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this liberty interest as "embracing the
right of man to be free in the enjoyment of the faculties with which he has
been endowed by his Creator, subject
only to such restraints as are necessary
for the common good." Furthermore,
said the 1905 court, this includes "the
right to live as one will, so long as that
will does not interfere with the rights of
another or of the public," and the
"right to be let alone so long as one was
not interfering with the rights of other
individuals or of the public." In more
recent years, Georgia courts had developed this right to include, for example,
the right of a state prisoner to refuse
food and medical treatment, see Zant v.
Prevatte, 286 S.E.2d 715 (Ga. 1982);
State v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651 (Ga.
1989). * * * Given this past history, and
the accepted principle that state constitutions may provide greater protection
for individual rights than the federal
constitution provides, Benham observed that the Georgia Supreme Court
clearly has a tradition of affording
greater protection to individual privacy
than does the U.S. Supreme Court,
making the Hardwick decision irrelevant to the court's determination of this
case. * * * Benham declared that "it is
clear that consensual sexual behavior
between adults in private is covered by
the principles espoused in Pavesich
since such behavior between adults in
private is recognized as a private matter
by 'any person whose intellect is in a
normal condition... "', quoting from
the Pavesich decision. "We cannot
think of any other activity that reasonable persons would rank as more private
and more deserving of protection from
governmental interference than consensual, private, adult sexual activity,"
wrote Benham, then citing recent decisions striking down sodomy laws in
Montana, Tennessee, and Texas. (The
Texas court of appeals decision was
subsequently reversed on procedural
grounds by the Texas Supreme Court.)
* * * After determining that private
adult sex is covered by the right of pri-
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vacy, the court had to decide whether
the state's legitimate interests outweighed the individual's rights. Here,
Benham observed that the state's legitimate interest is in protecting the public
against offensive public conduct, and
protecting individuals against unwanted
activity. After producing a long list of
other laws specifically enacted to
achieve these goals, Benham concluded
that ultimately the only role left for the
sodomy law is interfering with the private consensual activities of adults,
which is not a legitimate state interest. *
* * Countering the argument of lone
dissenting judge George H. Carley that
the state has a right to criminalize conduct deemed immoral by the majority,
Benham argued that "it is not the prerogative of members of the judiciary to
based decisions on their personal notions of morality," and that the fact that
a particular law is enacted in pursuit of
the legislature's moral judgments does
not remove that law from scrutiny
under the constitution. "While many
believe that acts of sodomy, even those
involving consenting adults, are morally
reprehensible," Benham commented,
"this repugnance alone does not create
a compelling justification for state regulation of the activity... We agree with
our fellow jurists [in Tennessee, Kentucky and Pennsylvania] that legislative
enactments setting 'social morality' are
not exempt from judicial review testing
their constitutional mettle." * * * In a
concurring opinion, Justice Leah Sears,
a frequent champion for lesbian and
gay rights on the Georgia Supreme
Court in recent years, saluted the
court's decision as "clearheaded and
courageous." Taking on the dissent,
Sears argued that "simply because
something is beyond the pale of
'majoritarian morality' does not place it
beyond the scope of constitutional protection. To allow the moral indignation
of a majority (or, even worse, a loud
and/or radical minority) to justify
criminalizing private consensual conduct would be a strike against freedoms
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paid for and preserved by our forefathers. Majority opinion should never
dictate a free society's willingness to
battle for the protection of its citizens'
liberties. To allow such a thing would,
in and of itself, be an immoral and insulting affront to our constitutional democracy." * * * In his dissent, Justice
Carley accused the majority of misinterpreting Pavesich and undermining
democratic government in Georgia by
striking down a criminal law that dated
back to English common law colonial
days. Carley argued, in effect, that
longstanding criminal laws are not subject to judicial review, and can only be
removed by legislative repeal. He
noted that the majority of sodomy laws
that have been removed from the
books since the 1960's were removed
through legislative repeal rather than
judicial invalidation, and argued that
the court should have allowed the legislative process to run its course in Georgia. Carley also argued that the
rationale of the court's opinion would
invalidate all criminal laws that regulate
private consensual conduct, including
incest, adultery, and private drug use. *
* * There is a certain irony to the
court's decision, since in recent years
this court has ducked several opportunities to rule directly on the constitutionality of the sodomy law. In fact,
just a few years ago, in Christenson v.
State, 468 S.E.2d 188 (Ga. 1996), a plurality of the court had issued language
finding the law constitutional in a case
where a majority voted to reject the
constitutional challenge on the ground
that the conduct in question (a solicitation to engage in sodomy) took place in
public. (In his decision, Chief Justice
Benham cited the solicitation law in his
list of statutes regulating public conduct. A challenge to the constitutionality of punishing somebody for soliciting
lawful conduct may be next on the list
for Georgia civil libertarians.) * * *
Even more ironically, a year ago the
U.S. Supreme Court refused to review
a federal appellate decision that had

[Vol. XVII

upheld the right of the Georgia attorney general, then Michael Bowers, to
withdraw a job in his office from Robin
Shahar, an openly lesbian attorney, at
least in part because Bowers argued
that his duties to uphold Georgia's sodomy law made it impossible for him to
employ an openly-lesbian attorney who
had a rabbi perform a commitment ceremony for her and her partner. Shahar
v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 693 (1997). * * *
On the other hand, some recent decisions involving gay and lesbian family
law issues, including City of Atlanta v.
Moran, 492 S.E.2d 193 (Ga., Nov. 3,
1997) (upholding domestic partner benefits for Atlanta municipal employees),
had signalled some receptivity by the
court to gay rights arguments, so the
opinion was not a total surprise to legal
observers, although the scope of the
victory and the decisiveness of the vote
were unexpected. * * * Although the
case involved heterosexual sodomy, the
Georgia statute did not distinguish between homosexual and heterosexual
acts, and several gay rights groups, including Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund and the ACLU Lesbian
and Gay Rights Project, had filed briefs
urging the court to invalidate the law.
A.S.L. [Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18
(Ga. Nov. 23, 1998).]
January 1999: OREGON APPEALS
COURT GIVES UNPRECEDENTED
DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP VICTORY TO GAY LITIGANTS: In one
fell swoop, the lesbian and gay community in Oregon has won a triple victory
with a unanimous December 9 decision
by the Oregon Court of Appeals in
Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences University, 1998 WL 869976. Ruling on the
defendants's appeal of a 1996 trial court
decision that ordered the Oregon
Health Sciences University to provide
health and life insurance benefits to the
same-sex domestic partners of its employees, the appeals court found that
failure to award such benefits would vi-
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olate the state constitution's equal protection provision, Art. I, sec. 20, the
first time an appellate court has issued
such a ruling on the merits. The court
implicitly held that such benefits are
mandated for all public employees in
Oregon, not just state employees. * * *
The court also held that anti-gay discrimination is covered as "sex discrimination" under the state's civil rights
law, ORS 659.030(1)(b), thus giving activists an unexpected victory that they
have been unable to win in the legislature. This is the first time a state appellate court has interpreted a state civil
rights law banning sex discrimination to
cover discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation. * * * Finally, and
perhaps most historically, for the first
time a state appellate court has ruled
that gay people are a "suspect class" for
purposes of ruling on discrimination
claims against the state government,
potentially setting the stage for a lawsuit seeking same-sex marriage licenses.
* * * The case arose out of the refusal
of the University, at that time a state
agency, to extend benefits to the lesbian partners of three women employed on its staff. The women and
their partners, Christine Tanner, Barbara Limandri, Regina Phillips, Lisa
Chickadonz, Terrie Lyons, and Kathleen Grogan, sued under the state civil
rights law and the state constitution. In
a historic decision, Multnomah County
Circuit Court Judge Stephen L. Gallagher ruled in August 1996, 1996 WL
585547, that the failure to provide these
benefits violated both the state civil
rights law and the constitutional provision, and ordered the state to extend
group insurance benefits to unmarried
domestic partners of its gay employees.
* * * The state appealed the ruling, but
also complied by adopting a domestic
partner benefit plan for state employees that went into effect last June.
Also, while the case was pending, the
legislature reorganized the state's
higher education system and transformed the University from a state
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agency to a public corporation, thus
casting potential doubt on the trial
court's ruling. * * * On appeal, however, the court concluded that the University remained subject to
constitutional suit as a government employer. This was significant on two
counts. First, only government employers can be sued for constitutional violations. Second, due to the preemptive
effect of the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act, a state court
lawsuit may not be brought against a
private sector employer to seeking domestic partnership benefits. * * * Analyzing the discrimination claim under
Oregon's Civil Rights Law, which prohibits employment discrimination on
the basis of sex, Judge Landau's opinion focused on a key phrase that does
not appear in most federal or state civil
rights laws. In addition to banning discrimination based on the sex of an employee, the Oregon law also bans
discrimination based on the sex "of any
other person with whom the individual
associates." Taking up a suggestion
that the Oregon Supreme Court made
in a 1988 case, ACLU v. Roberts, 752
P.2d 1215, Landau concluded that this
phrase outlaws discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation, since logically such discrimination is based on
the sex of the person or persons with
whom the employee might have a sexual relationship. * * * However, another provision of the civil rights law,
ORS 659.028, pertaining to employee
benefits, prevented the court from basing its decision on this statute. This
provision states that it is not unlawful
for an employer to "observe the terms
of a bona fide employee benefit plan,
such as a retirement, pension or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to
evade the purposes of this chapter."
The court found that the University's
insurance programs are bona fide employee benefit plans, and that there was
no evidence that the University had
adopted them specifically to discriminate against gay people, so they could
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not be a considered a "subterfuge to

gender, race, alienage, and religious af-

evade the purposes" of the civil rights

filiation is widely regarded as defining a
distinct, socially-recognized group of
citizens, and certainly it is beyond dispute that homosexuals in our society
have been and continue to be the subject of adverse social and political stereotyping and prejudice." Further, "we
must determine whether the fact that
the domestic partners of homosexual
OHSU employees cannot obtain insurance benefits can be justified by their
homosexuality. The parties have suggested no such justification, and we can
envision none." * * * The University's
defense was that it was distinguishing
among employees based on marital status, rather than on sex or sexual orientation, and that marital status
discrimination has not been held to violate the Oregon constitution. However,
here the court pointed out another significant difference between federal and
state constitutional law. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the federal
equal protection clause only outlaws intentional discrimination. By contrast,
the Oregon courts have accepted the
theory that apparently neutral policies
may violate the guarantee of equal protection if they have the actual effect of
discriminating. * * * "OHSU has taken
action with no apparent intention to
treat disparately members of any true
class of citizens," wrote Landau. "Nevertheless, its actions have the undeniable effect of doing just that... What is
relevant is the extent to which privileges or immunities are not made available to all citizens on equal terms."
Because gay people cannot marry their
partners to qualify for these benefits,
then "the benefits are not made available on equal terms. They are made
available on terms that, for gay and lesbian couples, are a legal impossibility."
* * * Interestingly, this analysis brings
directly into question the refusal of Oregon to issue marriage licenses to samesex couples. In a footnote, Judge Landau commented that the parties had
not raised the issue of a constitutional

law. (In effect, the court ruled that in
the area of employee benefits, only intentional discrimination is covered by
the statute.) * * * But all was not lost,
because there was still the constitutional claim. Here again, the unique

phrasing of Oregon's laws was crucial
to the court's decision. Unlike the federal equal protection clause or the

equivalent provisions of most state constitutions, which broadly state that the
government may not deprive any individual of equal protection of the laws,
Oregon's provision states: "No law
shall be passed granting to any citizen
or class of citizens privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms,
shall not equally belong to all citizens."
* * * The court first had to determine
whether gay people constitute a "class
of citizens," then whether the insurance
plans constituted class-based discrimination, and finally whether such discrimination was constitutionally
justified. Determining the strictness of
judicial review to be applied to these
question was a crucial first step, and
here the court made a very significant
ruling. * * * Under Oregon constitutional law, discrimination against a
"suspect class" is "subject to a more demanding level of scrutiny." Judge Landau found that suspect classes are
"distinct, socially-recognized groups
that have been the subject of adverse
social or political stereotyping or
prejudice," and that "if a law or government action fails to offer privileges and
immunities to members of such a class
on equal terms, the law or action is inherently suspect and... may be upheld
only if the failure to make the privileges
or immunities available to that class can
be justified by genuine differences between the disparately treated class and
those to whom the privileges and immunities are granted." * * * Landau
stated that "we have no difficulty concluding that plaintiffs are members of a
suspect class. Sexual orientation, like

2000]

CHRONICLING A MOVEMENT

challenge to the ban against same-sex
marriage, and so the court would not
address that issue. But the logic of the
constitutional ruling suggests that such
a challenge might succeed, at least in
front of this three-judge intermediate
appellate panel. * * * Thus, the end result of the court's ruling is three-fold:
First, same-sex partners of public employees in Oregon are entitled to participate in employee benefits programs
on the same basis as legal spouses of
public employees. Second, apart from
the issue of employee benefits, all employers in Oregon, whether public or
private, are prohibited from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation. Third, state and local governments in Oregon may not discriminate
in any respect against gay people unless
they have a truly compelling justification, setting the stage for potentially interesting developments not only in the
area of marriage but potentially in
other state policies as well. * * * State
officials expressed uncertainty about
whether to appeal this ruling to the
state's highest court, especially since
the state had voluntarily extended eligibility for benefits to same-sex partners
of state employees in response to the
trial court's ruling, but it would not be
surprising if local government officials
were to pressure the state to appeal.
Some Republican state legislators outlined a strategy to place several questions on the state ballot for a May
referendum seeking to overturn this decision, to require citizen referenda on
all gay rights measures, and to reserve
to local government bodies the right to
decide whether to adopt domestic partnership benefits plans (Portland Oregonian, Dec. 19). * * * The six lesbian
plaintiffs were represented by Oregon
attorney Carl G. Kiss. The ACLU of
Oregon and Lambda Legal Defense
Fund filed an amicus brief in support of
their claim, as did the Oregon Public
Employees Union. A.S.L. [Tanner v.
Oregon Health Sciences University, 971
P.2d 435 (Or. Ct. App. 1998), award of
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attorney fees, 980 P.2d 186, 161 Or.
App. 129 (Ore. App., June 16, 1999).
The state decided not to appeal, and issued regulations extending domestic
partnership benefits to state
employees.]
March 1999: MISSISSIPPI SUPREME
COURT REJECTS CUSTODY MODIFICATION PETITION FROM GAY
DAD: On Feb. 4, the Supreme Court of
Mississippi affirmed the findings of a
Chancery Court denying the application of a gay father for modification of
a custody and visitation order in effect
with regard to his son. Weigand v.
Houghton, 1999 WL 47748. David Weigand had filed a petition for modification of the custody order with respect
to his son alleging a serious change in
circumstances supporting his application. * * * David and Machelle Houghton were divorced in 1987 in Kansas.
Originally, they had joint custody of
their minor child, but in 1988 the custody arrangement was modified giving
Machelle residential custody of the minor when David moved to California.
Machelle subsequently remarried and
currently resides in Mississippi with her
husband, Jeff Houghton, and the minor
child. Jeff is a convicted felon who had
been arrested for hitting Machelle in
the face in the presence of the minor
child. In another incident, Jeff was intoxicated and knocked out the window
of a car being driven by Machelle, also
in the presence of the minor child. At
one point, Machelle, Jeff and the minor
child were evicted from their apartment
due to Jeff's violent behavior. Evidence presented at trial indicated that
Jeff has a heavy drinker who often
mixed alcohol with prescription pain
medicine. Jeff did not work due to a
disability and Machelle worked two
jobs to support the family. * * * David,
on the other hand, owns his own home
in California with his life partner,
Wayne Fields. David admitted to being
in a homosexual relationship and admitted having engaged in anal and oral
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sex with his life partner, but stated that
this did not take place in the presence
of the minor child during visitation.
Evidence adduced at trial showed that
David was a property manager earning
about $40,000 per year. David and
Wayne were in a monogamous relationship for in excess of eight years. Evidence also showed that David had
made every effort to provide for the minor child. David bought the child a
personal computer and software to encourage the child to enhance his writing
skills. David also arranged for an 800
number so that the child could reach
him anytime he wished. Moreover,
David had offered to pay for the child
to go to private schools and he had
spent a great deal of time investigating
schools in Mississippi and California
which could provide the child the best
education. * * * The child, who was
fourteen at the time of trial, expressed
no preference for which parent he
wished to live with. The child did state
to the Chancery Court that he was embarrassed when David and Wayne
showed affection for each other. * * *
Judge James L. Roberts, writing for the
Supreme Court, held that the decision
of the Chancellor could not be disturbed unless there was a clear showing
that he abused his discretion. The
Court then went on to summarize the
Chancellor's decision. The Chancellor
found that the minor child exhibited no
preference as to with which parent he
wished to reside. The factor weighed in
favor of maintaining the status quo.
The Chancellor did find that Machelle's
employment responsibilities hindered
her relationship with the child and that
David's work was more conducive to a
good relationship with the child. Both
parents were found to have great love
and affection for the child. With regard
to the incidents of domestic violence in
Machelle's home, the Chancellor found
this weighed in favor of awarding custody to David. * * * However, the
Chancellor was most troubled by the
moral fitness of the parents. The Chan-
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cellor spent many pages of the decision
discussing the fact that David was
openly gay and had admitted to violations of Mississippi's sodomy laws. Interestingly, as pointed out in a strong
dissent by Justice McRae, no inquiry
was ever made into whether Machelle
had violated those same laws which apply equally to heterosexuals and homosexuals. Lastly, the Chancellor
emphasized the fact that Machelle had
enrolled the child in religious training,
finding that this training weighed heavily in favor of Machelle maintaining
custody. * * * Based on these findings,
the Chancery Court denied David's application to obtain residential custody
of the child and entered an order indicating that Wayne could not be present
during David's visits with the child. * *
* Justice Roberts found no reason to
disturb the Chancery Court's decision
as to custody, but the court found that
the Chancery Court abused its discretion by putting limitations on David's
visitation. Justice McRae wrote a
lengthy dissent in which he pointed out
that much of the Chancery Court's reasoning was based upon David's homosexuality. The dissent found it
outrageous that the court could find
that the child was better off living in an
explosive environment with a stepfather who was a convicted felon, wife
beater, drinker, drug-taker, adulterer
and child-threatener as opposed to the
stable environment provided for by the
father. The dissent strongly argued that
David's homosexuality was the only
reason the Chancery Court refused to
alter the custody arrangement. The dissent also argued that the decision was
so afoul of the best interests of this
child as to violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. * * * David Weigand was
represented by the American Civil Liberties Union and volunteer attorneys
Robert McDuff and Alison Steiner. In
response to the decision, David Ingebretsen, Executive Director of the
ACLU of Mississippi, said that he was
pleased that the court overturned the
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visitation restrictions. "But," he added,
"I am perplexed that they decided that
the public violent outbursts of the stepfather were preferable to his natural father's private relationship with his
partner." * * * In light of the dissent's
comments about a possible constitutional violation, thought is being given
to attempting a U.S. Supreme Court appeal. [Weigand v. Houghton, 730 So.2d
581 (Miss. 1999). This article was written by Todd V. Lamb.]
May 1999: 2ND CIRCUIT RECOGNIZES RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN
PRISONER'S TRANSSEXUAL AND
HIV STATUS: In Powell v. Schriver,
1999 WL 223434 (2d Cir., April 2), the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit held that prisoners have a right to
privacy concerning their status as a
transsexual and their HIV status. * * *
Dana Kimberly Devilla filed suit in the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York under 42 U.S.C. sec.
1983, alleging that the defendants had
violated her constitutional right to privacy, deprived her of her constitutional
rights to life, liberty, due process of law
and equal protection as guaranteed by
the 5th and 14th Amendments, and inflicted cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the 8th Amendment, in addition to several state law causes of action. * * * On December 31, 1991,
Correction Officers Lynch and Crowley
were escorting Devilla to Albion's medical facility when Lynch told Crowley,
in the presence of other staff members
and inmates, that Devilla had had a sex
change and that she was HIV+. Devilla
alleged that, as a result of Lynch's comment, her HIV status and her status as
a transsexual became known throughout the prison and that she thereafter
became the target of harassment by
guards and prisoners. In April of 1995,
Devilla died and her executor, the Reverend Wayne Powell, was substituted as
plaintiff. During the course of the trial,
the district court dismissed several of
Devilla's claims, including her 8th
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Amendment claim, on the ground of
qualified immunity. As a result, only
two questions were put to the jury: (1)
whether Lynch's comment violated either Devilla's constitutional right to privacy or the state statute protecting the
confidentiality of HIV status; and (2)
whether Warden Schriver had violated
Devilla's constitutional right to privacy
by failing to properly train Lynch. * * *
After two days of deliberations, the
jury returned a verdict in favor of
Lynch but against Schriver, awarding
Devilla $5,000 in compensatory damages and $25,000 in punitive damages.
After the verdict, Schriver filed a motion asking that the verdict against her
be set aside on the grounds that (1) she
was protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity and (2) the verdict was
inconsistent with the verdict in Lynch's
favor. This motion was granted by the
district court, and an amended judgment was entered in favor of all defendants. * * * On appeal, the 2nd Circuit,
in an opinion by Circuit Judge Jacobs,
affirmed the judgment in Schriver's
favor on the ground that Schriver was
protected by qualified immunity, but
vacated the judgment and remanded
for further proceedings on Devilla's 8th
Amendment claim. * * * In affirming
the judgment for Schriver on the privacy claim, however, the court recognized that prisoners do have a
constitutional right to privacy concerning their HIV status and their status as
transsexuals. The court began by examining its earlier opinion in Doe v. City
of New York, 15 F.3d 264 (2d Cir.
1994), in which it held: "Individuals
who are infected with the HIV virus
clearly possess a constitutional right to
privacy regarding their condition." The
question for the court was whether this
holding was broad enough to cover
prisoners and transsexual status. * * *
In holding that the right to privacy did
encompass one's identity as a transsexual, Judge Jacobs explained that this interest in privacy, "like the privacy
interest of persons who are HIV posi-
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tive, is particularly compelling. Like
HIV status, . . . transsexualism is the
unusual condition that is likely to provoke both an intense desire to preserve
one's medical confidentiality as well as
hostility and intolerance from others."
* * * The court next addressed whether
the right to privacy in one's HIV status
established in Doe extended to the context of prisons. Because "inmates 'retain[] those [constitutional] rights that
are not inconsistent with [their] status
as . . . prisoners or with the legitimate
penological objectives of the corrections system[,]' . . . [i]t follows that
prison officials can impinge on that
right [to privacy in one's HIV status]
only to the extent that their actions are
,reasonably related to legitimate penological interest.'" * * * While the court
acknowledged that there are circumstances in which disclosure of an inmate's HIV status would further such
legitimate penological objectives, "the
gratuitous disclosure of an inmate's
confidential medical information as humor or gossip ... is not reasonably related to a legitimate penological
interest[.]" Therefore, the court held
that Lynch's disclosure violated
Devilla's constitutional right to privacy.
Similarly, the court concluded that disclosure of Devilla's transsexualism was
also not related to such legitimate interests. * * * After holding that Lynch's
comments violated Devilla's constitutional right to privacy, however, the
court held that the verdict in Schriver's
favor should be affirmed under the doctrine of qualified immunity because at
the time of Lynch's disclosure, "the
right of a prisoner to maintain the privacy of medical information was not
clearly established." * * * Finally, the
court reversed the district court's dismissal of Devilla's 8th Amendment
claim on the ground of qualified immunity. "By December of 1991, a reasonable prison official would have known
that under the Eighth Amendment he
could not remain deliberately indifferent to the possibility that one of his
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charges might suffer violence at the
hands of fellow inmates... In our view,
it was as obvious in 1991 as it is now
that under certain circumstances the
disclosure of an inmate's HIV-positive
status and - perhaps more so - her
transsexualism could place that inmate
in harm's way." The court asserted,
however, that its remand of this claim
did not express a view as to whether
Devilla stated a valid 8th Amendment
claim or whether defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on some
other ground. [Powell v. Schriver, 175
F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 1999). This article was
written by Courtney Joslin.]
Summer 1999: MASSACHUSETTS
HIGH COURT RECOGNIZES GAY
FAMILIES: In two decisions issued in
recent weeks, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts has recognized
the reality of lesbian and gay families,
although only one of the decisions had
a favorable outcome on the merits. In
E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 429 Mass. 824, 1999
WL 430460 (June 29), the court ruled 52 that a probate judge had jurisdiction
to issue a temporary visitation order on
behalf of a lesbian co-parent who had
initiated an action for joint custody of
the child she had been raising with her
former partner. However, in Connors
v. City of Boston, 1999 WL 500031
(July 8), the court unanimously concluded that a state law on public employee benefits preempted the effort by
Boston Mayor Thomas Menino to extend health benefits to the domestic
partners of city employees by executive
order. * * * The opinion in E.N.O. by
Justice Abrams treats the decision to allow a same-sex co-parent to sue for custody and visitation as almost routine, a
stance that drew an infuriated dissenting opinion by Justice Fried (who retired from the court with the issuance
of this opinion). Although Massachusetts domestic relations laws do not
specifically authorize a legally unrelated third party to seek custody of or
visitation with a child, the court held
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that the legislature has given the Probate Court equity jurisdiction, and in
family law matters this should be exercised in the best interest of the child. *
* * "The Probate Court's equity jurisdiction is broad," wrote Abrams, "extending to the right to authorize
visitation with a child. This is because
the Probate Court's equity jurisdiction
encompasses 'the persons and estates of
infants"' (quoting Gardner v. Rothman, 345 N.E.2d 370 (Mass. 1976),
where the court allowed the father of
an illegitimate child to seek visitation
despite the lack of specific statutory authorization). "The court's duty as
parens patriae necessitates that its equitable powers extend to protecting the
best interests of children in actions
before the court, even if the Legislature
has not determined what the best interests require in a particular situation." *
* * The case involved a couple who had
"shared a committed, monogamous relationship for thirteen years," during
which they executed documents seeking to formalize their relationship.
They were living in Maryland when
they decided to become parents
through the insemination of L.M.M.
E.N.O. participated fully throughout
the pregnancy, attending birthing workshops and so forth, and attending the
insemination sessions and participating
in making medical decisions. The
women made a written contract that
specified that if they broke up in the future, E.N.O. would continue to have
parental rights towards their child.
L.M.M.'s pregnancy during 1994 was
"complicated." When the son was born
in 1995, E.N.O. acted as L.M.M.'s birthing coach and cut the umbilical cord.
The hospital staff treated E.N.O. as a
mother of the child, and birth announcements were sent out in both of
the women's names. E.N.O. assumed
most of the responsibility for supporting the family during the months following the child's birth, and as L.M.M.
experienced medical difficulties, E.N.O.
also assumed primary caregiver respon-
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sibility for the child for some time. * * *
The family moved to Massachusetts in
September 1997, and in April 1998
E.N.O. contacted an attorney to explore a joint adoption proceeding so
that both would be legal mothers.
Shortly after this, their relationship deteriorated and they separated in May.
L.M.M. then denied E.N.O. any further
access to the child, and E.N.O. initiated
this litigation, obtaining a temporary
visitation order from the Probate Judge
which was reversed by the Court of Appeal. * * * Turning to the issue of "best
interest of the child," Abrams noted
that the Probate Judge "emphasized the
plaintiff's role as a parent of the child.
It is our opinion that he was correct to
consider the child's nontraditional family. A child may be a member of a nontraditional family in which he is
parented by a legal parent and a de
facto parent. A de facto parent is one
who has no biological relation to the
child, but has participated in the child's
life as a member of the child's family.
The de facto parent resides with the
child and, with the consent and encouragement of the legal parent, performs a
share of caretaking functions at least as
great as the legal parent. . . The de
facto parent shapes the child's daily
routine, addresses his developmental
needs, disciplines the child, provides for
his education and medical care, and
serves as a moral guide. * * * "The recognition of de facto parents is in accord
with notions of the modern family,"
Abrams continued. "An increasing
number of same gender couples, like
the plaintiff and the defendant, are deciding to have children. It is to be expected that children of nontraditional
families, like other children, form parent relationships with both parents,
whether those parents are legal or de
facto. . . Thus, the best interests
calculus must include an examination of
the child's relationship with both his legal and de facto parent." * * * Abrams
then summarized the factors to which a
court should look in determining
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whether somebody is a de facto parent
who should be considered a viable candidate for custody or visitation rights,
including whether there was a substantial parent-child relationship, whether
the candidate had assumed a formal
role in the child's life evidenced by legal documents, whether the legal parent
had treated the candidate as a parent of
her child in the past, whether they had
lived together for some time as a family, and whether the candidate had
demonstrated an interest in continuing
the relationship with the child. * * *
Abrams rejected the argument, recently
accepted in a Florida case, Kazmierazak v. Query, 1999 WL 415215
(Fla.App., 4th Dist., June 23), that recognizing a lesbian co-parent as a de
facto parent entitled to contest custody
and visitation would improperly restrict
the legal parent's fundamental right, as
a fit parent, to custody of her child,
founded on a liberty interest in the 14th
Amendment (and the due process
clause of the state constitution) that has
been recognized by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972), and the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court in Opinion of the Justices, 691 N.E.2d 911 (Mass. 1998).
Abrams insisted that such rights are not
"absolute," and that the court "must
balance the defendant's interest in protecting her custody of her child with the
child's interest in maintaining her relationship with the child's de facto parent. The intrusion on the defendant's
interest is minimal. What tips the scale
is the child's best interests." * * * Distinguishing this case from cases where a
putative father brings a paternity suit
that threatens to disrupt a family unit,
Abrams said, "The family that must be
accorded respect in this case is the family formed by the plaintiff, the defendant, and the child. The defendant's
parental rights do not extend to the extinguishment of the child's relationship
with the plaintiff... The child's interest
in maintaining his filial ties with the
plaintiff counters the defendant's custo-
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dial interest. . . The only family the
child has ever known has splintered.
The child 'is entitled to be protected
from the trauma caused by the disruption' of his relationship with the plaintiff" (citation omitted). * * * Having
noted that the Probate Court's decision
was consistent with the recommendation of the Law Guardian appointed to
represent the child's interest, the court
reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the Probate Court's temporary
visitation order, pending a final disposition on the merits of the case. * * * In
dissenting, Justice Fried characterized
what the court had done as "judicial
lawmaking," insisting that L.M.M., as a
fit legal mother, had the right to determine who would associate with her son.
"The probate judge's order in this case
was wholly without warrant in statute,
precedent, or any known legal principle," Fried remarked, "and yet the majority of this court has upheld it. As
such, the opinion the court delivers today is a remarkable example of judicial
lawmaking. It greatly expands the
courts' equity jurisdiction with respect
to the welfare of children and adopts
the hitherto unrecognized principle of
de facto parenthood as a sole basis for
ordering visitation. Even while expanding judicial authority and making
an addition to the common law, the
court speaks as though its decision were
nothing extraordinary. In light of the
denigration of parental rights and the
judicial infringement on the province of
the Legislature effected by the court's
decision, all without an acknowledgment of the novelty of that decision, I
must respectfully dissent." Fried was
particularly critical of the court's mentioning of the contract that two women
had made, guaranteeing E.N.O. continued parental status in the case of a
split-up, since such agreements have
traditionally been held to be unenforceable. In a footnote, the court rejected
Fried's criticism, saying it was not enforcing that contract but rather treating
it as evidence of the women's intentions
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in creating their family unit. * * * The
court's decision was foreshadowed by
its ruling in Youmans v. Ramos, 711
N.E.2d 165 (Mass. June 22, 1999), in
which it upheld continued visitation
rights for a child's maternal aunt
against the wishes of the child's father,
based on the broad equitable powers of
the probate court. The issue of samesex co-parent rights to visitation or custody after a couple splits up has sharply
divided the appellate courts of the
states, but support for the view embraced in this case by the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court is growing. * *
* Fried came closer to getting his way
in the second decision, Connors v. City
of Boston. (According to a note to the
decision, Fried participated in the deliberations, but had resigned from the
court by the time the opinion was finalized.) The mayor and city council of
Boston were poised to extend benefits
eligibility to domestic partners of city
employees, but doubts were raised
about their ability to do so without specific state legislative authorization.
State legislative leaders also had some
doubts about the propriety of doing
this, and an advisory opinion from the
court eventuated in 1998, Opinions of
the Justices, 427 Mass. 1211, in which
six members of the court concluded
that the legislature could delegate to
the city of Boston the authority to define domestic partnership for the purpose of extending such benefits. The
legislature passed a bill for this purpose, but Governor Paul Celluci, a Republican, vetoed the bill, voicing his
concerning that including unmarried
opposite-sex couples as domestic partners, as the city planned to do, would
undermine the state's interest in promoting marriage. * * * With the city
council stymied from acting, Mayor
Menino went ahead on his own, issuing
an executive order extending the benefits. A group of taxpayers, led by plaintiff Dennis Connors, then filed suit,
claiming that the mayor and city lacked
authority to extend such benefits. A

541

superior court judge agreed with the
plaintiffs, and issued an order to stop
the law from going into effect. The case
was certified to the Supreme Judicial
Court to consider whether the mayor's
executive order is inconsistent with
state law and thus a violation of the
city's home rule powers. * * * In agreeing with the plaintiffs, the court
adopted a rather strict reading of the
statutory language, concluding, in an
opinion by Justice Margaret Marshall,
that the legislature had indeed intended
to authorize local governments to extend benefits eligibility only to the legal
spouses and dependent children of municipal employees, and that this was the
exclusive source of authority for cities
to provide benefits to anyone other
than their own employees. * * * The
opinion is given over largely to the arcana of local government legislative authority. However, towards the end of
the opinion, Justice Marshall notes that
the benefits legislation was enacted at a
time when family structures were quite
different from the present, leaving the
suggestion that the legislature should
revisit this issue. "When the Legislature enacted G.L. c. 32B in 1955, c. 760,
it defined the term '[d]ependents' in a
manner consistent with the then-prevalent view of persons for whom the beneficiary (the employee) likely had an
obligation to provide support, and who
reasonably could be viewed as relying
on the beneficiary for support. . . We
recognize that the category of covered
dependents of city employees, as defined by the Legislature in 1955 and
1960, no longer fully reflects all household members for whom city employees
are likely to have continuing obligations to provide support. A 'family'
may no longer be constituted simply of
a wage-earning father, his dependent
wife, and the couple's children. We
also recognize that the categories of
household members who may rely on a
wage earner for support have broadened over time ... * * * "Adjustments
in the legislation to reflect these new
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social and economic realities must
come from the Legislature, whether it
does so by expanding the statutory definition of 'dependent' or by authorizing
governmental units to define for themselves the term 'dependent.' Our decision is mandated only because, in the
context of group health insurance provided by governmental units for their
employees, the Legislature has defined
precisely the scope of the term dependent to exclude all but spouses, unmarried children under nineteen years of
age, and older children in limited circumstances... Had the mayor sought
to extend group health insurance benefits to other categories of household
member beyond those defined by the
Legislature, our conclusion would be
the same. We recognize that some
household members of some of Boston's employees may be without a critical social necessity, health insurance.
That is a reality that must be addressed
by the Legislature." * * * Ultimately,
the decision has greater reach than the
city of Boston, since four other municipalities in the state have previously extended eligibility for benefits to
domestic partners of their employees,
and the validity of whose programs is
now thrown into doubt by this decision.
Since no appeal is possible, an attempt
to work out an agreement between the
governor and the legislature over an
appropriate legislative resolution is
next on the agenda for proponents of
domestic partnership coverage. * * *
The city's defense of its benefits program was carried on by David Mills and
Assistant Attorney General Robert L.
Quinan, Jr., with amicus support from
Jennifer Levi and Mary L. Bonauto of
Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders on behalf of a group of lesbian and
gay city employees whose benefits were
affected by the outcome. In _E.N.O.,
the plaintiff was represented by E. Oliver of Boston and Mary Bonauto of
GLAD; while Elaine M. Epstein and
Gary Owen Todd represented the defendant and Bettina Borders repre-
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sented the child's interests. A.S.L.
[E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 429
Mass. 824 (Mass. 1999).]
TEXAS APPEALS COURT RULES
A MAN CAN NEVER BECOME A
WOMAN; REJECTS WRONGFUL
DEATH ACTION BY TRANSSEXUAL WIDOW: A three-judge panel of
the Texas Court of Appeals, sitting in
San Antonio, has rejected a claim by a
male-to-female transsexual that she has
standing to sue for the wrongful death
of her husband. Littleton v. Prange,
1999 WL 972986 (Oct. 27). In an opinion cruelly dismissive of the rights of
transgendered persons to be able to
function in the gender they experience
as genuine, Chief Justice Phil
Hardberger stated, "There are some
things we cannot will into being. They
just are." * * * The ruling affirmed a decision by Bexar County District Judge
Frank Montalvo to grant summary
judgment to Dr. Mark Prange, who accompanied his motion with a copy of
the original birth certificate of the
plaintiff, Mrs. Christie Lee Littleton,
who was born Lee Cavazos, Jr., in 1952.
Ms. Littleton began to experience her
reality as female in early childhood, and
by the time she was 17 was searching
for a doctor to perform sex reassignment surgery for her. She enrolled in a
program at the University of Texas
Health Science Center that culminated
in her sex reassignment procedure, legally changing her name in 1977 to
Christie Lee Cavazos, and undergoing
surgical procedures between November
1979 and February 1980. Doctors involved in her treatment offered affidavit testimony that she was a "true
transsexual" whose gender dysphoria
could only be resolved by living as a
woman. * * * In 1989, Christie married
Jonathon Mark Littleton in Kentucky.
Jonathon was fully aware of her background. The marriage lasted seven
years until Jonathon's death, allegedly
due to the negligence of Dr. Prange.
Christie brought an action under the
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Texas Wrongful Death Act, which authorizes a surviving spouse to seek
compensation for the injury caused by
the death of their spouse. Dr. Prange
opposed the case by arguing that because Christie was born as a man, she
could not be legally married to
Jonathon and thus was not a surviving
spouse qualified to bring a wrongful
death action. * * * In his opinion for
the majority of the panel, Justice
Hardberger reviewed the history of litigation over the status of transsexuals in
England and the U.S., and concluded
that, apart from a 1976 New Jersey decision, _M.T. v. J.T._, 355 A.2d 204
(1976), there was no support in U.S.
law for the proposition that a post-operative transsexual has legally accomplished a change of sex. Hardberger
also emphasized the strong opposition
in Texas to same-sex marriage, noting a
recently-enacted statute specifically rejecting any recognition of same-sex
marriages, and also cited the federal
Defense of Marriage Act, which purports to relieve the states of any constitutional obligation to recognize samesex marriages performed in other jurisdictions (although, curiously,
Hardberger did no more than mention
DOMA, avoiding any real analysis of
its application to this case or possible
constitutional flaws). * * * Expressing
aversion to letting a Texas jury try to
determine as a matter of fact whether
Christie is a man or a woman,
Hardberger insisted that the issue could
be decided on summary judgment as a
matter of law based on uncontested
facts. This seems strange, since Christie's sex is a highly contested fact in the
case. But for Hardberger, genetics is
destiny, unalterably so. Based on the
facts submitted by the parties,
Hardberger concluded that Christie is a
transsexual, and that through surgery
"a transsexual male can be made to
look like a woman, including female
genitalia and breasts," but that the internal organs remain male and the male
chromosomes are not changed by the
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surgery or other treatment. "Biologically, a post-operative female transsexual is still a male." Concluded
Hardberger, "Some physicians would
consider Christie a female; other physicians would consider her still a male.
Her female anatomy, however, is all
man-made. The body that Christie inhabits is a male body in all aspects
other than what the physicians have
supplied." * * * Hardberger refused to
accord any significance to the fact that
Christie had applied for and received a
court order "correcting" her birth certificate to show her female name and
gender, finding that her original birth
certificate was correct when it was issued. "The trial court that granted the
petition to amend the birth certificate
necessarily construed the term 'inaccurate' to relate to the present, and having been presented with the
uncontroverted affidavit of an expert
stating that Christie is a female, the trial
court deemed this satisfactory to prove
an inaccuracy. However, the trial
court's role in considering the petition
was a ministerial one. It involved no
fact-finding or consideration of the
deeper public policy concerns
presented... The facts contained in the
original birth certificate were true and
accurate, and the words contained in
the amended certificate are not binding
on this court." * * * Concluded
Hardberger, "We hold, as a matter of
law, that Christie Littleton is a male.
As a male, Christie cannot be married
to another male. Her marriage to
Jonathon was invalid, and she cannot
bring a cause of action as his surviving
spouse." * * * In a brief concurrence,
Justice Karen Angelini premised her
vote on the lack of legislative guidelines
for dealing with transsexuals. * * * Dissenting, Justice Alma L. Lopez argued
that Christie's original birth certificate
was no longer a valid document upon
which the court could premise any factual conclusion. Lopez insisted that
Christie had introduced sufficient "controverting evidence that indicated she
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was female" to create a contested issue
of material fact, thus precluding a summary judgment. According to Lopez,
the absence of any controlling law in
the jurisdiction argued in favor of holding a real trial, and not granting summary judgment and attempting to rule
on difficult factual questions as a matter
of law. "Under the rules of civil procedure," she wrote, "a document that has
been replaced by an amended document is considered a nullity... Under
this authority, an amended instrument
changes the original and is substituted
for the original. Although a birth certificate is not a legal pleading, the document is an official state document....
In this case, Christie's amended birth
certificate replaced her original birth
certificate. . . . As a result, summary
judgment was issued based on a nullified document. How then can the majority conclude that Christie is a male?
If Christie's evidence that she was female was satisfactory enough for the
trial court to issue an order to amend
her original birth certificate to change
both her name and her gender, why is it
not satisfactory enough to raise a genuine question of material fact on a motion for summary judgment." * ** The
opinions are perhaps most notable for
their complete avoidance of discussing
the precise issue that was really before
the court: how to construe the wrongful
death act in order to effectuate its purpose of compensating a surviving
spouse for the loss of her life partner?
In this case, what should really matter is
Christie's gender as she lived her life,
and not her genetic sex. Christie lived
as Jonathon's wife, with the legal sanction of the state of Kentucky, for seven
years. As such, she was exactly the sort
of person intended to be allowed a
cause of action for the loss of a spouse.
There are many state court decisions
around the country acknowledging surviving spouse-type claims on behalf of
persons who, it was determined, were
in marriages that were legally defective,
but the defects of the marriages were
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held in many instances not to overcome
the strong policy reasons for allowing
the claim. The court's failure to entertain any sort of sophisticated distinction
between sex and gender role produced
a decision that seems inconsistent with
purposes of the wrongful death statute.
A.S.L.[Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d
223 (Tex. App., San Antonio, 1999).]
December 1999: SOUTH AFRICA
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT RECOGNIZES SAME-SEX COUPLES
FOR IMMIGRATION PURPOSES:
In an unanimous ruling issued Dec. 2 in
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian
Equality v. Minister of Home Affairs,
Case CCT 10/99, the Constitutional
Court of South Africa decided that the
country's immigration law had to be
changed in order to recognize same-sex
couples as having essentially the same
immigration rights as legal spouses.
The ruling was based on provisions of
the South African constitution that ban
sexual orientation and marital status
discrimination (section 9) and that
guarantee human dignity to all residents of the country (section 10). * * *
In an opinion for the Court, Justice
Laurie Ackermann relied heavily on
precedents from Canada, the United
Kingdom, and New York in determining that same-sex couples could form
families that were entitled to equal
treatment under the law. Ackermann
prominently cited the decision by the
New York Court of Appeals in Braschi
v. Stahl Associates Company, 74
N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544
N.Y.S.2d 784 (N.Y. 1989), a tenants
rights case, as an example of judicial
recognition of same-sex couples as families. * * * The case was brought by the
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian
Equality, six non-South Africans who
are partners with South Africans, their
six partners, and the Commission for
Gender Equality. The National Coalition had actually been successful at first
in getting "waivers" of the normal immigration rules for several gay appli-
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cants, but as the number of requests for
such applications increased, the Ministry of Home Affairs determined that it
was not plausible any longer to treat
same-sex couples as presenting "special
circumstances," the ground under
which the immigration law gives the
Ministry authority to waive normal requirements, and refused to process any
more or to renew the one-year waivers
it had issued, thus leading to this lawsuit. * * * Justice Ackermann's summary of his holding says it all, quite
concisely: "Section 25(5) of the Aliens
Control Act 96 of 1991, by omitting to
confer on persons, who are partners in
permanent same-sex life partnerships,
the benefits it extends to spouses, unfairly discriminates, on the grounds of
their sexual orientation and marital status, against partners in such same-sex
partnerships who are permanently and
lawfully resident in the Republic [of
South Africa]. Such unfair discrimination limits the equality rights of such
partners guaranteed to them by section
9 of the Constitution and their right to
dignity under section 10. This limitation is not reasonable or justifiable in
an open and democratic society based
on human dignity, equality and freedom and accordingly does not satisfy
the requirements of section 36(1) of the
Constitution. This omission in section
25(5) of the Act is therefore inconsistent with the Constitution. * * * "It
would not be an appropriate remedy to
declare the whole of section 25(5) invalid. Instead, it would be appropriate to
read in, after the word 'spouse' in the
section, the words 'or partner, in a permanent same-sex life partnership.' The
reading in of these words comes into effect from the making of the order in
this judgment." * * * This summary follows a lengthy discussion of how the legal status of families has been evolving
in South Africa and abroad, quoting extensively from Canadian Supreme
Court decisions in particular, and an
analysis that rejects the government's
contention that immigration rights
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should be limited to legal spouses as a
way of "protecting" the family. * * *
Perhaps most interesting is Ackermann's treatment of the issue of procreation as it relates to family
recognition. The government, as governments elsewhere have done, had argued that limiting family recognition to
opposite-sex couples was justified by
the connection between marriage, procreation, and the raising of children.
After observing that "nothing prevents
a gay or a lesbian couple, one of whom
has so adopted a child, from treating
such child in all ways, other than strictly
legally, as their child," Ackermann
stated: * * * "From a legal and constitutional point of view procreative potential is not a defining characteristic of
conjugal relationships. Such a view
would be deeply demeaning to couples
(whether married or not) who, for
whatever reason, are incapable of
procreating when they commence such
relationship or become so at any time
thereafter. It is likewise demeaning to
couples who commence such a relationship at an age when they no longer
have the desire for sexual relations. It
is demeaning to adoptive parents to
suggest that their family is any less a
family and any less entitled to respect
and concern than a family with procreated children. I would even hold it to
be demeaning of a couple who voluntarily decide not to have children or sexual relations with one another; this
being a decision entirely within their
protected sphere of freedom and privacy." * * * As to the argument that
same-sex partners are so distinguishable from opposite-sex spouses that no
equality violation arises from their differential treatment, Ackermann concluded that same-sex partners "are
capable of constituting a family,
whether nuclear or extended, and of establishing, enjoying and benefitting
from family life which is not distinguishable in any significant respect
from that of heterosexual spouses." * *
* Ackermann's opinion is significant
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not only for finding that the immigration law unconstitutionally discriminates on grounds of sexual orientation
and marital status, but also for breaking
new ground in South African constitutional law by adopting the process of
"reading in" to cure a constitutional defect. This is not a process used by U.S.
courts, but it has been repeatedly used
by the Supreme Court of Canada in its
decisions dealing with gay rights issues,
most notably in "reading in" a ban on
sexual orientation discrimination as
part of the Canadian Charter of Rights.
As is customary in countries that are
part of the English Commonwealth, the
South African court freely cites and relies on decisions by the highest courts
of other Commonwealth nations, including Canada. * * * Ackermann
pointed out that when a statute is found
unconstitutional, the court has an option to strike it down in its entirety, or,
if the unconstitutional feature is severable from the rest, to strike that feature
down and preserve the rest. Why not,
he asked, also include in the court's remedial arsenal the possibility of revising the faulty provision so as to cure its
constitutional defect? The lower court
had refrained from doing this, shying
away from performing a legislative
function, at least in part because of the
difficulty of deciding upon the precise
language to describe those couples that
would be entitled to immigration recognition. But Ackermann was not
daunted by the problem, writing that it
was enough to read in a recognition for
permanent same-sex partnerships, accompanied by a judicial explanation of
the factors to be considered in determining whether any particular partnership qualified. If this left ambiguities,
the legislature could surely follow along
with a more detailed definition, so long
as it did not impose limitations or conditions that offended the constitutional
equality requirement. * * * Although a
decision by the South African Constitutional Court has no legal effect in the
U.S., the stirring language of Ack-
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ermann's ruling, especially in its discussion of how refusal to accord
recognition to same-sex families in the
context of immigration undermines the
human dignity of gay people, will undoubtedly contribute to the growing
consensus in the international human
rights community that same-sex partners are entitled to the same treatment
as spouses for an increasing range of
benefits and rights. As the U.S. participates as a treaty partner with countries
that have adopted more advanced
views of gay rights, there may come a
time when such developments prove influential with American legislatures
and courts. At least one can hope...
A.S.L.
January 2000: VERMONT SUPREME
COURT RULES SAME-SEX COUPLES ENTITLED TO EQUAL
TREATMENT; MANDATES LEGISLATIVE CHANGE WITHOUT SET
TIMETABLE: In a unanimous ruling,
the Vermont Supreme Court has ordered the state legislature to extend to
same-sex couples the benefits and protections that are currently offered exclusively to married heterosexual
Vermonters. Baker v. State of Vermont,
1999 WL 1211709 (Dec. 20). The
landmark victory is a fitting culmination to a decade that has seen a drastic
surge in public debate and political activity concerning the legal status of
same-sex relationships - in local, state
and national arenas and in all three
branches of government. It perhaps
also alleviates some of the disappointment stemming from the Hawaii Supreme Court's order, issued eleven
days before the Vermont decision,
which dismissed the only other pending
same-sex marriage case in the country.
* * * Vermont's five Supreme Court
justices concluded that since the state's
marriage statute implicitly permits only
opposite-gender couples to marry, it violates the "Common Benefits Clause"
of Vermont's constitution: "That government is, or ought to be, instituted
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for the common benefit, protection and
security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man,
family, or set of persons who are a part
only of that community." (Ch. 1, Art.
7) The court's decision was not based
on federal law or the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Federal Constitution, and therefore cannot be appealed to the United
States Supreme Court. * * * "The legal
benefits and protections flowing from a
marriage license are of such significance that any statutory exclusion must
necessarily be grounded on public concerns of sufficient weight, cogency, and
authority that the justice of the deprivation cannot seriously be questioned,"
announced Chief Justice Jeffrey Amestoy in the majority opinion adopted by
three of the justices. The court professed little difficulty ruling that in the
case of same-sex couples, not only did
the arguments advanced by the State
fail to overcome this burden of proof,
but they also undermined Vermont's
existing public policy concerning family
relations. * * * For example, the State
argued that denying marriage benefits
to same-sex couples was justified in order to "further the link between procreation and child rearing," and to
promote a permanent commitment between couples for the security of their
children. Yet Vermont already permits
same-sex couples to adopt and rear
children who are born through assistedreproductive techniques. Vermont was
also one of the first states to permit
same-sex second-parent adoptions. In
light of these laws, and recent studies
cited by the court which showed that a
growing number of children are being
born to and raised by same-sex couples,
the Chief Justice concluded that "if anything, the exclusion of same sex
couples from the legal protections incident to marriage exposes their children
to the precise risks that the State argues
marriage laws are designed to secure
against." * * * The court also noted
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that many of the benefits of marriage,
including intestacy rights, standing to
commence wrongful death or loss of
consortium actions, evidentiary privilege for marital communications, homestead rights, spousal support, and
hospital visitation rights, are not dependent on whether a couple has children.
As the majority opinion noted, these
collective benefits, protections, and obligations are indicative of the fact that
marriage is premised on more than the
desire to raise a family: "The extension
of the Common Benefits Clause to acknowledge plaintiffs as Vermonters
who seek nothing more, nothing less,
than legal protection and security for
their avowed commitment to an intimate and lasting human relationship is
simply, when all is said and done, a recognition of our common humanity." * *
* Notwithstanding the court's unanimous conclusion that the state's marriage statute is unconstitutional, the
court did not direct Vermont to immediately begin issuing marriage licenses
to same-sex couples. Instead, four out
of five of the justices chose to leave the
ultimate decision to the legislature, who
must now determine how to effectuate
the court's ruling requiring substantive
equality among heterosexual and homosexual couples. According to the
court, the legislature could forego legalizing same-sex marriage as long as
same-sex couples are offered the same
benefits as married couples. Chief Justice Amestoy justified the court's limited remedy by contending that "a
sudden change in the marriage laws or
the statutory benefits traditionally incidental to marriage may have disruptive
and unforeseen consequences." Early
reports in the New York Times and the
Boston Globe indicated that Vermont
Governor Howard Dean (D) favors
creating a domestic partnership system
in lieu of same-sex marriage; Dean expressed discomfort with the concept of
same-sex marriage, and suggested that
his discomfort was widely shared. * * *
Justice Denise Johnson dissented from

548

N.Y.L. ScH. Jr. HUM.

the "novel" and "truncated" remedy
fashioned by the court, accusing the
majority of hypocrisy. "Within a few
pages of rejecting the State's doomsday
speculations as a basis for upholding
the constitutionality of discriminatory
classification, the majority relies upon
those very same speculations to deny
plaintiffs the relief to which they are
entitled as a result of the discrimination," she argued. Justice Johnson
would enjoin the state from denying
marriage licenses to same- sex couples.
* * * The plaintiffs are represented by
Beth Robinson and Susan M. Murray
of Langrock, Sperry & Wool, a Middlebury, Vermont, law firm, and Mary
Bonauto of Gay & Lesbian Advocates
& Defenders, a Boston-based public interest law firm. Amicus briefs were
filed by more than fifteen organizations, including Lambda Legal Defense
and Education Fund, Vermont Coalition for Lesbian and Gay Rights and PFLAG. [This part of the article was
written by Ian Chesir-Teran.]
Additional notes by Arthur S. Leonard:
The Vermont Supreme Court's decision
in Baker appears to be the first by a
court of last resort in any jurisdiction to
hold on the merits that same-sex
couples are entitled to the same rights
and benefits as married opposite-sex
couples, although decisions by Hungary's Constitutional Court to allow
same-sex couples to be treated the
same as common-law spouses and recent decisions by the highest courts in
South Africa, Canada, and Britain have
come close to this point. In South Africa, the Constitutional Court ruled that
the nation's constitutional commitment
against discrimination on grounds of
sexual orientation required the immigration laws to be changed so as to accord equality between committed samesex couples and married opposite-sex
couples; the Law Committee of the
House of Lords, Britain's highest appeals court, recently ruled that a samesex couple should be treated as family
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members for purposes of tenant regulations; and the Canadian Supreme Court
ruled last summer that same-sex
couples should be treated as equivalent
to married couples under an Ontario
law on spousal support obligations. * *
* In his opinion for the Vermont court,
Chief Justice Amestoy speculated that
the legislature might look to the legislative domestic partnership schemes
adopted in the Scandinavian countries,
or to the original, broadly-conceived
domestic partnership proposal
presented to the Hawaii Senate during
its deliberations over responses to the
Baehr ruling, as models for compliance,
while noting that those schemes fell
short of full equality. Indeed, it is hard
to know how the Vermont legislature
could meet the court's mandate of providing full equality through a domestic
partnership statute, without providing
expressly that same-sex couples who
qualify and register must be treated
precisely the same as opposite-sex
couples for every benefit, right, and obligation of state law. Even then, of
course, full equality would not have
been achieved, since only conferral of
the right to marry itself would likely
have extra-territorial consequences.
There is no direct precedent, for example, for opining on whether a neighboring state would recognize a Vermont
registered partnership if, for example,
the couple were traveling out-of-state
and encountered some situation in
which their marital status would be crucial. Even married same-sexers would
be likely to confront obstacles to recognition of their relationships, not least
the 1996 federal Defense of Marriage
Act and some 29 state-analogue statutes, but at least as lawfully married
couples they would have clear legal
standing to challenge those obstacles.
Consequently, a strong argument might
be made that only by conferring the
right to marry would the Vermont legislature clearly meet the equality mandate set down by the court. * * * The
Vermont Supreme Court retained juris-
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diction of the case, and Amestoy's
opinion suggested that should the legislature opt for a domestic partnership
scheme, or should the legislature fail to
act in a timely fashion, the court stood
ready to hear arguments that it should
mandate the right to marry as a remedy. As to the likelihood that this will
result in a delay sufficient to produce a
constitutional amendment overruling
the decision, Vermont's constitution is
not nearly so easy to amend as Hawaii's. A proposed amendment would
have to be approved by two successive
legislatures with a legislative election
intervening before it could be placed on
the ballot, so the earliest such an
amendment could be presented to the
people for ratification would be many
years in the future. Amestoy's opinion
said that the current statute could remain in effect "for a reasonable period
of time" to give the legislature a chance
to act. One speculates that a "reasonable period" would not go beyond the
electoral life of one legislature. * * *
There is another point of interest surrounding the decision, although it is a
point mainly of concern to devotees of
constitutional theory. In his opinion for
the court, Chief Justice Amestoy departed from past Vermont precedents,
in which the court had closely followed
the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme
Coffrt under the Equal Protection requirements of the 14th and 5th Amendments. Beginning in the 1930's, the
Supreme Court constructed a methodology based on different levels of judicial review depending upon the
characteristics upon which discrimination was based and the significance of
the rights as to which discrimination
was alleged. In the three-tiered structure that emerged, discrimination involving "suspect classifications," such
as race, or concerning "fundamental
rights," such as the right to vote, was reviewed under a "strict scrutiny" standard that was usually fatal to the
challenged statute or rule, placing the
burden on the government to show a
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compelling interest that could only be
achieved by following the challenged
policy. Discrimination involving nonsuspect classifications or interests that
were not seen as fundamental received
deferential "rational basis" review,
under which the challenged statute or
rule would survive if the court could hypothesize any plausible rationalization
for it. An intermediate standard appeared to be applied in cases involving
sex discrimination, where the court
held that "heightened scrutiny" was appropriate and the government had to
come up with a convincing justification
of the need to classify people based on
their sex to achieve an important purpose. * * * Some members of the Supreme Court have questioned the logic
of this three-tiered approach, arguing
that all discriminatory treatment should
be subject to careful review under the
Equal Protection requirement, and in
recent years the Court has seemed to
develop a more flexible approach, particularly in considering discrimination
based on classifications that have not
been determined by the Court to be
suspect, such as sexual orientation in
Romer v. Evans (1996). In his opinion,
after observing that state supreme
courts are not bound to follow U.S. Supreme Court methodology in construing their state constitutions, Amestoy
contended that the Vermont court had
departed in the past from strict adherence to the three-tiered approach, and
that in Vermont all equal protection
challenges should be evaluated by a
flexible, fact-based analysis that takes
into account the weight of interests affected on both sides of the issue. * * *
Amestoy's analysis persuaded two of
his colleagues, but produced concurring
opinions following different paths by
Justices John Dooley and Denise Johnson. Justice Dooley expressed grave
concerns about Amestoy's approach,
suggesting that the departure from precedent might undermine the perceived
legitimacy of the court's conclusion
(with which he heartily agreed). For
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Dooley, the case could be dealt with
straightforwardly by finding that sexual
orientation is a suspect classification for
purposes of the Vermont Common
Benefits clause, and that the state's articulated justifications for reserving
marriage for opposite-sex couples fail
to withstand strict scrutiny. * * * Justice Johnson's opinion was both a concurrence and a dissent, but she
concurred only with the majority's conclusion on the merits, not with its methodology. She preferred to follow the
lead taken by the Hawaii Supreme
Court, which had determined that so
long as a person's sex was used by the
state as a basis to grant or deny marriage rights, the marriage law was imposing a sex classification, and that sex
classifications are "suspect" for purposes of equal protection analysis.
From there, her analysis was similar to
Justice Dooley's, finding that the state's
rationale for its policy failed the strict
scrutiny review. Johnson departed
from Dooley and Amestoy in finding
that the only remedy would be to order
the state to let same-sex couples have
marriage licenses on the same basis as
opposite-sex couples. In defending its
existing policy, the state had argued
that one justification was to avoid the
disruption and uproar that granting
same-sex marriages might cause; Amestoy had dismissed this as a rationale in
his ruling on the merits, but had then
invoked the same argument in his ruling on the remedy - thus, Johnson's
denunciation of the majority for hypocrisy on this point. * * * No matter how
this eventually turns out, lesbians, gay
men and bisexuals should long remember the names of the five Vermont Justices who unanimously agreed in their
historic ruling of December 20, 1999,
that same-sex couples should be entitled to all the rights and benefits that
are routinely accorded to opposite-sex
couples in our society through the legal
status of marriage. They hereby join
the Lesbian and Gay Legal Rights Hall
of Fame. (Is any Lesbian and Gay
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Community Center ready to establish
such an institution?) They are: Jeffrey
L. Amestoy, Chief Justice, and Associate Justices Denise R. Johnson, John A.
Dooley, James L. Morse, and Marilyn
S. Skoglund. A.S.L. [Baker v. State of
Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).]
March 2000: CALIFORNIA APPEALS COURT DISALLOWS SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION: In
a case of first impression, a California
appellate court has ruled that prosecutors cannot exercise peremptory challenges to excuse lesbians and gay men
from criminal jury pools solely because
of the prospective juror's sexual orientation. People v. Garcia, 92 Cal. Rptr.
2d 339, 2000 WL 116213 (4th Dist., Div.
3, Jan 31), order denying rehearing and
correcting opinion, 2000 WL 199682
(Feb. 22). The panel of three judges
concluded unanimously that criminal
defendants have the constitutional
right to have cases tried before an impartial jury that "represents a cross-section of the community," including
lesbians and gay men. The court based
its holding on the Sixth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of the California Constitution. * * * Cano Garcia was
charged with what the court labeled "a
garden variety" burglary. During "jdry
selection, it became known that two
members of the jury panel were lesbians. Defense counsel challenged the
prosecutor's decision to exercise peremptory challenges to excuse both jurors, arguing that the prosecutor had
engaged in unlawful group bias. Orange County Superior Court Judge Corey Cramin denied the defendant's
motion, finding that "sexual preference
is not a cognizable group. . . I don't
think that your sexual preference specifically relates to them sharing a common perspective or common social or
psychological outlook on human
events." The California Court of Appeal disagreed. * * * Writing for the

2000]

CHRONICLING A MOVEMENT

court, Judge Bedsworth traced the history of two distinct constitutional limitations on the use of peremptory
challenges. The first and more wellknown of the two, which prohibits individuals from being excused from both
criminal and civil juries on the basis of
race and gender, is based on the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S.
127 (1994). Regrettably, the panel
balked at the opportunity to extend
these cases to sexual orientation discrimination. Bedsworth explained almost apologetically that classifications
based on race and gender require
heightened judicial scrutiny in Equal
Protection cases, whereas classifications
based on sexual orientation do not, "so
it has not yet been established whether
such [heightened] scrutiny is a sine qua
non of Batson error or merely a common characteristic." The panel chose
not to decide the issue one way or another. * * * Instead, the appellate court
fashioned a truncated remedy that applies only in criminal cases, based on
the Supreme Court's 1975 decision in
_Taylor v. Louisiana-, 419 U.S. 522.
The Taylor court held for the first time
that by excluding women from a criminal jury venire, prosecutors had violated a defendant's implicit Sixth
Amendment right to be tried by a "representative cross-section" of the community. In 1978, the California
Supreme Court adopted the holding in
Taylor and, on state constitutional
grounds, broadened the scope of prohibited group bias to include "race,
ethnicity, gender or 'similar' group
bias." The court here ruled that sexual
orientation discrimination during criminal jury selections flouts the Sixth
Amendment and California's constitution. * * * Garcia first had to demonstrate to the court that lesbians and gay
men "share a common perspective arising from their life experience in the
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group." The panel found little difficulty
concluding that this test had been satisfied. Using bold if not controversial language, Judge Bedwworth explained that
lesbians and gay men "share a history
of persecution comparable to that
blacks and women share. . .It cannot
seriously be argued in this era of 'don't
ask, don't tell' that homosexuals do not
have a common perspective." * * *
The Attorney General challenged the
defendant's position that lesbians and
gay men constitute a legally cognizable
group: "What common perspective is,
or was, shared by Representative Jim
Kolbe (R-Ariz.), RuPaul, poet William
Alexander Percy, Truman Capote, and
Ellen DeGeneres?" The court dismissed this rhetorical question, noting
that "they share the common perspective of having spent their lives in a sexual minority, either exposed to or
fearful of persecution and discrimination." The Attorney General's argument also proved too much, Bedsworth
noted, since the same diversity is found
among African Americans and women,
yet jurors cannot be excluded on the
basis of race and gender. * * * The
court also agreed with Garcia's counsel
that no other members of the community are capable of adequately representing the perspective of lesbians and
gay men. "We cannot think of anyone
who shares the perspective of the homosexual community," Bedsworth
wrote. "Outside of racial and religious
minorities, we can think of no group
which has suffered such pernicious and
sustained hostility, and such immediate
and severe opprobrium as homosexuals." * * * Since the record on appeal
did not indicate explicitly why the prosecution had excused the two lesbian jurors, the panel remanded the case and
directed the trial court to hold a hearing on the issue. Whatever the outcome of that hearing, criminal defense
attorneys may now have a new basis to
help ensure that lesbian, gay and
straight defendants alike are judged by
a jury that more fully reflects their com-
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munity.
Mr. Garcia was represented
by Michael Satris. [People of California
v. Garcia, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339, 77 Cal.
App. 4th 1269 (4th Dist., Div. 3, 2000).
This article was written by Ian ChesirTeran.]
March 2000: WASHINGTON STATE
APPEALS COURT REVERSES
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AWARDING INTESTATE MAN'S ESTATE
TO HIS SAME-SEX DOMESTIC
PARTNER: In an opinion by Judge
Bridgewater, the Washington Court of
Appeals reversed the award of summary judgment to plaintiff Frank Vasquez, who claimed that he was entitled
to inherit the whole of the estate of
Robert Awrey Schwerzler, a gay man
who was his domestic partner and who
died intestate. Vasquez v. Hawthorne,
2000 WL 146805 (Wash. App. Div. 2,
Feb. 11). * * * Vasquez and Schwerzler
lived together for approximately 16
years, and according to Vasquez were
life partners. When Schwerzler died, he
left an estate that included the house
they both lived in, a life insurance policy, two cars and a checking account.
Vasquez filed a claim against the estate,
arguing that he and the deceased had
been life partners in a "meretricious relationship", and therefore he was entitled under Washington precedents to a
share of the community property.
Hawthorne, the appointed personal
representative of the intestate's estate,
denied Vasquez's claim on the ground
that, as a matter of law, a same-sex relationship cannot be "meretricious." The
trial court agreed with Vasquez and
awarded almost the entire estate in a
partial summary judgment. The Appeals Court disagreed with the trial
court's ruling. * * * According to
Judge Bridgewater, under Washington's
common law a "meretricious relationship" is defined as "a stable, maritallike relationship where both parties cohabit with knowledge that a lawful marriage between them does not exist."
Determination of whether any particu-
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lar relationship is meretricious is to be
made by the court on a case-by-case basis. The Washington Supreme Court has
ruled that courts may apply community
property laws by analogy to a lawful
marriage in order to determine ownership at the end of a meretricious relationship, on a just and equitable basis.
In re Marriage of Lindsey, 101 Wash.
2d 299, 678 P. 2d 328 (1984). Since meretricious relationships are not legally
the same as marriage, Washington
courts limit the distribution of property
to whatever would have been characterized as community property had the
parties been legally married. * * *
Bridgewater refused to extend the protections of the common law to include
same-sex partners. He found that Vasquez' and Schwerzler's relationship was
not quasi-marital or sufficiently similar
to a marriage to warrant treating it as a
marriage for purposes of dividing the
property, because two people of the
same sex cannot legally marry. Furthermore, he stated that "we find no precedent for applying the marital concepts,
either rights or protections, to same-sex
relationships; all of the reported cases
concerning meretricious relationships
have been between men and women,
and community property law clearly applies only to opposite-sex relationships." In a footnote, he stated that
Washington statute RCW 26.16.030 defines community property as property
acquired after marriage by either husband or wife or both. In finding no legal
basis to extend the rights and protections of marriage to same-sex relationships, he noted that it was up to the
legislature to do that, and Vasquez
might still have a chance to prevail in
court by basing his claim on the existence of a constructive trust and implied partnership. * * * Vasquez is
represented by Terry James Barnett of
Tacoma, and the estate is represented
by Ross Edwin Taylor, also of Tacoma.
[Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 994 P.2d 240
(Wash. Ct. App., Div. 2, 2000). This article was written by Elaine Chapnik.]
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April 2000: TRANSGENDER
BREAKTHROUGH: 9TH CIRCUIT
PANEL FINDS PROTECTION
UNDER FEDERAL LAW: In a littlenoted case with great potential significance, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit has found that
federal sex discrimination laws should
be interpreted to ban discrimination or
bias-motivated violence based on gender identity. Ruling on an interlocutory
appeal of a denial of summary judgment in Schwenk v. Hartford, 2000 WL
224349 (Feb. 29), the panel held that
Douglas "Crystal" Schwenk is entitled
to pursue her 8th Amendment claim
under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 against Washington state prison guard Robert Mitchell, although qualified immunity bars
her suit under the Gender-Motivated
Violence Act of 1994 due to the unprecedented nature of the court's holding
under that statute. * * * Schwenk, who
self-identifies as female and grooms
and dresses accordingly, was incarcerated in an all-male state prison in Walla
Walla, Washington, subject to the authority of guard Robert Mitchell beginning in September 1994. According to
Schwenk's complaint, Mitchell is an aggressive sexual harasser who repeatedly
importuned Schwenk for sexual favors,
including oral sex, which she repeatedly
rebuffed, culminating in an attempted
anal -rape in her cell accompanied by
threats to transfer her into a situation
where she would be more vulnerable to
sexual attack by other prisoners.
Schwenk presented evidence of severe
emotional distress resulting from
Mitchell's actions. She sued under 42
U.S.C. sec. 1983, alleging cruel and unusual punishment and naming as defendants various prison officials in addition
to Mitchell. After she was assigned
counsel, her complaint was amended to
add a count under the Gender-Motivated Violence Act (GMVA), a provision of the 1994 Violence Against
Women Act that specifically outlaws
gender-motivated violence. * * *
Mitchell moved for summary judgment
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after discovery, claiming qualified immunity under both legal theories. (The
other defendants were dismissed from
the case by the district court prior to
discovery.) He claimed there was no
established federal constitutional or
statutory protection for transsexuals,
and thus as a public employee he enjoyed qualified immunity against all of
Schwenk's claims. District Judge Robert H. Whaley (E.D.Wash.) rejected
Mitchell's arguments and denied the
motion for summary judgment, and
Mitchell took an interlocutory appeal, a
procedural device that is available in
qualified immunity cases. * * * Writing
for a panel that included Judges Betty
B. Fletcher and Sidney R. Thomas, Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhardt found the
qualified immunity argument to be
without merit on the 8th Amendment
claim, but reversed as to the GMVA
claim. * * * Reinhardt cited a 1992 Supreme Court decision, Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, for the proposition
that "when prison officials maliciously
and sadistically use force to cause harm
contemporary standards of decency are
always violated." Further, in 1994, the
Supreme Court ruled in Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, a case involving
a transgendered prison inmate: "Being
violently assaulted in prison is simply
not 'part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against
society.'" In Farmer, the claim was that
prison officials exhibited deliberate indifference to the danger in which they
placed the inmate in light of the likelihood that she would be subjected to
sexual assault by fellow prisoners.
Reinhardt found plenty of support in
lower federal court cases extending
these Supreme Court precedents to find
that where "guards themselves are responsible for the rape and sexual abuse
of inmates, qualified immunity offers
no shield." Concluded Reinhardt, "To
the extent that Mitchell argues that the
law is clearly established that a prison
guard may be liable for allowing someone else to sexually assault an inmate,
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but not for an assault that he himself
commits, his position, both legally and
as a matter of common sense, is absurd.
In light of pre-existing Eighth Amendment law, a reasonable prison guard
simply could not have believed that he
could with impunity enter the cell of a
prisoner (transsexual or otherwise), unzip his pants, expose himself, demand
oral sex, and then, after being refused,
grab the prisoner, push her up against
the bars of the cell, and grind his naked
penis into her buttocks." * * * Reinhardt rejected Mitchell's contention
that Schwenk's description of the incident could be characterized as mere
same-sex harassment not amounting to
a constitutional violation. Observing
that "the point of qualified immunity is
to allow officials to take action 'with independence and without fear of consequences,"' Reinhardt contended that
"there is, however, no societal interest
in allowing prison guards to rape (or attempt to rape) inmates 'with independence' or 'without fear of consequences.'" * * * Turning to the
GMVA claim, Reinhardt faced Mitchell's argument that because the GMVA
was enacted as a provision within the
Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA), which is currently being reviewed for constitutionality by the Supreme Court after having been
declared unconstitutional by the 4th
Circuit in Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University,
169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
granted, 120 S.Ct. It (1999), he should
be entitled to qualified immunity on
several grounds: that VAWA only prevents violence against women, and not
same-sex violence involving men; that
there is no existing case law from which
a reasonable person would conclude
that his actions had violated the
GMVA, and that because of the 4th
Circuit's ruling on constitutionality and
the consequent uncertain validity of the
statute, public officials should be held
qualifiedly immune from any charges
under the statute. * * * On the first ar-
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gument, Reinhardt found that both the
language and the legislative history of
the GMVA clearly refuted Mitchell's
contentions. The statute by its terms
protects all people, not just women,
from gender-motivated violence, and
the legislative history even includes an
explicit reference by a sponsor of the
bill to same-sex prison rape as a type of
violence that would be covered by the
GMVA. The more difficult problem for
Schwenk in this case is the lack of prior
case law specifically construing the
GMVA to extend to violence against
transsexuals motivated by their gender
identity as opposed to their anatomical
sex. Here is where Reinhardt's opinion
definitely breaks new ground. * * *
Mitchell argued that an attack due to
Schwenk's transsexuality is not motivated by gender, pointing to numerous
cases rejecting claims of sex discrimination by transsexuals under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including a
prior 9th Circuit opinion. Reinhardt
found in the legislative history an assertion that "Congress intended proof of
gender motivation under the GMVA to
proceed in the same way that proof of
discrimination on the basis of sex or
race is shown under Title VII," but that
the cases Mitchell cites all predated the
crucial Supreme Court decision in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228
(1989). In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court accepted as a sex discrimination claim the contention that
discrimination against somebody for
failing to comply with stereotypical
views of gender role is, in fact, discrimination on the basis of sex. While the
pre-Price Waterhouse federal cases had
sharply distinguished between sex and
gender, Reinhardt found those cases to
have been "overruled by the logic and
language of Price Waterhouse." Under
Price Waterhouse, according to Reinhardt, "'sex' under Title VII encompasses both sex - that is, the biological
differences between men and women and gender. Discrimination because
one fails to act in the way expected of a
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man or woman is forbidden under Title
VII. Accordingly, the argument that the
GMVA parallels Title VII and applies
only to sex is in part right and in part
wrong. The GMVA does parallel Title
VII. However, both statutes prohibit
discrimination based on gender as well
as sex. Indeed, for purposes of these
two acts, the terms 'sex' and 'gender'
have become interchangeable." * * * In
this case, Reinhardt found that
Schwenk's allegations in her complaint
and in testimony offered in opposition
to the motion for summary judgment
"tends to show that Mitchell's actions
were motivated, at least in part, by
Schwenk's gender - in this case, by her
assumption of a feminine rather than a
typically masculine appearance or demeanor. Accordingly, we conclude that
Schwenk's assertion that the attack occurred because of gender easily survives summary judgment." The court
also found, based on the Supreme
Court's approach in other sex discrimination cases, that the GMVA's requirement that gender-based animus be
alleged was also met in this case, finding that "animus, for purposes of the
GMVA, is not necessarily overt hostility; it may in some instances even involve expressed or believed affection."
But in this case, where the allegations
include attempted rape, gender-based
animus could be presumed. * * * The
problem for Schwenk, however, is that
Mitchell would enjoy qualified immunity from the GMVA claim unless the
law on this point was "clearly established" at the time of Mitchell's alleged
assault. Since this opinion is the first
expressly to embrace the proposition
that a sexual assault on a 'transsexual
would be covered by the GMVA, the
court concluded that Mitchell would be
entitled to immunity in this case. (But
the court rejected the proposition that
because the GMVA, and the VAWA
within which it is embedded, have not
yet been held constitutional by the' Supreme Court, they cannot be considered to be a source of clearly-
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established law. Indeed, the court went
so far as to say that prior judicial decisions are not necessary to a determination of "clearly established law" where
statutory language clearly applies. The
problem was that it was not clear from
the face of the statute that violence motivated by the victim's gender identity
would be construed as gender-motivated violence, without the additional
analysis flowing from Hopkins and applying it to overrule the past transgender cases under Title VII.)
Consequently, the court reversed the
district court's denial of summary judgment on the GMVA claim. * * * The
potential significance of this decision
under the GMVA (and by express extension, Title VII), is enormous, but on
the other hand its precedential value
might prove short-lived. If Mitchell petitions for rehearing en banc, this ruling
by a notably liberal panel of the 9th
Circuit might fall at the circuit level,
and if Mitchell attempts to take the
case to the Supreme Court, its ultimate
survival might be even more questionable. It is unlikely that Congress, when
considering the GMVA, contemplated
that the statute would be used to mean
that federal law outlaws anti-transgender violence, as such, and it is uncertain that the Supreme Court
plurality that produced the Hopkins decision contemplated that it would be
used as a basis to extend protection
against gender-identity discrimination
under Title VII. (Significantly, the author of that plurality opinion, Justice
William Brennan, is gone from the
Court.) On the other hand, in its recent
decision in Oncale v. Sundowner, the
Supreme Court held, per Justice Scalia,
that Title VII could be extended to
cover situations not contemplated by
Congress, such as same-sex harassment,
so long as the language and logic of the
statute itself extends to those situations.
So the lack of express consideration of
transgender issues by Congress would
not necessarily be dispositive of the
current interpretation of the GMVA
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(assuming it survives constitutional review) or Title VII. Predicting how this
might develop is a difficult task. * * *
But there is no doubt that, at least for
the moment, transgendered people are
protected within the 9th Circuit from
gender-motivated violence under the
GMVA and, arguably, from gender
identity discrimination under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This
puts them a major step ahead of the lesbian and gay rights movement, which
still faces an uphill vote to obtain
favorable congressional action on the
Employment Non-Discrimination Act
(ENDA). Transgender rights activists
have been pushing hard to have ENDA
extended to include gender identity.
ENDA congressional sponsors and
some of the gay rights lobbying groups
have been resisting the call, contending
that the addition of gender identity
would sink ENDA. It will be interesting to see how this debate plays out in
light of Schwenk v. Hartford. A.S.L.
[Schwenck v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187
(9th Cir. 2000).]
May 2000: VERMONT ENACTS
CIVIL UNION LAW FOR SAMESEX PARTNERS: By a vote of 79-68
on April 25, the Vermont House of
Representatives approved the version
of the Civil Union Bill, H.B. 847, that
had been approved the previous week
by the state Senate, 19-11, after some
minor amendments were made, and
Governor Howard Dean signed the
measure into law the next day, April 26.
The signing ceremony was held privately in Dean's office, amidst speculation that public unhappiness with the
new law may result in major changes in
the composition of Vermont's legislature in November, as well as imperiling
Dean's own re-election chances. * * *
The most significant change from the
bill that had previously passed the
House was to move up the effective
date for some parts of the bill (including the date on which couples can begin
to apply for civil union licenses) to July
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1, from the previously approved date of
September 1, and to add a religious exemption and stronger language affirming that marriage in Vermont is
reserved for opposite-sex couples. Provisions related to insurance and taxes
will not take effect until January 1,
2001, to give the state time to secure
the necessary coverage and to simplify
the implementation of the tax measures
by having them coincide with the calendar year, which is the tax year for most
individual taxpayers. * * * Significantly, the Senate had rejected proposals to limit eligibility for civil union
ceremonies to couples of whom at least
one was a Vermont resident, dismissing
the argument that allowing out-of-state
couples to become civilly united would
create conflicts with laws of other
states. The Senate had also rejected a
proposal to send the issue of civil unions to a referendum, or to submit a
constitutional amendment to voters
overturning the Vermont Supreme
Court's ruling in Baker v. State of Vermont,744 A.2d 864(Vt. Sup. Ct. 1999),
which was the catalyst for enactment of
the law. * * * With this enactment, Vermont becomes the first state to offer
anything comparable to the registered
partnerships that are available to samesex couples in the Scandinavian countries, sometimes mistakenly referred to
as same-sex marriage. Although the
states of California and Hawaii have
enacted legislation under which samesex couples can achieve a recognized
status through registration, and many
counties and municipalities have
adopted domestic partnership ordinances with registration features, only
the Vermont law attempts to provide
for registered couples all of the rights
and responsibilities that the state confers on married cotiples. As such, it
might provide a useful legislative model
for other jurisdictions that are hesitant
about opening up the institution of
marriage to same-sex couples but that
recognize the serious inequities suffered by same-sex couples who are de-
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prived of a similar legal status. * * *
Although the bill does not afford access
to marriage to same-sex couples, it provides virtually all of the rights and responsibilities of marriage under state
law. However, by avoiding labeling the
result marriage, the state has deprived
couples who are civilly united from being able to argue that other states are
required to recognize their status under
the settled principles of comity that
states follow in recognizing out-of-state
marriages, although there is nothing to
stop civilly-united couples from attempting to gain recognition of their
new status in other states by arguing
that comity should apply to this situation. Also, the state has avoided giving
such couples automatic standing to
challenge the federal Defense of Marriage Act, which provides that for purposes of federal law only opposite-sex
couple marriages will be recognized.
New York Times, April 26 & 27. * * *
In addition, because of federal employmient benefits law preemption, the state
could not order private employers to
treat civilly-united couples as spouses
for purposes of employment benefit
plans. However, there is no legal reason why Vermont employers cannot decide to do so voluntarily, or through
collective bargaining with unions representing their employees. * * * As soon
as the new law was signed, some local
town clerks (who will have the initial
role of processing applications for licenses) vowed civil disobedience, stating that they would not in good
conscience administer this program. It
is clear, based on votes at several dozen
town meetings in recent months, that
the Vermont legislature was well out in
front of the views. of many state residents in approving the bill, so the next
steps remain unclear. Boston Globe,
April 28. A.S.L.
Summer 2000: SUPREME COURT
RULES FOR BOY SCOUTS IN GAY
MEMBERSHIP DISPUTE: Ruling 54 in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,
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2000 WL 826941 (June 28), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the New Jersey
Supreme Court's application of the
state's public accommodation law to require the Boy Scouts of America
(BSA) to reinstate openly-gay Jim Dale
(described in the Court's opinion as an
"avowed homosexual and gay rights activist") as an adult member and scout
leader violates the BSA's First Amendment right of expressive association.
The majority opinion, by Chief Justice
William Rehnquist, apparently an
avowed heterosexual, asserted that requiring the reinstatement of Dale
would be improperly forcing the BSA
to articulate a message that homosexuality is acceptable for its members. In
dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the record supported no such
conclusion, and that the First Amendment was not even implicated in the
case. * * * Dale joined the Scouts as an
8-year old, working his way up through
the ranks to attain the distinction of an
Eagle Scout, the organization's highest
rank for a youth member. After turning 18, Dale applied to be an adult
member, and was assigned as assistant
scoutmaster to his New Jersey troop.
Meanwhile, Dale enrolled at Rutgers
University, finally accepted his sexual
orientation and joined the Lesbian/Gay
Alliance, becoming co-president in
1990. After a local newspaper printed
an article about Dale's participation in
a seminar on problems of gay teens and
identified him as co-president of the
gay alliance, Dale received a letter from
the local Scout council dismissing him
from the organization. Responding to
his follow-up inquiry, Monmouth
Council Executive James Kay told him
that the Scouts "specifically forbid
membership to homosexuals." In 1991,
New Jersey's gay rights law went into
effect. Dale filed a lawsuit, asserting
that he was being denied participation
by a place of public accommodation on
the basis of his sexual orientation. * * *
The state trial judge granted the Scouts'
motion for summary judgment, finding
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that the organization is not a place of
public accommodation under the statute and, alternatively, that the Scouts
are entitled to discriminate in membership based on a First Amendment right
of freedom of association. The Appellate Division of the Superior Court reversed, finding that the law applies to
the Scouts and rejecting the First
Amendment defense, although one
judge partially dissented, finding that
the organization should be entitled to
select its leaders without court interference. The New Jersey Supreme Court
unanimously affirmed in 1999, and the
Scouts petitioned for certiorari, raising
the First Amendment defense as the
only federal issue in the case. * * *
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion,
which was joined by Justices Scalia,
Thomas, Kennedy and O'Connor,
rather extraordinarily held that the
Court must defer to the Scouts' determination of two factual issues vital to
the case: that the organization is engaged in an "expressive association"
that includes the expression of disapproval of homosexuality, and that compliance with New Jersey's public
accommodation law in Dale's case
would significantly burden that expressive association. The New Jersey Supreme Court had unanimously ruled
against the Scouts on both points, finding that the BSA's publicly articulated
policies did not include any coherent
anti-gay message or purpose, and thus
that the organization's right of expressive association would not be burdened
by the court's order to reinstate Mr.
Dale as an assistant scoutmaster. * * *
On behalf of the Court, Rehnquist took
the view that so long as the BSA's position appeared to be genuinely held and
found some support in the record, it
would not be appropriate for the Court
to substitute its own finding as to what
the organization's expressive purpose
is. The BSA argued that part of its expressive function is to signal to its members that homosexuality is unacceptable, and that although none of the or-
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ganization's publications mention homosexuality, this message could be
derived from the Scout Oath's injunction to be "morally straight" and the
Scout law's command to be "clean in
word and deed." Further, the BSA advanced a "role model" theory, arguing
that having an openly-gay scoutmaster
would present a role model to Boy
Scout troop members contradictory to
the desired message. * * * Further,
Rehnquist accepted the BSA's argument that accepting Dale, an openlygay person who was the co-president of
a gay student organization, as a scoutmaster would significantly burden the
organization's expressive association,
embracing without any real analysis or
explanation the "contradictory role
model" theory. * * * Finally, without
any substantive discussion of the state's
justification for burdening expressive
association, Rehnquist conclusorily
stated that any interests New Jersey
sought to advance through its enactment and application of the public accommodations law were outweighed by
the significant burden on BSA's expressive association. * * * Writing for himself and Justices David Souter, Ruth
Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer,
Justice John Paul Stevens argued that
the Court had adopted an "astounding
view of the law" when it held that the
BSA was entitled to judicial deference
on the issue of defining its expressive
association and determining the degree
of burden placed upon it by the state.
Stevens argued that this approach
would severely undermine the application of public accommodation laws by
giving a free pass to potential sham expressive associational claims. In this
case, he pointed out, at the time Dale
was dismissed, the BSA had not publicly articulated any position with respect to homosexuality, and had never
sought to instruct its members as to any
view of this issue. The sole documentation of BSA policy prior to 1991 was an
internal memorandum sent in 1978 by
the top scout official to the members of
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the executive board, and, as Stevens
noted, even that document indicated an
understanding that if states began to
outlaw sexual orientation discrimination, the organization would have to adjust its employment policies
accordingly. * * * Stevens found that
the documentary record totally supported the New Jersey Supreme Court's
conclusion that far from being a central
or unified part of the BSA's expressive
purposes, homosexuality was an invisible issue in the organization, as to
which all overt expression seems to
have been carefully avoided. Under
the circumstances, it was hard to conclude that the BSA's expressive association would be burdened in any way by
having an openly gay man serve as a
scoutmaster. * * * Stevens was particularly critical of the majority's implicit
embrace of the idea that an openly-gay
person is a virtual political billboard,
whose message could be found to be
forced on anyone required to associate
with him. "The only apparent explanation for the majority's holding, then, is
that homosexuals are simply so different from the rest of society that their
presence alone - unlike any other individual's - should be singled out for
special First Amendment treatment.
Under the majority's reasoning, an
openly gay male is irreversibly affixed
with the label 'homosexual.' That label,
even though unseen, communicates a
message that permits his exclusion
wherever he goes. His openness is the
sole and sufficient justification for his
ostracism. Though unintended, reliance on such a justification is tantamount to a constitutionally prescribed
symbol of inferiority." Stevens described as "mind-boggling" the idea
that an organization could be considered to endorse every political position
taken by any of its members, pointing
out that the Scouts' million-plus adult
members must have a wide variety of
views on controversial social issues. * *
* Stevens concluded his dissent with a
summary of societal change in attitudes
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towards homosexuality, which is very
pleasant to read but whose relevance to
the legal analysis is unclear. Indeed,
this last section prompted Justice Souter to write a brief separate dissent,
joined by Justices Breyer and Ginsburg,
observing that societal attitudes, while
interesting, were not dispositive of the
issues before the Court, and that Souter
and his colleagues had joined the dissent because they agreed with Stevens
that the BSA failed to show that their
expressive association was being burden by the application of the public accommodations law. In his opinion for
the Court, Rehnquist acknowledged
that social attitudes towards homosexuality have moved towards greater acceptance and toleration, but contended
that First Amendment values are all the
more importantly implicated to protect
those who seek to express their disagreement with societal trends. * * *
Dale was represented in the case by
Lambda Legal Defense Fund, whose
Senior Staff Attorney Evan Wolfson argued the case at all levels of the litigation. Lambda's cooperating attorney
co-counsel in the case was Allyson W.
Haynes of Cleary Gottlieb Steen &
Hamilton. A wide range of organizations joined together to file sixteen amicus briefs in support of Dale's case
(including the Girl Scouts of America
and the 4-H Clubs, the nation's other
leading youth organizations, while opponents had filed 21 amicus briefs in
support of the Boy Scouts. * * * The
long term significance of this case is unclear. Although the Court upheld the
BSA's First Amendment claims, Rehnquist's opinion strained to distinguish
this case from the growing body of
cases rejecting such claims by other
membership organizations, and emphasized Dale's own activism in justifying
the contention that his present as an assistant scoutmaster would force an unwanted message on the organization.
Stevens noted that this is the first case
in which the Court has upheld a constitutional defense by a membership or-
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ganization against the application of a
public accommodations statute or ordinance. On the other hand, the Court's
articulation of a "deference" policy in
reviewing the factual assertions of the
BSA, if followed indiscriminately by
lower courts, could seriously undermine
the enforcement of anti-discrimination
laws in a wide range of circumstances.
And the case does perpetuate the notion of gay people as walking billboards
whose very presence sends messages,
giving rise to potential First Amendment claims by who knows how many
discrimination law defendants. * * *
Media reaction to the opinion was divided, but many media outlets editorialized that even if the decision was
correct, the Court had carefully avoided
expressing any support for the BSA's
discriminatory policy, and many argued
that having won their legal point, the
BSA should now revisit the matter and
abandon its policy. * * * The BSA's
policy has had one ironic impact: Boy
Scout Troop 73 in Matawan, N.J., the
troop for which Dale was briefly assistant scoutmaster, is no more. Why? A
shortage of adult leaders is one of the
reasons given for the decision to disband the troop. (See J. Gold, "Troop is
gone, but Scouts cheer court ruling,"
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel (Associated Press Story), July 2.) It sounds
very much like the BSA policy is cutting off the organization's nose to spite
its face. A.S.L. [Boy Scouts of America
v. Dale, 120 S.Ct. 2446 (2000) .]
September 2000: NINTH CIRCUIT
AWARDS ASYLUM TO GAY MEXICAN; FINDS SEXUALITY IMMUTABLE: Producing an opinion that
marks a historic breakthrough in U.S.
asylum law as it relates to gay people, a
unanimous panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 9th Circuit ruled on
Aug. 24 that a gay Mexican man with a
female sexual identity who was subjected to persecution in his home country should be granted asylum as a
refugee in the United States. Her-

nandez-Montiel
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v. Immigration and

Naturalization Service, 2000 WL
1199531. The opinion for the panel by
Circuit Judge A. Wallace Tashima held
(for the first time by a circuit court of
appeals) that sexual orientation is an
immutable characteristic, citing an extraordinary range of academic and theoretical writing for this proposition, and
also that sexual identity is an immutable characteristic, thus supporting the
conclusion that gay men with a female
sexual identity constitute a "particular
social group" within the meaning of
asylum law. * * * According to
Tashima's opinion, both the Immigration Judge (IJ) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) found
Hernandez-Montiel to be a credible
witness, and that he had been subjected
to persecution in the past (including being assaulted and raped by policemen
and seriously wounded by a ban of
young "macho" toughs after being expelled from his home by his family) and
would likely be persecuted in the future
if forced to return to Mexico. However, both the IJ and the BIA concluded that he was not a member of a
particular social group that was subjected to persecution as such, characterizing the group to which he belongs as
"homosexual males who wish to dress
as a woman," and finding that the desire to dress as a woman is not an "immutable characteristic." * * * The court
found that the IJ and the BIA had mischaracterized Hernandez-Montiel, concluding that having a female sexual
identity is an immutable characteristic
and is different from a mere preference
regarding how to dress. The court held
that a particular social group is "one
united by a voluntary association, including a former association, or by an
innate characteristic that is so fundamental to the identities or consciences
of its members that members either
cannot or should not be required to
change it." * * * Wrote Tashima, "Sexual orientation and sexual identity are
immutable; they are so fundamental to
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one's identity that a person should not
be required to abandon them. Many
social and behavioral scientists 'generally believe that sexual orientation is
set in place at an early age.' The American Psychological Association has condemned as unethical the attempted
'conversion' of gays and lesbians. Furt her, the American Psychiatric Association and the American Psychological
Association have removed 'homosexuality' from their lists of mental disorders. Sexual identity is inherent to
one's very identity as a person. Sexual
identity goes beyond sexual conduct
and manifests itself outwardly, often
through dress and appearance." (Removed from this series of sentences are
intervening citations of books and articles as documentation.) * * * Tashima
also noted that in 1990, the BIA had
ruled in the Toboso-Alfonso case (20 I
& N Dec. 819), that "sexual orientation
can be the basis for establishing a 'particular social group' for asylum purposes." The problem the BIA had in
this case was that the applicant's evidence did not show that gay men in
general were subjected to persecution
in Mexico; his evidence focused on the
experience of himself as a gay man with
a female sexual identity, a subgroup of
gay men, and the BIA found that subgroup to be defined by a dress preference, not by an immutable
characteristic. The court disagreed with
BIA, relying heavily on the expert testimony offered at the immigration hearing by San Diego State University
Professor Thomas M. Davies, Jr., an acknowledged expert on Latin American
history and culture. Davies vividly described the travails suffered by gay men
with female sexual identities in Latin
American society, and also provided
detailed testimony about the distinctive
sexual and social identity of this group,
which the court found persuasive in reviewing the hearing record. Wrote
Tashima, "Professor Davies did not testify that homosexual males are persecuted simply because they may dress as

561

females or because they engage in homosexual acts. Rather, gay men with female sexual identities are singled out
for persecution because they are perceived to assume the stereotypical 'female,' i.e., passive, role in gay
relationships. Gay men with female
sexual identities outwardly manifest
their identities through characteristics
traditionally associated with women,
such as feminine dress, long hair and
fingernails. Gay men with female sexual identities in Mexico are a 'small,
readily identifiable group.' Their female sexual identities unite this group
of gay men, and their sexual identities
are so. fundamental to their human
identities that they should not be required to change them. We therefore
conclude as a matter of law that the
'particular social group' in this case is
comprised of gay men with female sexual identities in Mexico." * * * Having
so concluded, the court found that the
hearing record fully supported Hernandez-Montiel's contention that he is
a member of this group, and that the
group is targeted for severe persecution
within Mexican society. "Professor Davies testified that gay men with female
sexual identities are recognized in Mexico as a distinct and readily identifiable
group and are persecuted for their
membership in that group. He testified
that the police attack and even rape
men with female sexual identities."
Tashima went on to discuss rape is a
method of persecution, and severely
criticized the BIA for its handling of
this aspect of the case, finding that the
BIA apparently sought to blame the
victim, having stated that HernandezMontiel's "mistreatment arose from his
conduct... thus the rape by the policemen, and the attack by a mob of gay
bashers are not necessarily persecution..." * * * It appears that the BIA
was referring to his manner of dress
and presentation as provocative misconduct, but Tashima found this to be
pretty outrageous, writing: "The 'you
asked for it' excuse for rape is offensive
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to this court and has been discounted
by courts and commentators alike."
Tashima concluded that HernandezMontiel had established past persecution, thus raising a presumption that he
would be persecuted in the future if returned to Mexico, and that the INS had
presented no evidence to rebut this presumption. Tashima was also scornful
about the BIA's characterization of
Hernandez-Montiel as dressing like a
"male prostitute," finding there was no
record testimony on this subject at all. *
* * Thus, the court concluded that Hernandez-Montiel is entitled to withholding of deportation and a grant of
asylum status, allowing him to remain
in the U.S., having concluded that the
BIA's decision "is fatally flawed as a
matter of law and is not supported by
substantial evidence." * * * In a comment that was widely quoted in the general press, Tashima wrote: " This case is
about sexual identity, not fashion. Geovanni is not simply a transvestite 'who
dresses in clothing of the opposite sex
for psychological reasons.' American
Heritage Dictionary 1289 (2d Coll. Ed.)
(1985). Rather, Geovanni manifests his
sexual orientation by adopting
gendered traits characteristically associated with women." * * * Judge Tashima
was appointed to the 9th Circuit by
President Clinton. The other members
of the panel were Melvin Brunetti, appointed by President Reagan, and District Judge William Schwarzer, sitting
by designation, appointed by President
Ford, so this was not some far-out, leftwing panel, but actually a cross-section
of ideological representation on the circuit. (Judge Brunetti, apparently uncomfortable with some of the wideranging dicta in Judge Tashima's opinion, concurred in the result with a separate opinion of one paragraph's length,
merely stating his agreement that Prof.
Davies' evidence "supports the legal
conclusion that in Mexico, gay men
who have female sexual identities constitute a particular social group for asylum purposes" and that the testimony
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by both Hernandez-Montiel and Davies
established the other elements necessary to support the asylum and withholding of deportation claims. * * *
Hernandez-Montiel is represented pro
bono by Robert S. Gerber of Sheppard,
Mullin, Richter & Hampton, a San Diego law firm, with amicus assistance
from Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund, the National Center for Lesbian Rights, and the ACLU Lesbian
and Gay Rights Project, as well as the
International Lesbian and Gay Human
Rights Commission. A.S.L.
September 2000: EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
FINDS PRIVACY RIGHT TO
GROUP SEX: On July 31, in A.D.T. v.
United Kingdom, Application No.
35765/97, a seven-judge Chamber of the
European Court of Human Rights held
that the conviction of a gay man for engaging in consensual, non-sado-masochistic, sexual activity (oral sex and
mutual masturbation) with four other
adult men in his own home violated Article 8 (right to respect for private life)
of the European Convention on
Human Rights. The applicant had
hosted a sex party in his home and
made a video of it, which police found
while searching his home with a warrant. He was convicted of "gross indecency" between men, contrary to sec.
13 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956
(England and Wales), and given a conditional discharge for two years. The
sexual activity would have been legal
under the Sexual Offences Act 1967
(England and Wales) but for sec.
1(2)(a): "An act which would otherwise
be treated ... as being done in private
shall not be so treated if done - (a)
when more than two persons take part
or are present..."* * * Relying on
obiter dicta in Laskey v. United Kingdom (1997) (which involved a video of
group sado-masochistic sexual activity
in a private home), the U.K. Government argued that the number of individuals present and the video recording
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took the sexual activity outside the
scope of "private life." The Court disagreed, finding no "likelihood of the
contents of the tapes being rendered
public." The Court also held that the
mere existence of the criminal legislation interfered with the applicant's right
to respect for his private life under Article 8(1). Thus, even in the absence of
a prosecution, he would have had
standing to challenge the law under the
Convention, as a group-sex enthusiast
fearing prosecution.* * * The U.K.
Government then argued under Article
8(2) that the interference was "necessary for the protection of morals or the
rights or freedoms of others." There
was a distinction between "intimate,
private and therefore acceptable homosexual activity (between two men), and
group, potentially public and therefore
unacceptable homosexual activity (between more than two men)"; "the possibility of [group] activities being
publicised is inevitable.., all the more
where the activities are video taped,"
the U.K. government argued. The
Court agreed that "at some point, sexual activities can be carried on in such a
manner that State interference may be
justified, either as not amounting to an
interference with the [Article 8(1)]
right. . ., or... for the protection of...
health or morals." But the applicant's
activities "were with a restricted number of friends in circumstances in which
it was most unlikely that others would
become aware of what was going on,"
and the prosecution was "for the activities themselves,... not for the recording, or for any risk of it entering the
public domain." The Court concluded
that, "[gliven . . . the absence of any
public health considerations and the
purely private nature of the behaviour
.. , the reasons submitted for the maintenance in force of legislation criminalising homosexual acts between men in
private ... are not sufficient to justify
the legislation and the prosecution." * *
* The Court declined to consider the
question of discrimination under Arti-
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cle 14, in that group sexual activity between women or between men and
women (as long as there are no sexual
acts between two men) is legal in England and Wales. This would have been
a far easier basis on which to decide the
case, and would have postponed the
question of an Article 8 right to engage
in group sexual activity. However, following its practice of avoiding Article
14 whenever possible, the Court boldly
continued down the road that U.S. Supreme Court Justice Byron White refused to take in Bowers v. Hardwick in
1986. Having already found an Article
8 right to private, consensual, adult sexual activity in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom in 1981, and excluded sadomasochistic sexual activity (causing injuries that are more than "trifling or
transient") in Laskey, the Court extended the right to group sexual activity, or at least to groups of three to five.
The Court reserved the right to draw a
line somewhere between five and U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Scalia's example
in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501
U.S. 560 (1991) ("60,000 fully consenting adults crowded into the
Hoosierdome to display their genitals
to one another"). "Public health considerations" might be invoked in the
context of a sauna or backroom, let
alone a covered football stadium. * * *
The "exception to the privacy exception" in the U.K. legislation is now effectively unenforceable, although its
formal removal from the statute book
will not take place until at least a year
or two after the next elections (not expected before May 2001). The amendment required by the Convention will
probably be included in a comprehensive reform of sexual offences legislation recommended in the Home
Office's Sex Offences Review Team's
consultation paper, published on July
26 (http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/new.
htm, views sought by March 31, 2001).
Setting the Boundaries: Reforming the
law on sex offences recommends the repeal of several offences in the Sexual
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Offences Act 1956: buggery (sec. 12)
and gross indecency between men (sec.
13) (which appear under the heading
"Unnatural Offences"), as well as assault with intent to commit buggery
(sec. 16) and solicitation by men in a
public place for an immoral purpose
(sec. 32). The Review Team concluded
that the criminal law "should not treat
people differently on the basis of their
sexual orientation. Consensual sexual
activity between adults in private that
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causes no harm to themselves or others
should not be criminal." As for "inappropriate sexual behaviour in public
places, including public toilets," they
recommended "a new [sex and sexual
orientation neutral] public order offence to enable the law to deal with sexual behaviour that a person knew or
should have known was likely to cause
distress, alarm or offence to others in a
public place." [This article was written
by Robert Wintemute.]

